U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001002

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: IAEA KACT KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR RS START
SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON
STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE: PART II

REF: A. STATE 003773

B. 06 STATE 201804

C. 06 STATE 165526

D. STATE 007445

E. 06 STATE 028324

F. STATE 004837

G. MOSCOW 01001

Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

This is part two of a two-part cable, reporting on the
January 29 meeting of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Security
Dialogue chaired by U/S Joseph and Russian DFM Kislyak. Part
one is Ref G.

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Australia Group / Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility
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1. (SBU) DFM Kislyak asked whether U/S Joseph had anything
new on the issue of the denial of Russia's membership in the
Australia Group. U/S Joseph said he did not.


2. (SBU) DFM Kislyak used this occasion to complain that the
U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was requiring
that contracts supporting the construction of the Chemical
Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye include a
provision prohibiting the employment of Russian companies
sanctioned under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
Even though Russia did not plan to employ at Shchuch'ye any
of the companies on the U.S. sanctions list, DTRA still
intended to include this provision in Shchuch'ye contracts.
Russia objected in principle, since it did not accept the
validity of U.S. sanctions imposed on Russian companies.
Accepting such provisions would imply that Russia accepted
the validity of the sanctions. DFM Kislyak asked U/S Joseph
to work with Russia on the issue. U/S Joseph said he was
unaware of the issue, but would respond.

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Highly Enriched Uranium Seizure in Georgia
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3. (C) DFM Kislyak complained that media reports in Georgia
following the seizure of 100 grams of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) there in 2006 had falsely alleged that Russia was the
potential source of a flood of uncontrolled nuclear material.
Such statements were unacceptable. A year prior to the
reports Russia had provided the Government of Georgia a list
of questions regarding the seizure, but Russia never received
a response. Russia had, in fact, dispatched a team of
Russian specialists to the site in Georgia immediately
following the seizure and had analyzed the samples. This
issue had become politicized and Russia was dissatisfied with
its outcome. He characterized the U.S. State Department's
recent announcement as correct, but said leaks were being
used for propaganda purposes.


4. (C) U/S Joseph explained there was concern this was only
the first portion of a much larger diversion of HEU. The
United States had worked bilaterally with Georgia on this
issue, but the United States never intended to conduct this
work without Russia's knowledge. This was a case where good
reporters had uncovered an exciting story. Although the
United States was sometimes concerned that Russia was
withholding information, what was important was that the
United States and Russia work together on nuclear forensics
and under the Global Initiative. U/S Joseph underscored that
the transfer of this HEU across the Russian-Georgian border
showed that there was a problem.

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International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
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5. (SBU) U/S Joseph stated that the ISTC was an important
tool which could play a significant role in the global war on
terrorism. He indicated that, due to U.S. budgetary
pressures, the United States would like Russia to consider
co-funding some of the ISTC's research projects and paying
ISTC employee salaries as a partnership goal. The United
States thought this was ripe for a partnership with a focus
on joint research in counterterrorism and nonproliferation.

U/S Joseph suggested that DFM Kislyak's personal involvement
would be helpful in ensuring such funding issues were
addressed. U/S Joseph provided a paper summarizing U.S.
views on the ISTC.


6. (SBU) DFM Kislyak agreed to have the Russia study the
paper. He believed that the ISTC produced good scientific
work, but that the center's mission needed to be reviewed on
a comprehensive basis. The original mission had been to
employ scientists, not to pursue specific initiatives. The
center's legal basis needed to be changed to enable joint
projects under existing Russian taxation laws. A strategic
review of how best to use the center could easily be done.

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Space Policy
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7. (SBU) Space Talks in Paris. MFA Arms Control and Security
Department Director Antonov reported that A/S DeSutter
(State/VCI) and he had a productive meeting on space
activities in Paris on January 25. During the meeting,
General Buzhinskiy presented a briefing on Russia's space
policy and A/S DeSutter provided the draft text of a Joint
Presidential Statement on the free access to and use of space
for peaceful purposes. Antonov considered the draft joint
statement a good idea, but said it would require some
adjustments. He questioned why the United States had not
responded to Russia's October 19, 2005, non-paper titled "On
the Development of a Russian-U.S. Dialogue on Military Space
Activities" (Ref E),which included a proposal on CBMs and
industry-to-industry cooperation. He suggested that each
side raise questions on the other's space policy briefing and
that they continue the space dialogue during the second half
of 2007.


8. (SBU) U/S Joseph said the United States was pleased with
the outcome of the space talks in Paris. He noted there were
countries that did not share U.S. and Russian views about the
free access to and use of space. He made clear that the U.S.
dependence on the free use of space would continue to grow in
support of the U.S. national security posture, and its
foreign policy interests and economic security. He believed
the existing multilateral treaties relating to space were
sufficient, in particular the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. He
suggested that the United States and Russia could explore
principles of peaceful uses of outer space.


9. (C) Chinese ASAT Test. U/S Joseph called attention to the
January 11 ASAT test conducted by China, underscoring that
the United States found it most disturbing. He noted that
the space debris caused by the event posed a threat and
represented a danger to manned space flight. The United
States warned China (Ref F) that an ASAT capability was
inconsistent with China's public statements on the prevention
of an arms race in outer space. The United States asked
China what its next steps would be, and hoped Russia would
express similar concerns. The United States did not see arms
control as the solution to this situation, nor did it think
that the situation would prompt an arms race in space.
However, it should be a wake up call for the United States
and Russia.


10. (C) DFM Kislyak replied that Russia was not opposed to an
arms control approach since it brought countries together.
In view of the Chinese test, he recommended considering the
draft agreement before the UN First Committee banning the
weaponization of outer space. U/S Joseph asked what lessons
Russia drew from arms control. He noted that, in the past,
countries could not even agree on a definition of "weapons"
as they related to space. He believed that the United States
and Russia were vulnerable in space and that treaties
engendered complacency. DFM Kislyak acknowledged that Russia
had major resources in space. He asked how the United States
planned to protect its space assets. He believed that a
political instrument, such as a UN Security Council
resolution, was the best means in the near term and was
better than nothing.


11. (C) U/S Joseph asked whether Russia had approached the
Chinese with Russia's concerns regarding the ASAT test. It
appeared to the United States that Russia was unwilling to
raise concerns about the test with China. DFM Kislyak
replied that Russia had tried. It was told by China that the

event was an experiment and that China would work with Russia
on preventing an arms race in space. Russia expected China
would continue ASAT testing. U/S Joseph said that China
might be able to deploy an ASAT capability soon. DFM Kislyak
said Russia did not know. However, there was a need to
improve the defensive posture of our space assets.


12. (S) DFM Kislyak asked whether the United States would
respond in kind to the ASAT test. U/S Joseph said he did not
think so. The United States did not have the capability, nor
was it developing it. DFM Kislyak said Russia was developing
a satellite capability that "would be a weapon of choice."
He also said Russia was concerned that the United States had
already developed dedicated satellite interceptors. If the
United States put interceptors in space, it could place at
risk huge numbers of Russia's military and technological
capabilities, both ground- and space-based, even in
peacetime. U/S Joseph noted that Russia had many
capabilities to disable or destroy satellites. He recalled
that Russia once expressed fear that the U.S. space shuttle
was an ASAT capability, even though Russia had the same
inherent capability for anti-satellite development. U/S
Joseph summarized that both the United States and Russia were
in a situation where their space assets were at risk. What
had become clear to the United States was that there was a
great deal of intent to stop the United States from using
space to enhance its missile defense capabilities. That was
inconsistent with allowing space to be used for ballistic
missiles to attack another country.


13. (SBU) DFM Kislyak believed that the U.S. and Russian
positions on the peaceful use of space were very close. U/S
Joseph said the United States concurred on the peaceful use
of space. DFM Kislyak urged that the United States consider
Russia's October 19, 2005, non-paper. U/S Joseph said the
United States would, along with the proposed joint statement
on the free access to and use of space for peaceful purposes.

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India
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14. (C) DFM Kislyak said there were a number of issues
relating to the U.S.-India Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation (Section 123 Agreement) that were unclear and
required further work. Despite Russia's encouragement, India
was not working with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement.
This was significant since many other countries were
watching. Russia was disturbed that India believed it would
no longer have difficulties with the NSG now that it had an
agreement with the United States. Russia would have more
discussions with India and Russia stood ready to help. U/S
Joseph said the United States made clear what the sequencing
would be now that there was U.S. enabling legislation for
civil nuclear cooperation with India. An IAEA-approved
safeguards agreement was required first, followed by a
positive NSG decision, and then Congressional approval of the
Section 123 Agreement. DG ElBaradei did not think there
would be a problem negotiating a safeguards agreement. U/S
Joseph hoped an Additional Protocol would also be negotiated.
He and DFM Kislyak agreed to work for a positive NSG outcome.


15. (C) Nuclear Testing. DFM Kislyak asked whether nuclear
testing would be covered in the Section 123 Agreement. A/S
Rood replied that, while some in India considered this a make
or break issue, Prime Minister Singh had stated that allowing
for nuclear testing in the agreement was unnecessary.
Secretary Rice had made clear the agreement would be off if

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India tested a nuclear device. U/S Joseph said this had been
made clear at every level. He added that each NSG member
would need to make its own decision on what the NSG
implications of an Indian nuclear test would be. The U.S.
position on this issue was clear. DFM Kislyak did not think
India planned to initiate nuclear testing anytime soon.
However, should the United States resume testing, he believed
that India would be punished, in effect, if it were not
allowed to test without losing NSG cooperation. U/S Joseph
disagreed, explaining that the United States and Russia were
NWS under the NPT, while India was not.


16. (C) Sale of Russian Reactors. DFM Kislyak confirmed that
Russia's sale of four reactors to India would be contingent
upon the NSG revising its Guidelines. He also confirmed that
two of the four reactors were not grandfathered under the

existing Guidelines. U/S Joseph said he felt more justified,
therefore, in moving forward on the U.S.-India Section 123
Agreement.

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Proliferation Finance
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17. (C) DFM Kislyak informed U/S Joseph that, on January 10,
President Putin had signed a counter-proliferation bill (No.
281-FZZ) into law. This provided legal authority to impose
domestic financial measures and would guide the Russian
government's proliferation finance efforts. U/S Joseph asked
whether regulations would be published and provided to
Russian financial institutions to instruct them on what
measures to take. DFM Kislyak said a Presidential Decree
would be issued with guidelines and regulations. According
to Mr. Antonov, the Decree could be combined with an
amendable annex of specific proscribed entities that would be
the targets of law enforcement action. U/S Joseph urged that
Russian financial institutions expeditiously implement this
law and carefully scrutinize their financial transactions
with the DPRK and Iran. The purpose here was to disrupt
illicit activities. DFM Kislyak noted that Russia's measures
would not necessarily match those of the United States.

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Missile Technology Control Regime: Iskander-E Missile
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18. (S) U/S Joseph reiterated that the United States sought
assurances that the front end of the Iskander-E was
permanently attached to the missile's motor. He called again
for technical discussions on the issue. DFM Kislyak replied
that the Iskander-E used a construction which precluded
detachment of the nose section from the part of the missile
containing the engine and guidance section. He questioned
why discussions were needed. U/S Joseph asked whether the
front section was bolted or welded. He said the United
States was not asking for proprietary information. Mr.
Antonov replied that the information that Russia had provided
on this issue was the same as what the United States had
provided in the case involving the transfer of Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS) to Turkey in 1996. PDAS Elliott
asked whether detachment of the front section would require
specialized tools that the Libyans would not have. DFM
Kislyak had no further information on how the front section
was permanently attached, but he promised to follow up. U/S
Joseph said the biggest U.S. concern was to ensure that
Russia did not transfer the missile to Iran or Syria. DFM
Kislyak declined to make such a commitment.


19. (U) Meeting Participants.

U.S.:

U/S Robert Joseph, State/T
A/S John Rood, State/ISN
ASD(Acting) Joseph Benkert, OSD
PDAS Stephen Elliott, State/VCI
DASD Brian Green, OSD/Strategic Capabilities
William Tobey, DOE/NNSA
Jim Timbie, State/T
Tim Katsapis, State/T
David Dowley, NSC/Defense Policy and Strategy
Richard Trout, IC/WINPAC
Tim MacGregor, State/VCI
Charles Miller, OSD
Scott Roenicke, JCS/J-5

Russia:

DFM Sergey Kislyak, MFA
Igor Neverov, MFA/Department of North America
Anatoliy Antonov, MFA/DVBR
Oleg Burmistrov, MFA/DVBR
Oleg Rozhkov, MFA/DVBR
Sergey Koshelev, MFA/DVBR
Vladimir Venyevtsev, MFA/DVBR
Andrey Belyakov, MFA/DVBR
Andrey Belousov, MFA/Department of North America
Vladimir Kuchinov, Rosatom
Marina Belyayeva, Rosatom
Gen-Lt. Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy, MOD



20. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared this message.
RUSSELL