KPRF: PEOPLE POLITICS THE KEY TO SUCCESS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001396

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: KPRF: PEOPLE POLITICS THE KEY TO SUCCESS

REF: MOSCOW 1067

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1. (SBU) Summary: The Communist Party of Russia's (KPRF)
broad-based and somewhat unexpected success in the March 11
regional elections (reftel),despite a minuscule campaign
budget, is attributable to the survival of its party machine
and a socialist message that resonates with voters. Although
likely to be increasingly pressed by For A Just Russia (SR --
the Kremlin's left wing party) and to a lesser extent the
newly-populist Union of Right Forces (SPS),KPRF has become
more appealing to voters disillusioned with United Russia's
monopoly on power. The KPRF's popularity is especially
visible in cities, where United Russia's (YR) administrative
resources are less effective. Even if KPRF can capitalize on
growing dissatisfaction, it has no chance to de-throne United
Russia in the December Duma elections, but it may nibble at
SR's numbers. Although the KPRF improved its standing on
March 11, that is unlikely to do much for party Chairman
Gennadiy Zyuganov's third run at the presidency in 2008. End
summary.

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KPRF's March Success
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2. (SBU) Although estimates vary, it is clear that in the
March 11 regional elections, the KPRF enjoyed a noticeable
increase in support in almost all regions when compared to
the 2003 Duma elections. On March 11, KPRF averages
increased to 15 - 20 percent across the fourteen regions from
the 10 - 15 percent it received in 2003. (KPRF's better
numbers in March are partially explained by the traditionally
lower turnout for the regional elections. This is thought to
work to the advantage of the KPRF, which is believed to have
more disciplined voters.) A campaign budget of just 25.4
million RUR (USD 1 million) -- 24 times smaller than that of
the Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party -- forced the KPRF
to rely on disciplined regional deputies and central
committees to get the KPRF message to the regions. As Orel's
KPRF representative Vasiliy Ikonnikov underscored to us on
March 15, KPRF's relative success was a tribute both to its
superior organizational skills and a sign of people's
unhappiness with YR's track record in areas such as housing
services and pensions.


3. (SBU) KPRF leadership was particularly pleased with its
success in cities. In Omsk and Orel, the party snagged over
thirty percent of the vote, while in the Komi Republic's
second city, Ukhta, it polled 17 percent (2.5 times its 2003
results). All, according to Ukhta KPRF head and
newly-elected legislator Anatoliy Ostroglazev, without the
benefit of money and administrative resources. While KPRF
won just 24 percent of the vote to YR's thirty percent in
Samara, it easily bested SR's sixteen percent to finish
second. KPRF Central Information Technology Center Head Ilya
Ponomarev reported that the KPRF had done much better across
the fourteen regions in cities, and less well in rural areas;
a difference he sourced to the more effective use of
"administrative resources" by Kremlin parties in the
countryside. Mercator Group Director Dmitriy Oreshkin
concurred that the less manageable cities had blunted United
Russia's edge in administrative resources.


4. (SBU) SR International Department Director Mikhail
Demurin told us that he had been "very impressed" with KPRF's
performance on March 11. He was convinced that the KPRF had
won a significant part of the youth vote. Young KPRF
sympathizers came from families whose parents were academics
or intellectuals and whose status had dropped considerably
during the 1990s transition, he said. Demurin surmised that
the youth who are suffering the effects of "botched"
education reform voted KPRF, as well. Komi's Ostroglazev
also traced KPRF's success to the youth vote, claiming that
50 - 55 percent of KPRF's Komi's totals had come from 18 - 30
year olds. KPRF interlocutors all see increasing support
from young people, who are having difficulty educating their
children, finding housing, and who face poor employment
prospects.

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Not Resting on Laurels
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5. (SBU) At its March 24 party convention, KPRF Deputy Chief
Ivan Melnikov enumerated the party's goals in the lead-up to
the December Duma elections. Melnikov described the
left-positioned SR as the KPRF's chief challenge, and
exhorted members to target it by highlighting its support of

MOSCOW 00001396 002.2 OF 002


United Russia policies. With forty percent of voters backing
Kremlin parties and twenty percent already committed
"protest" voters (KPRF and LDPR supporters),Melnikov tasked
the KPRF faithful to proselytize among the remaining,
economically-straitened forty percent of the electorate by
convincing it that the KPRF will better serve their interests
than SR Chairman Sergey Mironov.

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KPRF's Obstacles
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6. (SBU) Voters' Club Strategic Head Stanislav Kulakov
disagreed that KPRF's success could be traced to superior
organizational skills and disaffected youth. He instead
cited the Kremlin's desire to provide a manageable release
valve for disgruntled voters. KPRF was "harmless." It had
been in the Duma for years and had accomplished nothing,
which made it acceptable to the powers-that-be.


7. (SBU) KPRF interlocutors are guardedly positive in
conversations with Embassy about Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov,
but there are frequent rumors that he is seen by insiders as
a drag on the party. Demurin suggested that the KPRF may have
peaked with the March 11 elections, a possibility he traced
to the Chairman's limited public appeal and the party's
failure, under Zyuganov, to fully exploit traditional bases
of support, like the trade union movement.

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Comment
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8. (SBU) If the accounts of interlocutors are correct, the
March 11 elections suggest that KPRF may be in the middle of
a limited revival, fueled by voters opposed to United Russia
and, to a much lesser extent, dissatisfaction among youth.
Earlier assertions by KPRF contacts that the party was
recovering in the cities may have been borne out on March 11.
Still, KPRF urban voters are neither sufficiently numerous
nor notably very loyal, and might be co-opted by even a
slight improvement in living conditions before the next
elections. Also arguing against a further surge in KPRF's
popularity is the alleged intention of the "managers" of
Russia's democracy to see SR further improve on its March 11
election performance, which saw it over the seven percent
threshold in 13 districts a mere four months after being
created.
RUSSELL