MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON NUG, IRAQ, LEBANON, WESTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ LE MO WI SU RS
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST: MFA ON NUG, IRAQ, LEBANON, WESTERN
SAHARA AND SUDAN

REF: MOSCOW 828

CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL M/C ALICE G. WELLS. REASONS: 1.4(B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: THE MFA STRESSED IN A RECENT MEETING THAT
THE FORMATION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTED A MILESTONE IN HAMAS' SLOW EVOLUTION AND
SUGGESTED THE QUARTET SHOULD REVISIT ITS POLICIES ON CONTACTS
AND ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY. MFA DIRECTOR
FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SERGEY VERSHININ TOLD US
THAT THE NUG HAD ALREADY REDUCED INTRA-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE
AND CRITICIZED ISRAEL FOR HASTILY REJECTING CONTACTS WITH THE
NEW GOVERNMENT. HE SAID RUSSIA STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE
SECRETARYS EFFORTS TO RESTART TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE

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PALESTINIANS AND SUGGESTED THAT SAUDI ARABIA COULD PLAY A
USEFUL ROLE IN MODERATING HAMAS. RUSSIA CONTINUED TO
ADVOCATE FOR A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN IRAQ BUT
WELCOMED RENEWED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE NEIGHBORS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL PARTIES. HE CLAIMED THERE WAS NO URGENT NEED
TO ESTABLISH A HARIRI TRIBUNAL AND ARGUED THAT ONLY LEBANESE
CONSENT COULD PROVIDE THE TRIBUNAL WITH THE NECESSARY
LEGITIMACY. VERSHININ WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR
PROGRESS IN WESTERN SAHARA AND STRESSED RUSSIA'S OPPOSITION
TO SANCTIONS ON SUDAN AFTER BASHIR'S REJECTION OF PLANS FOR
THE DARFUR PEACEKEEPING OPERATION. END SUMMARY.
.
GOR AND NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
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2. (C) MFA MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR VERSHININ EMPHASIZED THAT
RUSSIA SAW THE FORMATION OF A PALESTINIAN NATIONAL UNITY
GOVERNMENT (NUG) AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO ENGAGE WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND FIND A WAY
FORWARD TO ACHIEVING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE EXPLAINED
THAT MOSCOW WAS SURPRISED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE
PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO TRANSLATE THE MECCA AGREEMENT
INTO A WORKABLE GOVERNING COALITION. RUSSIA HAD QUICKLY
HAILED THIS DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE THE NUG PROVIDED THE QUARTET
AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES "WITH A CHANCE, IF WE'RE ABLE TO
USE IT" TO MOVE BEYOND THE EXISTING STALEMATE. HE SAID THAT
ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF THE NUG WAS A MISTAKE AND THAT THE
ISRAELI LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO ADAPT TO A FAST CHANGING
SITUATION.


3. (C) TURNING TO QUARTET PRINCIPLES, VERSHININ
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RUSSIA HAD A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION OF
STATEMENTS MADE BY PALESTINIAN LEADERS WHEN THE NUG WAS
FORMED AND WAS PREPARED TO POCKET THE AMBIGUITY PROVIDED BY
HAMAS "RESPECT" FOR PREVIOUS PEACE AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.
HE STRESSED THAT THE MECCA AGREEMENT HAD ALREADY PRODUCED A
REDUCTION IN INTRA-PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE. HE SAID THAT THE
EUROPEANS WERE REVIEWING THEIR POLICIES ON INTERACTING WITH
THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY GOVERNMENT IN LIGHT OF THE NUG AND
MECCA AGREEMENT, AND WELCOMED U.S. WILLINGNESS TO DIFFER WITH
ISRAEL ON CONTACTS WITH FATAH MEMBERS OF THE NUG.


4. (C) ON THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT IN RIYADH, VERSHININ SAID
THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SALTANOV WOULD ATTEND AND WOULD
LIKELY MEET WITH PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS. (NOTE: PRESS
REPORTS INDICATE THAT HE DID SO ON MARCH 28.) HE WAS
SKEPTICAL THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD PRODUCE ANY "BIG
BREAKTHROUGHS" BUT HOPED THAT THE ARABS WOULD BE ABLE TO
RECAPTURE THE "FRESH SPIRIT" REFLECTED IN THE 2002 SAUDI
INITIATIVE. VERSHININ NOTED RUSSIA'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR
SECRETARY RICE'S EFFORTS TO START A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PM

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OLMERT AND PRESIDENT ABBAS (WHICH A MARCH 28 MFA STATEMENT
"POSITIVELY" ASSESSED.) VERSHININ FLAGGED RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO
ENCOURAGE THE RELEASE OF KIDNAPPED ISRAELI SOLDIER GILAD
SHALIT, WHICH VERSHININ AGREED WAS CRITICAL TO PROVIDING
STIMULUS TO AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TRACK. HE CHARACTERIZED
COOPERATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PA ON
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES AS "TERRIBLE" AND ARGUED THAT ISRAELI
ACTIONS CONTINUED TO UNDERCUT ABBAS' POSITION BECAUSE THEY
RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE IMPROVEMENTS IN
DAY-TO-DAY LIFE.
.
SAUDI ARABIA'S ROLE
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5. (C) REVIEWING RUSSIA'S IMPROVED TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA
AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT PUTIN'S RECENT VISIT TO RIYADH
(REFTEL),VERSHININ SAID THAT THE SAG PLAYED AN INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT ROLE ON ALL REGIONAL ISSUES. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT
MOVED VERY SLOWLY, BUT IT HAD DEMONSTRATED A DEFT TOUCH IN
BROKERING THE MECCA AGREEMENT BETWEEN PALESTINIAN FACTIONS.
HE THOUGHT THE SAUDI MONARCHY COULD HELP IN INFLUENCING HAMAS
TO EVOLVE IN A MORE PEACEFUL (AND ACCOMMODATING) DIRECTION.
VERSHININ CONCEDED THAT THE PACE OF CHANGE IN HAMAS' POSITION
WAS TOO SLOW, BUT STRESSED THAT HAMAS WAS EVOLVING AND THAT
ITS LEADERS WERE LEARNING TO BALANCE THEIR IDEOLOGICAL
INCLINATIONS WITH THEIR NEED TO GOVERN.

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IRAQ: ENGAGEMENT IN NEIGHBORS PLUS
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6. (C) VERSHININ WELCOMED THE MARCH 10 NEIGHBORS PLUS
MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE IN BAGHDAD AND SAID THAT IT WAS
IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP THE IDEAS THAT CAME OUT OF THE MEETING
TO CHART A NEW PATH FOR IRAQ. RUSSIA CONTINUED TO SEE A NEED
FOR A CONFERENCE THAT FOSTERED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
VERSHININ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RUSSIA'S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH IRAQ HAD NOT MET EXPECTATIONS, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO
CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN IRAQ AND A LOW LEVEL OF POLITICAL
CONTACTS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD. RUSSIA CONTINUED TO
HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IN OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN
IRAQ, BUT DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT PROGRESSED FAR. (A SUBSEQUENT
MFA STATEMENT NOTED THAT DFM SALTANOV'S MEETING IN RIYADH
WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT TALIBANI FOCUSED ON TRADE AND ENERGY
DIPLOMACY.)
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LEBANON: NO NEED FOR HARIRI TRIBUNAL (YET)
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7. (C) VERSHININ WAS COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT UNIIC CHIEF SERGE
BRAMMERTZ'S MOST RECENT REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
CALLING IT BALANCED AND "UNPOLITICIZED" AND NOTING THAT
BRAMMERTZ WAS FOCUSED ON COMPLETING THE INVESTIGATION. HE
WOULD NOT SPECULATE ON HOW LONG THAT MIGHT TAKE, BUT STRESSED
THAT ESTABLISHING A TRIBUNAL WAS NOT AN URGENT TASK.
VERSHININ ARGUED AGAINST A CHAPTER VII AUTHORIZATION FOR THE
TRIBUNAL, STATING THAT ITS LEGITIMACY DEPENDED ON ACCEPTANCE
BY THE LEBANESE, WHO WERE NOT READY TO COME TO AGREEMENT. HE
TOOK THE POINT THAT BRAMMERTZ HAD COLLECTED SIGNIFICANT
EVIDENCE ALREADY, BUT NOTED THAT THE UNIIC CHIEF HAD NOT
CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL. HE
EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ONGOING POLITICAL TURMOIL IN
LEBANON, WHICH COULD EASILY SLIP INTO A CIVIL WAR AND WOULD
BE EXACERBATED BY "FOREIGN PARTICIPATION."
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WESTERN SAHARA: PROGRESS UNLIKELY
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8. (C) ACCORDING TO VERSHININ, DURING EARLY-MARCH
CONSULTATIONS WITH MOROCCAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
FASSI-FIHRI, THE MOROCCANS PREVIEWED A PROPOSAL FOR AUTONOMY
FOR WESTERN SAHARA, BUT HAD NOT SHARED DETAILS OF THE PLAN.
VERSHININ WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS IN THE
DISPUTE. RUSSIA SUPPORTED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOM AND
THE POLISARIO, BUT BELIEVED THESE WERE UNLIKELY. IN HIS
ANALYSIS, WESTERN SAHARA WAS AN EXISTENTIAL QUESTION FOR THE
MOROCCANS, WHO COULD NOT COMPROMISE ON THE QUESTION OF
INDEPENDENCE, WHILE ALGERIA LACKED ANY INCENTIVE TO COME TO A
RESOLUTION. THE ZERO-SUM MENTALITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS MEANT
THAT LITTLE COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THERE
WAS NOTHING ON THE HORIZON WHICH WOULD CHANGE THE EXISTING
DYNAMIC. THE BOTTOM LINE, VERSHININ SAID, WAS ALGERIA'S
CALCULUS THAT MOROCCO WOULD "WIN" IF WESTERN SAHARA WAS
SETTLED.
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SUDAN: KEEP WORKING ON BASHIR
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9. (C) REFLECTING ON SUDANESE PRESIDENT BASHIR'S MARCH 6
REJECTION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE UN-AU PLAN FOR DARFUR
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, VERSHININ SAID THAT THE UN WOULD
NEED TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GOS TO ACCEPT
THE TROOPS. VERSHININ SAID THAT BASHIR HAD NOT
UNCONDITIONALLY AGREED TO THE ENTIRE PEACEKEEPING PACKAGE.
IN THE MFA'S VIEW, BASHIR FEARED THAT PERMITTING UN TROOPS ON
THE GROUND IN DARFUR WOULD POSE A THREAT TO HIS REGIME.
THIS, COUPLED WITH FEARS OF CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT INDICTMENTS OF SUDANESE OFFICIALS, WOULD MAKE GAINING
AGREEMENT FROM BASHIR THAT MUCH HARDER. VERSHININ REJECTED
THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS AND WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF
BRITISH SUGGESTIONS OF ESTABLISHING A "NO-FLY" ZONE IN SUDAN,
ARGUING THAT THIS WAS A NON-STARTER.
.
COMMENT
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10. (C) RUSSIA CONTINUES ITS HIGH-VISIBILITY DIPLOMACY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH PUTIN'S FEBRUARY VISIT TO THE GULF AND
JORDAN FOLLOWED BY A STEADY STREAM OF MID-RANKING ARAB
OFFICIALS. WE SHOULD EXPECT MOSCOW TO CONTINUE TO PUSH ITS
VIEWS ON HAMAS' EVOLUTION AND SEEK TO NARROW OR REINTERPRET
QUARTET PRINCIPLES.
RUSSELL