Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW1579
2007-04-09 14:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

EUR DAS KRAMER'S MOSCOW TALKS ON TRANSNISTRIA

Tags:  PREL PBTS MARR MD RS 
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VZCZCXRO8679
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #1579/01 0991442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091442Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9045
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MD RS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER'S MOSCOW TALKS ON TRANSNISTRIA


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MD RS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS KRAMER'S MOSCOW TALKS ON TRANSNISTRIA


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer held talks on
Transnistria/Moldova in Moscow April 6 at the MFA with DFM
Grigoriy Karasin, Ambassador-at-Large Valeriy Kenyaikin,
Ambassador-at-Large Valeriy Nesterushkin; at the Security
Council with Andrey Kuzin; and at the Duma with Andrey
Kokoshin. Kramer stressed to all interlocutors that the
Transnistria conflict is an area in which the U.S. and Russia
can cooperate to achieve a resumption of negotiations in the
5 plus 2 format on the basis of the Moldovan draft. He
called for international pressure on Transnistria to
negotiate in good faith. He said that internationalizing the
peacekeeping force would also help lead to U.S. ratification
of the adapted CFE Treaty. Kramer's Russian interlocutors
stressed the need for direct talks between Moldovan President
Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov as equal parties to
the negotiations. Only when those two came to an agreement
should the international community get involved. The
Russians considered Kosovo to be an inevitable precedent.
They were willing to think about internationalization of the
PKF, but only as a result of the peace process. End Summary.

MFA
---


2. (C) EUR DAS Kramer met on April 6 with Ambassador-at-Large
for the Transnistria conflict Nesterushkin and with
Kenyaikin, who supervises the Ambassadors-at-Large for all
the frozen conflicts. The meeting was later joined on the
Russian side by DFM Karasin and on the U.S. side by
Ambassador Burns.


3. (C) Kramer led off by recalling that Karasin had called
Transnistria a conflict that the U.S. and Russia can work
together to resolve, recognizing the interests of other
parties as well. The meetings in the 5 plus 2 and 3 plus 2
formats have not been productive. We need to revive the
process, using as a basis the plan that Moldovan negotiators
Sova and Tkaciuk have presented to the Russians, which has
Voronin's support. Working together, Russia and the U.S. can
induce the international community to pressure Transnistria,

whose leaders are satisfied with the status quo. Russia and
the U.S. can also work to internationalize the PKF; in
addition to its influence on the conflict, this (along with
withdrawal of munitions from Colbasna and agreement on the
Gudauta base in Georgia) could also lead to U.S. ratification
of the Adapted CFE Treaty.


4. (C) Kenyaikin started his reply by saying that the
treatment of Kosovo would be an inevitable precedent for
Transnistria and other frozen conflicts. Two elements of
Kosovo are applicable to the other conflicts. First, no one
gave the international community the right to violate the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia without the
latter's agreement. Second, a solution to the Kosovo
conflict can only be achieved through negotiation. Kenyaikin
clarified that Russia's recognition that Kosovo will be a
precedent does not mean that Russia favors a particular
result to the peace process.


5. (C) Kenyaikin stated that an agreement must be worked out
between the parties, on the basis that both are equal
negotiating partners; and then taken up in the 5 plus 2
process. The Moldovan view is opposite: that the two
parties are Moldova and the international community; that
these two must come to an agreement; and that the
international community must impose this agreement on
Transnistria. Russia does not share that approach. With
regard to the PKF, Kenyaikin said Russia is willing to
discuss internationalization, but as a result of political
agreement, not at the beginning of the process.
Internationalization first would not be acceptable to
Transnistria, which sees the Russian PKF as guarantor of the
peace.


6. (C) In reply, Kramer outlined the U.S. position on why
Kosovo is not a precedent. In the case of Transnistria, he
said, Kosovo is only the latest in a long line of excuses for
the lack of progress. Kramer said Voronin will not meet with
Smirnov, and the history of the negotiations makes that
attitude understandable. With regard to internationalizing
the PKF, obviously that needs to be part of and in parallel
with the peace process, not a separate decision.


7. (C) When Karasin joined the meeting, he repeated many of
Kenyaikin's positions. He stressed the need for a common
document which the two sides could agree would be the basis
for negotiations. Kramer responded that the Moldovan package

MOSCOW 00001579 002 OF 002


provided the basis for discussions. He also noted that the
Transnistrians seem to have no interest in moving forward.
Karasin agreed that this may have been the case two years
ago, but now the Transnistrians are very unhappy with the
status quo. There needs to be a dialogue between the
parties, and it is not clear who on the Moldovan side, below
the level of Voronin, has a clear mandate to engage in such
dialogue.

Security Council
--------------


8. (C) At the Security Council, Kramer made the same points,
and Kuzin's response was almost identical to the MFA's. He
noted that Russia has good relations with both the Moldovans
and the Transnistrians, and urged the U.S. to widen its
direct contacts with the Transnistrian de facto authorities.
He believed internationalizing the PKF should not be a first
step, but part of a long process of dialogue and CBMs.
Moscow does not dream of a permanent military presence, and
has never rejected the Istanbul commitments, burdensome as
they are. Economic CBMs should take precedence, including
"freeing Transnistria from the measures taken by Ukraine"
(i.e., the Customs regime).


9. (C) Kramer thanked Kuzin for raising the Istanbul
commitments, and repeated that internationalizing the PKF
could help lead to U.S. ratification of the Adapted CFE.
With regard to widening U.S. contacts, in recent days the
Transnistrian de facto authorities have barred U.S. diplomats
from Embassy Chisinau from entering Transnistria. Kramer
reiterated that the Transnistrians seem to have no interest
in progress to resolve the conflict. Internationalizing the
PKF would signal the international community's commitment not
to accept that the status quo is permanent.

Duma
--------------


10. (C) Kokoshin listened to Kramer's presentation and said
there was "some logic" in what Kramer had to say. He
promised to think about the issue and to be prepared to
discuss it further when Kramer returns to Russia.


11. (U) DAS Kramer has cleared this message.
BURNS