RUSSIAN MFA: AFGHANISTAN POST-FM VISIT; IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001236

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF IR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA: AFGHANISTAN POST-FM VISIT; IRAN


Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 21 meeting, MFA Director
Maryasov said Russia was evaluating further arms donations to
Afghanistan, finalizing the debt relief documents, pushing
for CSTO-NATO counter-narcotics cooperation, and sending a
drug control official to Kabul in the "nearest future."
During his February visit, FM Lavrov urged Karzai to find
common ground with Musharraf. The GOR believes Karzai is
politically indispensable and remains concerned by local
governance, but analyzes the emergence of an opposition
National Front in positive terms. Maryasov downplayed the
significance of leadership differences in Tehran on Iran's
quest for nuclear weapons and stance towards the West. He
termed Iranian-SAG cooperation in Lebanon as positive, and
urged coordination with Iran on Afghanistan counter-narcotics
and infrastructure development efforts. End Summary

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Next Steps in Russian-Afghanistan Relations
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2. (C) In a March 21 meeting, MFA Director for the Second
Asia Department Aleksandr Maryasov said that concern over
security dominated GOR thinking on Afghanistan. During his
February 23 visit to Kabul, Maryasov explained, FM Lavrov was
focused on the "new season" of fighting, worrisome trends in
the consolidation of spheres of influence by Taliban leaders,
and the expansion of the Taliban presence outside of the
southeast and southwest. Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's
readiness to render assistance, including deliveries of
equipment and small arms. Brandishing the list of Soviet-era
weaponry requested by the Afghans, and conveyed via the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC),Maryasov said it was being
reviewed by the Ministry of Defense. Maryasov queried
sources of possible funding for these new supplies, and we
underscored appreciation for the GOR's origiQl donation of
military equipment and noted additional contributions would
be welcome. Maryasov said a mix of donations, concessional
sales, and commQcial terms was likely. The GOR has invited
Defense Minister Wardak to come to Moscow as soon as
possible, but has not received a reply.


3. (C) In terms of practical cooperation, Maryasov
confirmed that the bilateral agreement eliminating
Afghanistan's $10 billion debt to the Soviet Union would be
signed within the next one-two months, and maintained that it
was a paper exercise at this stage. He flagged Russian
commercial interests in Afghanistan, including the GOR's
readiness to help rebuild some Soviet-era infrastructure
projects, but was noncommittal on the dimensions of
assistance. Maryasov told us that the Russian
counternarcotics official would arrive in the "nearest
future" to take up a permanent posting at the Russian Embassy
and to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. Maryasov
stressed that the GOR has a range of programs, including
bilateral, through the NRC, and via the Commonwealth Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO). He repeated Lavrov's public
calls for greater development of regional mechanisms to
combat narcotics trafficking, expressed disappointment over
the lack of progress in moving forward on CSTO-NATO
cooperation, and noted CSTO's recent consultations in Kabul
with its ministerial counterparts. (Note: Lavrov
subsequently has highlighted the divide between CSTO and NATO
in a series of public speeches.) Arguing that Iran's
interests dovetailed with those of the international
community and Afghanistan, and Maryasov pushed for more
aggressive coordination among all interested parties in both
combating narcotics and supporting infrastructure development.


4. (C) Maryasov noted that Karzai used his meeting with
Lavrov to vent about Pakistan's behavior, including
accusations of training Taliban cadre. While Maryasov said
that the GOR did not doubt the veracity of some of the
charges, the Russian message to the Afghan leadership was to
be more flexible, to focus on near-term cooperation, and to
find common ground with Musharraf. Lavrov undertook to raise
Afghan concerns with the GOP and Maryasov thought that the
meeting of Afghan-Pakistani Interior Ministers to discuss
jirgas was a positive development.

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Views of Karzai and National Front
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5. (C) The GOR believes that Karzai is indispensable to
Afghanistan's political development and stability, with

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Maryasov stressing that there was no alternative to his
leadership at present. In contrast to previous discussions
where GOR concerns over corruption and the Afghan President's
indecisiveness had been stressed, Maryasov described Karzai
as "experienced, flexible, and without the ethnic
limitations" that have clouded Afghan politics. The GOR
remains concerned by central government weakness in the
regions and by the quality of some governors. The
international community's objective, he stressed, must be to
"help Karzai, to prop him up, to make government more
effective" both in the center and at the local level.
Maryasov was positive on international efforts to strengthen
the Afghan national police, noting that Afghans must feel
secure for democratic institutions to take root.


6. (C) The emergence of a National Front opposition,
Maryasov argued, was natural and perhaps even positive. It
was better for an opposition to form legally and openly,
rather than take on a clandestine nature. In a best case
scenario, it might help to improve the ethnic balance of the
power structures and could be a healthy check on government
policies. Maryasov underscored that the checkered histories
and competing ideologies of the leading participants made him
question the viability of the opposition coalition. However,
he noted that Karzai's strength -- his status as a leader for
all Afghans -- was also his weakness, since he had not built
a political structure that would support and sustain his
political vision for Afghanistan.

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Iran: "No room for optimism" on leadership struggles
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7. (C) Maryasov, who has spent the bulk of his diplomatic
career in Iran, including four years as Ambassador, concluded
that there "was no room for optimism" in predicting "grave
and radical" changes in the Iranian government's commitment
to its nuclear program or attitudes towards the West. While
President Ahmadinejad's power was "objectively" declining, it
was not doing so rapidly, and he still "more or less" enjoyed
support among the major political factions. The moderates,
Maryasov concluded, were not in a position to officially
confront Ahmadinejad or even to criticize him sharply. The
GOR paid particular attention to the Supreme Leader's
"balancing act;" specifically, whether his system of
counterweights and parallel institutions (such as Velayatti
offsetting FM Mottaki) would further constrain Ahmadinejad.


8. (C) Maryasov concluded that Iran's nuclear program
remained a "national idea," enjoying popularity among all
strata of society, including liberals and pragmatists. The
differences among factions, Maryasov insisted, were tactical,
with former President Rafsanjani and some Qom clergy taking
issue with Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and confrontational style.
While this group flirted with a tactical freeze of the
enrichment program, the GOR was not confident they could gain
the upper hand or that, if they did, it would lead to a
renunciation of enrichment. Instead, it believed that Iran's
goal was to obtain all the necessary technology and then
assess the international situation. The GOR disputed whether
a final decision on a militarized nuclear program had been
made, because Iran did not enjoy the technical competence
necessary to launch one. Maryasov said that the GOR took
issue with Israeli estimates of Iranian capabilities, viewing
the Iranian program as primitive at best.


9. (C) Maryasov characterized Iranian-Saudi cooperation on
Lebanon as positive, with Iranian leaders telling the GOR and
SAG authorities that they were attempting to "pacify"
Hizbollah. The Iranians, Maryasov argued, were practical
enough to see that an ideological confrontation between
Sunnis and Shiites was not in their national interests and
would mitigate the reflexive Iranian response to assist
Shiite coreligionists.
BURNS