SERGEY IVANOV'S MIXED LEGACY AS DEFENSE MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001144

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: PINR MARR MCAP PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: SERGEY IVANOV'S MIXED LEGACY AS DEFENSE MINISTER

REF: A. 06 STATE 195944

B. 06 MOSCOW 1082

C. MOSCOW 10

D. 06 MOSCOW 8745

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov
leaves behind a mixed legacy as Defense Minister. He can
claim credit for increased defense funding and launching a
multi-year modernization program for the armed forces. He
also sparked some reform initiatives, like the Ministry's
revised procurement procedures. Inside the Ministry, he was
perceived as a corporate CEO providing strategic direction
and allowing the General Staff to manage operational issues.
Ivanov showed his forceful side by overseeing the
consolidation of several aircraft producers into the United
Aircraft Corporation. The Ministry's intractable problems
did nothing to advance Ivanov's presidential ambitions and,
in fact, his poor handling of the Private Sychov hazing
incident was a PR disaster for him. END SUMMARY.
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DEFENSE REFORM
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2. (SBU) When then-Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov appeared
before the State Duma February 7, there was no public inkling
that he would soon relinquish his position or be promoted to
First Deputy Prime Minister, putting him on par with his
rival for the presidency, Dmitriy Medvedev. Ivanov used the
occasion to summarize his accomplishments at the Ministry's
helm. In a nod to legislators for their approval of
significant increases in the budget since 2001, he outlined
the defense establishment's plans to step up procurement of
both conventional and nuclear weapons systems as part of the
modernization program he instituted in 2003. He claimed that
almost half of the military's equipment inventory would be
replaced by 2015. Ivanov emphasized procurement of ballistic
missiles, noting that the Ministry would obtain 17 new ICBMs
in 2007 and press ahead with procurement of the sea-launched
Bulava missile system (despite repeated test failures).
Upgrading armaments for ground combat units was another
priority touted by Ivanov, including re-equipping 40 tank, 97
mechanized infantry, and 50 airborne battalions.


3. (SBU) Ivanov highlighted efforts to increase salaries and
to improve housing conditions for servicemen and their
families. He updated the legislature on professional
contract soldiers, claiming that some combat units had
already achieved 100% of their recruiting goals. Although
the Russian military would never be completely comprised of
volunteers, increasing the number of professional soldiers
equipped with modern arms, was necessary to fight "wars of
the future," as well as to maintain the ability to project
power and launch pre-emptive strikes, if required. Ivanov
also told legislators that the Ministry had revamped its
procurement process, which would be in place by 2008.
.
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REALITY AT ODDS WITH RHETORIC
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4. (C) While Ivanov claimed credit for initiating programs
to modernize Russia's armed forces, our defense contacts
emphasized that his success was a function of Russia's flush
coffers, and not of his bureaucratic or political savvy.
Ivan Safranchuk of the Moscow office of the Center for
Defense Information said the modernization program
demonstrated Russia's intention to complement its political
and economic resurgence with enhanced military power. In
spite of increased funding, however, modernization would
probably not be sufficient for the military to meet all its
goals even under the most favorable conditions.


5. (C) Ivanov was unable to resolve the personnel issues in
Russia's entrenched, bloated military relying on a conscript
force during a demographic downturn. Aleksandr Golts,
another respected defense analyst, told us that establishing
a professional volunteer military was a worthy goal but
service conditions were still so poor that many first-term
soldiers and junior officers failed to renew their contracts.
About 12,000 junior officers leave the service every year at
the end of their first terms. Golts said Ivanov left with
the military still unable to compete for Russia's best and
brightest human talent, particularly as more lucrative
opportunities became available for young people. Neither the
military (nor Russia in general) had yet come to terms with
the demographic crisis; in Golts' view, the declining pool of

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manpower clashed with Ivanov's goal of maintaining the armed
forces at 1.1 million personnel. Vitaliy Shlykov of the
Center for Foreign and Defense Policy told us that the
inability of the military to develop a professional
non-commissioned officer corps would constrain its effort to
field a qualified force capable of successfully using its
new, modern equipment.


6. (C) Ivanov's success in implementing a modernization
program was also questioned by experts. Independent defense
analyst Pavel Felgengauer took issue with Ivanov's assertion
concerning the nation's missile force. He was not confident
that Russia's defense industry would be able to produce the
number of ICBMs envisioned in the program by 2015 or that
problems associated with the Bulava missile would be resolved
soon. Even if Ivanov's production goals were met,
Felgengauer pointed out that Russia planned to destroy
several hundred ballistic missiles under its international
treaty obligations. This would still leave Russia with a
missile force capable of deterring any foreseeable threat,
but he thought that the ministry's missile modernization
plans were overly ambitious and could undermine efforts to
overhaul the military's conventional armaments.
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INSIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY
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7. (C) Within the Ministry, Ivanov reportedly worked out a
relatively efficient delineation of responsibilities between
military and civilian officials. Sergey Sumbayev, former
correspondent with the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) journal,
told us he had gotten to know Ivanov's style fairly well and
had traveled with him to military sites around the country.
According to Sumbayev, from the outset of his tenure Ivanov
surrounded himself with a close circle of civilian advisors
(many of whom were associates from his days in intelligence),
who focused on broad political and managerial concerns
affecting the ministry and national security. The General
Staff and other military officers were given a relatively
free hand to concentrate on traditional military and
operational issues. Sumbayev said the division of labor
generally worked well, particularly after Yuriy Baluyevskiy
was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 2004.
Felgengauer attributed Ivanov's relative success to
Baluyevskiy's pliancy but was skeptical that reform would
survive Ivanov's departure.


8. (C) Tensions occasionally did arise between the military
and civilian staffs. Sumbayev explained that many senior
military officers did not respect Ivanov and/or resented
strong civilian control within the Ministry. He said Ivanov
tended to promote officers lacking in charisma or ambition in
order to minimize their ability to challenge his authority.
At the same time, Sumbayev said Ivanov's lack of military
expertise compelled him to defer to the brass more and
constrained his ability to respond to issues more
pragmatically. He cited Ivanov's clumsy, insensitive
response to the hazing of Private Sychov in 2006 as an
example (Ref B). Ivanov sided with the military on several
subsequent hazing incidents as well.


9. (C) Ivanov's management style is best described as that
of a corporate CEO providing strategic direction, although
many initiatives came from his civilian advisors, and he
sometimes failed to follow through on his own ideas. As
Defense Minister, Ivanov seemed to rely on advice from the
Ministry's Main Behavioral Directorate, which was charged
with personnel reform, though Sumbayev said it was difficult
to pinpoint precisely who constituted Ivanov's inner circle.
Two programs that emerged from his civilian advisors were
designed ostensibly to foster public understanding of the
military -- the establishment of parents committees and a
public chamber within the Ministry (Ref C). Both initiatives
were widely perceived as simply public relations ploys aimed
at containing the damage caused by Ivanov's public gaffes,
notably on hazing. The consensus among experts was that
Ivanov's actions were best understood when viewed through the
prism of his presidential ambitions.
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DEFENSE ECONOMY MANAGEMENT
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10. (C) Ivanov was charged by Putin last year to oversee
civil aviation, and he is credited with overseeing creation
of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). The UAC, a GOR
consolidation of many of Russia's aircraft manufacturers,
would probably not have occurred without a forced, top-down

MOSCOW 00001144 003 OF 003


restructuring under Ivanov's direction. In contrast to his
collegial style at the Ministry of Defense, Ivanov proved a
more forceful manager in civil aviation. Embassy contacts
have told us that they were worried that Ivanov would soon
reorganize their agencies and fire current managers. The
heads of the Federal Authority for Transportation Oversight
and the Ministry of Transport's Department of State Policy
for Civil Aviation, in fact, were recently dismissed.


11. (C) Ivanov, as First Deputy Prime Minister, will stay
connected to the defense establishment via chairmanship of
the Military Industrial Commission (MIC),created by Putin in

2006. At that time, the move to appoint Ivanov as MIC
chairman was seen as a modest boost to his standing as
potential successor to Putin (Ref D). Although most defense
analysts at the time criticized the MIC as a futile attempt
to streamline the bureaucratic defense procurement process,
it was a step in the right direction and had little risk for
Ivanov. Over the past year, Ivanov's MIC garnered mostly
positive press coverage. Favorable media reporting of plans
to spend 5 trillion rubles (about $192 billion) on the
Ministry of Defense's ambitious modernization program
burnished Ivanov's image, making him look presidential,
without having to produce many tangible results.
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COMMENT
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12. (C) While it can be argued that long-overdue
modernization was mostly a function of Russia's economic
revival, Ivanov nonetheless got the ball rolling. Ivanov
likewise did a credible job overseeing a ministry justly
famed for its intractable structural and personnel problems.
The public, however, will remember his tenure most for his
poor handling of the Private Sychov hazing scandal.
BURNS