ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002128

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ETRD PHUM OSCE UNSC GG UP RS
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN
DFM KARASIN, APRIL 23

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and Russian DFM Grigoriy Karasin
focused on Georgia and Ukraine during an April 23 discussion
in Moscow lasting over an hour. Fried noted recent progress
from the Georgian side (the release of an Abkhaz official
arrested by the Georgians, toned-down rhetoric) and called
for reciprocal steps both from the Abkhaz (release of
arrested Georgian students, willingness or dialog without
preconditions) and Russians (end to border closures,
transport and import bans). Fried said it is time to work
towards a visit to New York by Abkhaz "FM" Shamba. Karasin
favored gradual Russian normalization with Georgia, but
focused on the "alternative" governments the Georgians have
set up in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as obstacles to
progress, and stressed repeatedly that the de facto Sukhumi
and Tskhinvali authorities are "internationally recognized"
as parties to the conflicts and participants in negotiations
to resolve them.


2. (C) On Ukraine, both Fried and Karasin reiterated the U.S.
and Russian positions of refusal to interfere. Both saw the
current crisis as an internal political issue that the
Ukrainians must resolve by themselves. Karasin said that
neither Yushchenko, nor Yanukovich, nor Moroz were interested
in violence, but slammed Tymoshenko as having a "relative"
interest in seeing the situation spiral out of control. End
Summary.

ABKHAZIA
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3. (C) Fried led off with the good news of the Georgian
release of "Abkhaz" Gali official Chakaberia. He said that
after his last conversation with Karasin, he had asked DAS
Matt Bryza to work with the Georgian authorities towards the
release, and the result had just come through. He hoped the
Abkhaz would respond by releasing the three Georgian
protestors they have been holding. Karasin said he would
telephone Abkhaz de facto leader Bagapsh with the news, and
asked about the second Gali official who was abducted and is
allegedly being held by the Georgians -- that would be the
first question Bagapsh would ask him.


4. (C) Fried raised the ongoing discussion about prospects
for a visit by Abkhaz "FM" Shamba to New York. Now that we
have UNSCR 1752, it would be useful to develop a way forward
on Abkhazia in which Shamba's participation in an informal
"Geneva-style" meeting in New York could play a part. Other
parts of the way forward could include parallel progress on
CBMs approved by the Friends in Geneva, such as improvements
in the situation of Georgians in Gali, Abkhaz-Georgian
business contacts, direct dialog between the Georgian
President Saakashvili and de facto Abkhaz leader Bagapsh, and
return of internally displaced persons. The point was that
Shamba's visit to New York should itself be a CBM, not for
"polemical purposes."


5. (C) Karasin asked whether the "Geneva-style" meeting meant
an "aria-style" meeting, and Fried clarified that it did not.
Karasin said that Shamba wanted to explain Abkhaz positions
to UNSC members. Fried reiterated that the visit should not
be for polemical purposes, but should contribute to progress.
Karasin continued that Shamba's inability to meet with UNSC
members in New York is eroding Abkhaz confidence in the UN.
Shamba might himself refuse to visit the UN. But such a
visit is important to us all, Karasin maintained: the Abkhaz
are an "internationally recognized party to the conflict,"
and has the right to express its point of view at the UN as a
sign of the attention of the international community to the
Abkhaz point of view. "The Abkhaz leaders are normal people."


6. (C) Fried responded that we are asking the Abkhaz to show
they are serious by reciprocating Georgian steps with their
own steps such as releasing their hostages or agreeing to a
Bagapsh-Saakashvili meeting. The U.S. does not have a hard
and fast list of conditions or demands. It would, however,
be good if the Abkhaz can help develop positive momentum
towards a settlement. Otherwise, the Shamba visit would just
be polemical, just the latest in many attempts by both sides
to gain "foolish advantage." "If it's important to you,"
Fried said, "let's work towards it together. "Message
received," Karasin replied.


7. (C) Karasin asked for the U.S. reaction to UNSCR 1752,
which renewed the mandate for UNOMIG. Fried said the U.S.
views it positively, especially the confirmation of CBMs
elaborated by the Friends in February. They are the basis

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for moving ahead with a positive dynamic. He said the
Georgians are responding. For example, there was no
propaganda campaign after the March 11 attack in Kodori.
Karasin said the Russian view of 1752 is equally positive.
From a Russian point of view, 1752 called for Georgian
restraint in Kodori and reaffirmed 1716. Karasin praised the
flexibility of the negotiators that led to a substantive
resolution, not a technical rollover.


8. (C) Karasin warned that Kodori is still tense, with
potential for new clashes. The Russian PKF is "decisive" but
the Russian military leadership fears new provocations from
Georgia and will take steps to counter them. The General
Staff has shared evidence with Karasin that the Georgians are
increasing the quality and quantity of their troops in
Kodori. Karasin had promised to speak to the U.S. about
that. He warned, "We should be precise: we won't let anyone
use force." He understood that the U.S., too, opposes the
use of force. Both Russia and the U.S. need to maintain that
position, he said.


9. (C) Karasin raised Georgia's refusal to sign an agreement
on the non-use of force. Fried pointed out that the draft
documents on the non-use of force are part of a package with
documents on IDP returns, and are recognized by 1752 as part
of the same package. Karasin said that the Georgians are
refusing to register their IDPs. Thus if we bind the two
documents together too literally we will wait a long time for
both. Fried replied that the Georgians have made repeated
unilateral statements denying the intention to use force.
They object to any agreement that confers greater legitimacy
on the Sukhumi authorities, or an analogous agreement with
Tskhinvali. Russia and the U.S. need to work together to

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fulfill 1752 by defining IDP return in such a way that both
it and an agreement on the non-use of force become achievable
goals. Russia has a list of things it wants accomplished,
such as the Shamba visit and an agreement on the non-use of
force. These are reasonable. Georgia has a list as well,
including IDP return. This, too, is reasonable. We need to
put these on a joint list of things to be accomplished.

SOUTH OSSETIA
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10. (C) Karasin mentioned that a Russian interagency
delegation had left that day for Tbilisi. It was headed by
DPM Bukayev, and would carry out a needs assessment for South
Ossetia, inviting Georgian government officials along.
(Note: Bukayev outraged Georgia last year by attending a
"joint" meeting of the North Ossetian government and
Tskhinvali authorities and calling for unification. End

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note.) Karasin said Russia wants its humanitarian assistance
to South Ossetia, while through its own channels, to be fully
transparent to Georgia and the OSCE.


11. (C) Karasin decried Georgian sponsorship of the Sanakoyev
"alternative regime" in Kurta. He said this act cancels out
any CBMs. It makes the situation unstable and dangerous.
Saakashvili has visited Kurta, and is financing Sanakoyev.
Russia has knowledge that Georgia has emplaced 150 special
forces personnel under police cover near Kurta. This
represents a danger. It will be even more dangerous if the
international community starts to deal with the Sanakoyev
structure, which is now supported by a new Georgian law. All
this makes Kokoity and others nervous. It would be much
better to focus on peaceful development, as Russia does, by
providing infrastructure, roads, hospitals and schools.


12. (C) Fried answered that the U.S. is aware of the new
checkpoints and the military outpost outside Kurta. We are
looking into it to determine whether this is a legitimate
police presence or a violation. He reminded Karasin that
Sanakoyev is neither more nor less legitimate than Kokoity.
Karasin cut in, saying Fried's assessment was "not polite."
There is an important difference between the two, in Russia's
view: Kokoity is an "internationally recognized party to the
conflict." Tskhinvali is an "internationally accepted member
of various structures."


13. (C) Fried replied that the U.S. urges Georgia to have
contact with Kokoity. But Fried would not advise the Russian
Federation to wrap its reputation around Kokoity, whose
regime produces counterfeit U.S. hundred dollar bills. EUR
DAS Bryza had encouraged the Georgians to focus their new law
on the structure of autonomy, not on persons. It was the
deprivation of autonomy that had led to the conflict in the
first place. Thus Russia should look upon the new law as a
useful element.


14. (C) Karasin repeated that this is "playing with fire."
Any act to strengthen Sanakoyev increases tensions in South

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Ossetia. The Georgians need to negotiate with Kokoity.
Karasin hoped the Joint Coordination Commission can move
forward. He promised to send Fried immediate news of the
results of the Russian delegation's trip to Tbilisi and
Tskhinvali.

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RUSSIA-GEORGIA
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15. (C) Fried said he hopes Russia will resume normal
relations with Georgia, ending the border closures, flight
bans, bans on the import of agricultural products, wine and
mineral water that Russia has imposed. It is an anomaly that
even the delegation Russia has sent to work with Georgia
cannot fly there directly. Karasin said that Russia has made
exceptions to the flight ban, for example at Easter. Fried
countered that the whole regime made no sense. Even as
Russia is trying to convince the Georgians to address its
concerns, it is engaging in such economic pressure.


16. (C) Karasin blamed Georgia for "publicly humiliating"
Russian officers in Tbilisi last September. The Russian
reaction to that was predictable; "We have our honor."
Russia needs signals from the Georgian side "of a positive
character" that could lead to gradual improvement in
relations, first in the humanitarian sphere, then through
direct talks on transport and aviation, and lastly "a gradual
return to normal." Karasin said he understands that
relations are "abnormal," but called for efforts from both
sides.


17. (C) Karasin said that if the U.S. wants good
Russian-Georgian relations, it should not "push" Georgia into
NATO. Russia-Georgia normalization cannot remain unaffected
by this. Fried said that the U.S. understands Russia does
not like this, but we will be predictable and transparent.
Over the next year there will be discussion in NATO over a
Membership Action Plan. If Georgia receives a MAP there will
be a period of years before further steps. Russia should
worry about more immediate concerns.


18. (C) Karasin claimed that the U.S. Ambassador had raised
with the Georgian government a potential Georgian role in
Missile Defense. Fried denied this, saying that this
question had been raised in Secretary Gates' meeting earlier
that day with DefMin Serdyukov, and U/S Edelman had given a
detailed reply. Any discussion of a Georgian role is
premature. There had been no such discussion, and no such
discussion will be possible in the near term. Edelman had
pointed out that we might be interested in collocation, but
that implied Azerbaijan rather than Georgia.


19. (C) Karasin raised the Georgian suit against Russia in
the European Court of Human Rights. He said this could raise
tensions. Fried replied that Georgia has stated that the
deportees exhausted all national remedies, and had no further
recourse to Russian courts. Georgia accuses Russia of
refusing to discuss the issue. Karasin said that the suit
would bring practical help to no one. He said that 7000
Russian Dukhobors (a religious sect) used to live in a few
villages in Georgia. 6000 have left, and those that remain
have no representation in their local executives. But Russia
is not going to court over this.


20. (C) Fried closed the discussion on Georgia by saying that
last autumn's anti-Georgian campaign and the sanctions are a
terrible anomaly. Russia should take a longer-term view: as
Georgia develops economically it will be less prone to
adventurism. Karasin replied that Russia is not
anti-Georgian; thousands of Georgians play leading roles in
Russian society. Fried responded that Russian-Georgian
relations should be seen as an organic process, with
development replacing confrontation.

UKRAINE
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21. (C) Fried laid out U.S. policy on Ukraine: there is an
"orange-blue" government, and it is up to Ukrainian
politicians alone to resolve the issues legitimately. The
U.S. is not expressing views on the constitutionality of
early elections: that is an internal matter, and it is up to
the Ukrainians to decide issues of their own constitution.
The U.S. has not rushed in to mediate, nor have we urged any
others to do so. Our Ambassador in Kyiv maintains contacts
with everyone. Karasin noted approvingly that our Ambassador
had recently met with Russian Ambassador Chernomyrdin, and
Fried reiterated that staying in touch is part of our policy.
The U.S. might reconsider its hands-off position if there
were a serious outbreak of violence, but now we consider the
problem to be a Ukrainian internal political issue.

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22. (C) Karasin pressed Fried for his personal views of the
constitutionality of Yushchenko's decree dissolving the Rada.
Fried said he has mixed feelings. If the result were a
stable, functioning government it might prove worth it. But
the Constitutional Court is weak, and we will never get a
clear decision from it. Fried reiterated that the U.S. is
not taking sides.


23. (C) Karasin said that Russian views are close to those of
the U.S. This is the next stage in the creation of a
democratic order, the creation of a new political culture
with a new pluralism. Russia, like the U.S., is not taking
sides and has contact with all parties. Putin recently spoke
by telephone with Yushchenko. FM Yatseniuk had just been in
Moscow and impressed Karasin as an open-minded, thoughtful
minister with no sympathies or antipathies. Yanukovich has
been acting "solidly," unlike two or three years ago.
Karasin maintained that neither Yushchenko, nor Yanukovich,
nor Moroz is interested in violence or allowing the situation
to spin out of control. Only Tymoshenko has a "relative"
interest in this: it provides a chance, and "she is not one
to let chances go by." In the unpredictable world of
Ukrainian politics, Yulia Tymoshenko could go into coalition
with anyone.


24. (C) Whatever the outcome, Karasin said, will be "fine
with us." He said there had been some attempt to "raise a
cry" about the Black Sea Fleet, but that is not serious. The
Ukrainians need a chance to get their house in order and
achieve an equilibrium based on a balance of interests. "We
are calm," he concluded. Fried said the U.S. is similarly
calm. The Ukrainians still do not know what they want to be.
Nor can we predict where they will end up. But we do know
that if we get into the act the results will be bad. During
the Orange revolution we were on the Orange side because the
election had clearly been stolen. After the Blues had
legitimized themselves through fair elections, we accepted a
Yanukovich visit to Washington. "In one respect," Fried
concluded, "you were right and we were wrong during the
Revolution: you told us the Oranges would be unable to
govern effectively. They couldn't."

COMMENT
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25. (C) Karasin's comments on Georgia highlight three vicious
circles:

-- Russian attempts to "legitimize" separatist governments
and Georgian attempts to create "alternative" governments
feed off one another and lead to an impasse.

-- Full IDP return to Abkhazia is anathema to the Abkhaz, who
even today make up a minority of the population of Abkhazia.
IDP return is linked in all peace plans to an agreement on
the non-use of force; as long as the Russian "peacekeepers"
maintains the preponderance of military power in Abkhazia
such an agreement implicitly gives Russia the arbitrary power
to decide when a violation has taken place and the
authorization to intervene. The net result is stagnation in
both fields.

-- The Russian search for "signals" from Georgia is a
combination of emotion -- Karasin called it "Russian honor"
-- and one substantive issue, Georgian NATO membership.
There is no practical way Georgia (or the U.S.) can satisfy
the Russians on either of these aspects; at best, with U.S.
help, Georgia can manage them.


26. (U) Assistant Secretary Fried has cleared this message.
BURNS