Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW2201
2007-05-11 15:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA AND A CFE "MORATORIUM"

Tags:  PREL KCFE OSCE PARM MARR NATO RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111535Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0165
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002201 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KCFE OSCE PARM MARR NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND A CFE "MORATORIUM"

REF: A. STATE 57275

B. MOSCOW 1932

C. DTRA-OSES DTG 271428Z APR 07

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002201

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KCFE OSCE PARM MARR NATO RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND A CFE "MORATORIUM"

REF: A. STATE 57275

B. MOSCOW 1932

C. DTRA-OSES DTG 271428Z APR 07

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak reviewed
with the Ambassador Putin's April 26 call for a moratorium on
Russia's compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty and his insistence that all NATO Allies ratify
the Adapted Treaty without linkage to the 1999 Istanbul
commitments. For now Russia will comply with the terms of
the treaty, including inspections and data exchanges. The
GOR would look to upcoming meetings in Brussels for Allies to
show flexibility in addressing long-standing Russian concerns
and then make a permanent decision regarding a moratorium.
Putin's gambit surprised the MOD and MFA bureaucracies, whose
officials believe this position plays well domestically and
will be difficult to walk back. Kislyak called for a
"creative approach" on the Istanbul commitments, especially
Moldova -- well aware that the Moldovans are offering to let
the Russians stay in return for progress on the Transnistria
conflict. One option of a creative approach could involve
internationalization of the PKF under an OSCE umbrella. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
MORATORIUM SOON BUT NOT QUITE YET
--------------


2. (C) Putin's April 26 remarks to the Federal Assembly on a
possible CFE moratorium touched off a round of mixed signals.
The MFA told us that the moratorium would not go into effect
until the issue had been discussed at the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC). However, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov
told the media May 3 that the moratorium was already in
effect. General Buzhinskiy of the International Treaties
Department in the Ministry of Defense (MOD) made similar
remarks to visitors last week.


3. (C) DFM Kislyak outlined to the Ambassador May 4 the
GOR's likely next steps. Kislyak said Putin was serious

about what he viewed as an outmoded treaty that imposed
unilateral restrictions on Russia. Kislyak pointed to US
agreements with Bulgaria and Romania on military facilities
as an additional factor. He said Moscow would wait to see
whether the US and Europeans take into account Russian
concerns in the next month. Western reactions at the May 10
NATO-Russia Chiefs Of Defense meeting and the May 23 NRC
meeting would be a factor in Russia's decision on whether to
suspend compliance with the treaty. If Russian concerns were
not taken seriously in the next month, Putin would issue a
document that would require the GOR to suspend compliance; no
formal presidential decree was required.


4. (C) The Ambassador urged the GOR to walk back the threat
of withdrawal from the CFE, noting the importance of the
treaty to European security and of Russia's Istanbul
commitments. Kislyak reprised Russia's rejection of any
linkage between the Istanbul commitments and NATO members'
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. Russia was moving
ahead with its force withdrawals from Georgia (Russia
accelerated its withdrawal in response to last September's
tensions with Georgia over the arrest of four Russian
military personnel). On withdrawal of troops and munitions
from Moldova, Kislyak called for a more creative approach
that distinguished between Russian peacekeepers in
Transnistria and those forces guarding the Colbasna weapons
depot. (As we and others have reported, the Moldovan draft
for a package agreement between Moldova and Russia -- which
Moldovan negotiators have been pressing vigorously --
explicitly calls for Russian troops to remain in
Transnistria. Kislyak in essence viewed this as an argument
to persuade us not to be more Moldovan than the Moldovans.)


--------------
MFA ON CFE
--------------


5. (C) Anton Mazur, the Foreign Ministry's chief CFE expert,
amplified Kislyak's views to us May 8. Russia would continue
to accept inspections and exchange data pending a final
decision on whether to impose a moratorium. Ratification by
all Allies including the Balts was Putin's bottom line.
Otherwise, the Ministry's Legal Department had determined
that the treaty's withdrawal provisions implicitly allowed

MOSCOW 00002201 002 OF 003


for "less significant" steps, including a moratorium or
suspension. For the moment, Mazur said, Russia was
considering only a moratorium. Putin's moratorium call was
not linked directly to concerns about deployment of a US
missile defense.


6. (C) Mazur reiterated that Russia had complied fully with
the Istanbul Commitments. Troop withdrawal from Georgia is
on track, with a full pull-out expected no later than the end
of 2008. Russian peacekeepers would remain. (The CIS
peacekeeping force itself has never been an Istanbul
Commitment issue, but the PKF's continued use of the base at
Gudauta -- to be closed under Istanbul -- is considered by
Georgia to be a violation.) Moldova was a more complicated
situation that would probably not be resolved until
Transnistria's status was settled, Mazur continued. In the
meantime, the treaty allowed for the stationing of six
battalions in Moldova; at the moment, the Operational Group
of Forces-Transnistria consisted of only two rotating
battalions (peacekeepers) and one security battalion
(guarding Soviet-era weapons facilities). In any case,
Russia had little confidence that the Allies would move
forward on ratifying the Adapted Treaty even if Moscow pulled
all of its forces out of Moldova and Georgia tomorrow.

-------------- -
DOMESTIC POLITICS COULD BE COMPLICATING FACTOR
-------------- -


7. (C) Respected defense analyst Aleksandr Golts told us
that Putin's statement on CFE was "absolutely political" and
had nothing to do with real military issues. Golts' military
contacts had been puzzled by the President's statement (MOD
contacts told us the same). Independent defense analyst
Pavel Felgengauer concurred that, in addition to concerns
over U.S. Missile Defense deployments, domestic politics was
a factor in the moratorium call. Felgengauer speculated that
Putin had made it at the instigation of hard-liners in the
Presidential Administration or First Deputy PM Sergey Ivanov.
The MFA was not happy with Putin's remarks because it would
now be hard for the GOR to reverse policy or to accept
anything less than full ratification of the Adapted Treaty by
all Allies, which was unlikely.

--------------
TOWARDS A U.S. RESPONSE
--------------


8. (C) The GOR might have painted itself into a corner on
CFE suspension, sparking a dispute that will excite European
concern at a time when Russia has sought to create divisions
in the Alliance. Our response needs to be one that will
maintain NATO unity -- recognizing that:

-- some of our European diplomatic colleagues here, notably
the Germans, have echoed de Hoop Scheffer's contention that
there is no Alliance consensus on whether Russian
peacekeepers in Transnistria are covered under the Istanbul
Commitments; and

-- the Moldovan draft agreement on relations with Russia,
with its provision for the Russians to remain, is close to
being in the public domain.

Rather than allow Russia to probe for fissures in the
Alliance, or for daylight between us and Moldova, we should
use this opportunity to consider all options that will
advance our objectives, recognizing that our course will not
be easy and will require careful examination.


9. (C) Moldova: The U.S. has held some discussions in
internationalizing the peacekeeping force in Transnistria.
One option is to move forward on this, proposing to the
Russians that we internationalize the peacekeeping force
under an OSCE mandate -- since such forces are exempt from
CFE limitations and therefore from the Istanbul Commitments.
We should recognize that a significant Russian component will
remain in the internationalized force -- a basic
Transnistrian as well as Russian demand -- but giving it an
OSCE umbrella would make the force transparent to the
international community and could, with an appropriate OSCE
mandate, provide the opportunity not only for troops from
other countries, such as Ukraine, but also for military
observers from a wide variety of countries, potentially
including the U.S. Giving the internationalized OSCE force
the mandate to monitor and guard the Colbasna facility would
facilitate the removal of Russia's 14th Army troops, which

MOSCOW 00002201 003 OF 003


all Allies agree are covered under the Istanbul Agreements.


10. (C) Georgia: The overall poor tone of Russian-Georgian
relations has made all dialogue problematic, but the issue of
Gudauta is not insoluble. Our understanding is that the
agreement between Georgia and Russia on closing Gudauta
outlined which parts of the former base were permissible for
PKF use. The extant Joint Fact-Finding Group, which
investigated the March 11 Kodori incident, could be a vehicle
for ensuring and certifying that PKF use of the base is
within the guidelines set down in the Georgian-Russian
agreement. Likewise, the Quadripartite Talks, which the
Russians have recently pushed to resume in the village of
Chuburkhinja with UNOMIG in the chair -- the other
participants are the Georgians, Abkhaz, and PKF -- could also
involve information exchanges which, under UN auspices, could
serve to reassure Allies that the Russians are fulfilling
their Istanbul commitments with regard to Gudauta.


11. (C) Putin's tough language on CFE was a typical
enunciation of non-negotiable demands followed by a call for
negotiations. The first part is a clear non-starter, since
no NATO Ally will be ready to cave in to a Russian ultimatum.
But by dismissing the rhetoric and turning to the call for
negotiations, we can advance our own agendas -- in areas such
as internationalizing the Transnistria PKF -- while providing
the Russians with a face-saving way of climbing down at no
cost to us.

BURNS