U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON

S E C R E T MOSCOW 001001

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS: IAEA KACT KNNP MNUC PARM PREL IR RS START
SUBJECT: U/S JOSEPH-RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK MEETING ON
STRATEGIC SECURITY DIALOGUE: PART I

REF: A. STATE 003773

B. 06 STATE 201804

C. 06 STATE 165526

D. STATE 007445

E. 06 STATE 028324

F. STATE 004837

Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

This is part one of a two-part cable.


1. (C) Summary. On January 29 in Moscow, Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security Robert
Joseph and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak
co-chaired a meeting on the Strategic Security Dialogue.
They discussed a range of issues, including:

-- Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear
Nonproliferation: The sides laid groundwork for developing a
draft "common vision" and "attractive offer" for the Joint
Initiative, and agreed to work on draft texts before they met
in Ankara in mid-February.

-- Post-START Arrangement: U/S Joseph suggested that
U.S. and Russian experts could meet.

-- Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism:
Discussions continued on developing a strong outreach program
and on how best to expand the partnership after the February
12-13 Global Initiative meeting in Ankara.

-- Trends and Directions in Defense Doctrine and
Programs: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Green
summarized steps the United States was willing to take to
address Russia's concerns on U.S. conventional long-range
ballistic missiles. The U.S. side explained why a U.S.
missile defense site in Europe posed no threat to Russia, and
said discussions on this issue would continue in MFA and MoD
channels. The Russian MOD repeated a briefing on Russian
military doctrine.

-- U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation: U/S Joseph reiterated that conclusion of the
agreement depended upon progress in working together on Iran.

-- Australia Group: There was no movement on the issue
of the denial of Russia's membership in the Australia Group.

-- Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF): Russia
objected in principle that Russian firms sanctioned by the
United States under the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act
were prohibited from contracts for the Shchuch'ye CWDF
project.

-- HEU Seizure in Georgia: DFM Kislyak complained that
media reports mischaracterized Russia's response to the 2006
diversion of highly enriched uranium from Russia to Georgia.

-- International Science and Technology Center (ISTC):
U/S Joseph urged Russia to co-fund ISTC research projects and
to pay ISTC employee salaries as a partnership goal.

-- Space Policy / China's Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Test:
U/S Joseph said the United States had expressed concerns to
China following its January 11 ASAT test. He urged Russia to
do the same. DFM Kislyak again urged adoption of a UN
agreement banning the weaponization of outer space.

-- India: The United States and Russia agreed to work
for a positive outcome for India in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG). DFM Kislyak confirmed that Russia's sale of
four reactors to India was contingent on the NSG revising its
Guidelines.

-- Proliferation Finance: DFM Kislyak reported that
President Putin signed a bill into law in January providing
the legal authority to impose domestic financial measures and
to guide the government's proliferation finance efforts. U/S
Joseph urged that the law be promptly implemented.

-- MTCR/Iskander-E Missile: U/S Joseph again sought
assurances that the missile's front end was permanently
attached to the missile's motor, and he again called for
technical discussions. DFM Kislyak had no new information,

but promised to follow up. End Summary.

--------------
Strategic Security Dialogue
--------------


2. (SBU) DFM Kislyak opened the meeting by stating that
U.S.-Russia strategic relations and the U.S.-Russia Strategic
Security Dialogue were of paramount importance for
U.S.-Russia relations. U/S Joseph said the United States
valued the dialogue and considered the agenda important. Our
bilateral efforts on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism showed that we could have a productive dialogue.
The new Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear
Nonproliferation was another example where the United States
and Russia could play a leadership role in moving forward on
issues of mutual importance. He welcomed a frank and
productive discussion -- both on issues of agreement and
disagreement -- so we could find a way to move forward.

-------------- --------------
Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation
-------------- --------------


3. (C) DFM Kisylak expressed appreciation for the January 10,
2007, paper on the Joint Initiative to Strengthen Nuclear
Nonproliferation that U/S Joseph had provided (Ref A). He
believed the U.S. and Russian visions for the Joint
Initiative were similar. The "attractive offer" needed to be
further developed. General concepts now needed to be
interpreted into specific, viable measures. Russia
understood the main purpose of the Initiative was to address
practical concerns of countries interested in developing
nuclear energy. A regional approach could be considered for
the Middle East. He noted that a report on the Initiative
was due to President Putin in approximately one month, and
outlined the preliminary Russian assessments and coordination
that needed to precede the report.


4. (C) U/S Joseph urged that, from the outset, the Joint
Initiative have a global flavor to avoid the appearance of
being a Western institution. DFM Kislyak concurred. U/S
Joseph also urged that the Initiative support the expansion
of nuclear energy in both industrialized and
"industrializing" countries in a way that was
proliferation-resistant. Like Russia, the United States was
considering a regional approach. A timeline was needed. To
build momentum, it was important to identify the "low-hanging
fruit," i.e., those suppliers and beneficiaries most likely
to participate in the near term. France, Japan, and some
others could be considered prospective suppliers, and Eastern
European states considered possible beneficiaries. Next
steps will involve the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and
Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom). It was
important to engage states to assess their nuclear intentions
(e.g., Egypt, Gulf states). U/S Joseph emphasized that
Presidents Bush and Putin had pledged to make the Initiative
a priority and he reiterated the need to move forward on it
expeditiously.


5. (S) DFM Kislyak asked U/S Joseph for a U.S. assessment of
nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and China, and
Jordanian-Pakistani links, and expressed concern that
Pakistan could market nuclear technology, including to
Jordan. U/S Joseph said he would look into it.


6. (C) Assistant Secretary of State Rood and Mr. Rozhkov
summarized the results of their January 26 Joint Initiative
meeting. The two sides had:

-- agreed that the Initiative's purpose should be to
deter states from pursuing reprocessing and enrichment
capabilities and, in return, to receive benefits;

-- proposed ideas to develop the "common vision" and
"attractive offer;"

-- agreed on potential criteria for supplier states and
beneficiary countries;

-- recognized that Argentina and Brazil would be
special situations, as they would be both suppliers and
beneficiaries;

-- agreed that India, Pakistan, and Israel should not
be discussed until a later stage in the Initiative's
development;

-- noted that North Korea and Iran were special cases
that need to be addressed at higher levels; and

-- agreed that the next steps would be to approach some
countries with these ideas.


7. (C) A/S Rood and Mr. Rozhkov held a side meeting on
January 29 to continue discussions on the Joint Initiative.
After their meeting, they reported that they had:

-- agreed that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism provided a good model for the Joint Initiative to
Strengthen Nuclear Nonproliferation;

-- agreed that beneficiary states under the Joint
Initiative should enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy
without concerns over the return of nuclear waste;

-- agreed that the attractive offer should address
financing and that the World Bank should be urged to agree to
provide financial aid to promote nuclear energy; and

-- committed to provide draft documents based on the
Global Initiative model by February 7 in preparation for the
February 12-13 meeting in Ankara.


8. (C) Securing a Commitment from Beneficiaries. U/S Joseph
emphasized that the Joint Initiative's key nonproliferation
benefit would be the commitment we received from countries
not to pursue the nuclear fuel cycle. We must ensure the
Initiative does not become an incentive for countries to
pursue the fuel cycle, and we should not provide them nuclear
energy capabilities without receiving such a commitment. DFM
Kislyak advised using constructive and respectful language
when dealing with prospective beneficiaries. He suggested
pointing out that we are offering a technically reliable,
economically attractive, and politically predictaZH*LPUsavQried the fuel cycle
would only
politicize the Initiative and discourage participation. U/S
Joseph also stressed that we needed to avoid discussions of
countries' rights under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Perhaps commercial contracts and
government-to-government agreements could be used to obtain
their commitment. In all cases, securing a commitment was
key to moving forward.


9. (SBU) Reactor Capacities. Rosatom's Kuchinov noted that,
given the diversity of countries in the world, small (100 MW)
and medium (300 MW) size reactors would be needed under the
Joint Initiative. The reactor size needed by each
beneficiary would depend upon the size and condition of that
country's power grids. He pointed out that Russia had begun
construction of a 70 MW reactor to supply electricity and
heat to a remote area in northern Russia. Russia had also
completed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Kazakhstan to
develop and provide 300 MW submarine-type reactors. DFM
Kislyak asked what type of arrangement should be used to
develop reactors for use by other countries, e.g.,
consortium, joint research, etc.


10. (SBU) U/S Joseph explained that the United States was
approaching this issue in a comprehensive manner through the
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Further work will
be required on disposition of spent fuel. We also need to
look at proliferation vulnerabilities; fuel assurances;
working with other countries to get them involved in
scientific and technical ways; fuel leasing; and use of small
reactors. Much was in the formulation stages and the United
States expected to have available a number of alternatives.


11. (C) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Funding.
DFM Kislyak drew attention to forecasts predicting a 60%
expansion in the global use of nuclear energy in the next 20
years. He believed, therefore, that the proliferation of
nuclear technologies would need to be addressed. He warned
that the IAEA safeguards inspection regime and technical
cooperation program could not be sustained within the current
system of voluntary contributions. We urged development of a
political and technological strategy. U/S Joseph agreed and

suggested working this issue bilaterally before involving
other countries. Based on his recent discussions in Japan,
he believed Japan might be willing to support. G8 financial
support might also be considered. These functions needed to
be funded.

--------------
Post-START Arrangement
--------------


12. (C) NPT Article VI Reductions. DFM Kislyak said Russia
considered it very important to assure critics that the
United States and Russia were continuing NPT Article VI
reductions. A straight-forward approach -- more than just
"joint propaganda" -- would be needed. U/S Joseph reminded
DFM Kislyak that the Moscow Treaty contains a commitment to
reductions. U.S. emphasis was on the tremendous disarmament
record to date, a record not recognized by many other
countries. That was not propaganda. There needed to be an
appreciation of the value of nuclear weapons in
nonproliferation efforts. DFM Kislyak said they each had
delivered this message during the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Other countries acknowledged the message, but have continued
to argue that the NPT nuclear weapons states (NWS) were not
committed to their Article VI obligations. He acknowledged
this was sometimes a cover-up for countries like Iran. The
United States and Russia needed to continue their reductions.
U/S Joseph replied that
the United States would deploy the nuclear weapons necessary
to meet its security requirements, and would not be driven by
the old arms control theology -- a theology for the
Non-Aligned Movement.


13. (C) Codifying Reductions. U/S Joseph noted that U.S.
strategic force levels were decreasing, not because of an
arms control treaty, but because U.S. requirements had
changed. DFM Kislyak asked why the United States had been
willing to codify reductions under the Moscow Treaty. U/S
Joseph said it was because Russia had declared its intent to
pursue reductions to the same levels that the United States
had already declared it would pursue. He noted that
codifying again the START limits of 1600 (delivery vehicles)
and 6000 (attributed warheads) would legitimize levels higher
than the levels actually deployed today by each side. Why
would we want to legitimize higher levels? DFM Kislyak asked
whether the United States and Russia could spell out their
post-START intentions in a manner that showed they were not
going to recreate the arms races of the past starting in

2009. U/S Joseph commended DFM Kislyak's formulation -- "not
to recreate the arms races of the past" -- and believed it
was useful for Russia to make that statement.


14. (C) U.S. Response to Russian Aide-Memoire. U/S Joseph
articulated the following responses to issues raised in
Russia's December 8, 2006, aid-memoire (Ref B):

-- On retaining START limits: Today U.S. and Russian
force levels were much below the START limits and the limits
bore no relationship to the actual strategic forces on either
side. The security situation had changed significantly and
both sides had adjusted their force postures. The United
States considered the Moscow Treaty limits as sufficient.

-- On continuing the START provisions not to base
strategic offensive arms outside national territory: The
issue concerns the stationing or long-term movements of U.S.
heavy bombers outside national territory. The United States
had shown those movements were unrelated to Russia and it
would not be useful to continue notifying them.

-- On not locating deployed SOA outside facilities
agreed by the Parties: The United States was not sure what
Russian problem this would address.

-- On retaining the START conceptual framework: The
United States did not understand what Russia meant by its
proposal to retain, for the most part, the START conceptual
framework. What was Russia trying to address?


15. (C) General Buzhinskiy responded that Russia could not
accept the U.S.-proposed CBM approach. It was unclear what
the United States intended by its proposal. For example,
what data would be exchanged and how often? Would data be
exchanged if there had been no change in the data? Would the

data be disaggregated by location or type of item? U/S
Joseph explained that Russia's approach hypothesized about a
problem that did not exist. That was not productive. It
would be helpful to know what problems that Russia was trying
to address. The United States and Russia should focus their
resources on the issues of today that would have a
fundamental difference, e.g., the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation. DFM
Kislyak said Russia believed CBMs could be useful if they
were self-constraining measures. Stand-alone CBMs would not
be enough.


16. (C) Proposed Meeting of Experts. U/S Joseph suggested
that U.S. and Russian experts meet to discuss the
U.S.-proposed CBMs and to find a mutually agreeable way
forward. He believed that an expert-level discussion could
be useful, but not if it involved a discussion of constraints
on strategic offensive arms. He made clear that, if the
experts met, they would not conduct an article-by-article
review of the START Treaty. DFM Kislyak agreed, suggesting
instead that the purpose of the meeting should be to identify
elements of an arrangement that could be worked out. The
experts could take elements from the U.S. and Russian papers
and develop a third paper. U/S Joseph agreed to give this
approach a try, with the experts meeting in the context of
pursuing a framework. The focus would be on a set of CBMs
and measures considered useful in the context of the new
relationship. DFM Kislyak explained that Russia was looking
for predictability and confidence-building. The question of
how to put the arrangement on paper would be another issue.
U/S Joseph made clear that the United States was willing to
pursue a framework for confidence-building and
predictability, but did not want to bring back an arms
control approach.


17. (C) U/S Joseph and DFM Kislyak agreed that the meeting of
experts would not be considered negotiations, and it would
not be held in Geneva, Helsinki, or Vienna. DFM Kislyak
declined to indicate who would lead Russia's team, but said
Russia would inform the United States within a few weeks.

--------------
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
--------------


18. (C) U/S Joseph said he was impressed with all elements in
the draft work program, and that so many countries were
pursuing initiatives to support the Global Initiative's
principles. He urged developing a strong outreach program
and making arrangements for other states to join the
Initiative after the Initiative meeting in Ankara on February
12-13, 2007.


19. (C) DFM Kislyak suggested agreeing on an approach for
attracting new partners (e.g., globally or region-by-region;
consider NPT membership or not). He asked how the Initiative
should handle Pakistan given that the Taliban posed a
proliferation threat. He believed that a decision should be
made at Ankara to invite Pakistan to join, and that Ukraine,
South Africa, and Brazil were major countries which needed to
be involved. He also asked to consult with the United States
on how to deal with Israel. U/S Joseph understood that at
Ankara the partners would discuss expanding the Initiative's
partnership and that a number of other countries would
endorse the Statement of Principles. He believed there was a
practical need to define a set of criteria for accepting new
partners (e.g., a candidate's nonproliferation record,
contribution to global representation, and potential for
making substantive contributions). He also believed it would
be difficult to say that certain countries could not
participate even
though they had endorsed the Statement of Principles. DFM
Kislyak concurred that the partners needed to agree.


20. (SBU) U/S Joseph and DFM Kislyak agreed to hold bilateral
discussions on the day prior to the start of the multilateral
meetings in Ankara in order to coordinate positions on Global
Initiative issues. In addition, DFM Kislyak confirmed that
Kazakhstan had agreed to host the third meeting of the
Initiative. U/S Joseph suggested informing the other
partners.

-------------- --------------
Trends and Directions in U.S. and Russian Defense Doctrine

and Programs
-------------- --------------


21. (SBU) Russia's Military Doctrine. General Buzhinskiy
provided copies of an eight-page briefing on "Directions and
Trends of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation."
He confirmed that it was the same briefing presented at the
September 15, 2006, meeting of the strategic security
dialogue (Ref C). He remarked that the current doctrine was
adopted in 2000, and was designed to be adaptable to cover
all developments.


22. (C) Noting that Russia was concerned about NATO's
November 2006 Riga Communique listing energy security as an
issue, General Buzhinskiy said Russian military doctrine (and
the briefing) now took into account depletion of energy
resources and emergence of various inter-state conflicts.
Russia preferred to resolve all issues by non-military means,
but reserved the right to protect its military and economic
interests. This was nothing new.


23. (C) Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. U/S Joseph recalled
that during their September 2006 meeting, they had discussed
Russia's increased reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons
(NSNW). He asked whether there had been a change since then.
General Buzhinskiy said Russia had never declared a greater
reliance on NSNW. Such weapons were merely part of Russia's
defense potential. The actual number of such weapons had
been reduced. Only the percentage of these weapons relative
to Russia's conventional weapons had increased. U/S Joseph
noted that the U.S. NSNW inventory had been reduced by
95-100%, while Russia's NSNW inventory had not. Thus, the
focus was now on Russia's NSNW. He asked whether that should
change. General Buzhinskiy replied that the U.S. and Russian
geographic situations were much different. MFA Director of
Security and Disarmament Affairs Antonov offered that Russia
provided figures on its NSNW in a report to the United
Nations in April 2005.


24. (C) Nuclear Stockpiles. U/S Joseph said the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) discussion would continue to play
out. He noted that the RRW would be a new design, but it
would not provide new capability. He further noted that the
U.S. and Russian approaches to maintaining their nuclear
stockpiles were different. Whereas the United States
considered the Stockpile Stewardship Program to be the most
efficient way to lengthen the life of its stockpile, Russia
continued to produce new nuclear weapons. General Buzhinskiy
acknowledged that this was a difficult issue to address, but
that the pattern which U/S Joseph suggested still existed in
Russia. There were a number of nuclear weapons depots and
storage sites and it was a costly program to maintain. He
could not comment further, because he was not in charge of
those matters.


25. (C) Conventionally Equipped Long-Range Ballistic
Missiles. U/S Joseph offered in the spirit of transparency
and confidence-building to address Russia's concerns
regarding conventionally equipped long-range ballistic
missiles. Responding to Russia's concerns that it would
misinterpret a conventional launch as nuclear, DASD Green
said there was no indication that Russian forces had
overreacted in past practice or that Russian doctrine would
cause them to do so. DASD Green summarized the following
steps that the United States was willing to take to address
Russia's concerns on this issue:

-- operate long-range ballistic missiles only at the
direction of the President;

-- use command and control procedures with the same
surety and positive control as those that are used for
nuclear weapons to prevent any unauthorized launch;

-- keep the systems and procedures separate from those
used for nuclear weapons;

-- commit not to fly over Russian territory with a
conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile;

-- engage Russia in other confidence-building measures,
including participation in exercises and wargames;

-- continue to consult on this issue with the Russian

MoD, and in other U.S.-Russia channels;

-- use a number of existing communication channels,
e.g., MOLINK pre-positioned messages.


26. (C) DFM Kislyak asked when the United States would
provide notification in the case of the launch of a
conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile. DASD
Green said this was still an open question, but that
operational security issues would need to be considered. DFM
Kislyak reiterated that Russia was very concerned how it
would differentiate a conventional missile from a nuclear
missile given that the reaction time available to
decision-makers would be very limited. Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense Benkert added that conventionally armed

SIPDIS
long-range ballistic missiles would be discussed during the
following week's meeting between Secretary of Defense Gates
and Defense Minister Ivanov, and that the United States
expected to provide a paper on the issue then. U/S Joseph
said this was an important capability and discussions would
continue on it in this and DoD-MoD channels.

--------------
Missile Defense
--------------


27. (C) DFM Kislyak expressed Russian concerns regarding a
U.S. missile defense site in Europe. Russia did not believe
this capability would be designed solely to counter an
Iranian missile threat. It would constitute a
reconfiguration in U.S. strategic presence that included a
deployment of U.S. strategic forces in Europe and, for the
first time, beyond the original NATO borders. Russia did not
take this lightly and would need to do a full assessment.
Russia believed this system would be the first step in a
larger effort and could cause complications for the strategic
situation. The silos would be close to Russian borders.
Moreover, the silos, which were very similar to Minuteman II
ICBM silos, could be used to deploy strategic missiles. The
United States was creating a system in which Russia would not
participate and that would not be friendly to Russia.


28. (C) General Buzhinskiy added that Russia had not been
convinced by the briefings that the United States had
provided on this issue. He noted that the intermediate-range
ballistic missile threat had not materialized by 2005 as the
United States had predicted when it withdrew from the 1972
ABM Treaty. He also noted that locating a "mobile" U.S.
radar with ground detection capability in the Caspian region
would provide the United States the ability to observe
Russian strategic forces' means of delivery.


29. (C) U/S Joseph pointed out that the United States had
repeatedly addressed Russian concerns regarding U.S. missile
defense plans, and it would continue to do so. Last week
Russia was notified that President Bush made a decision to
move forward on discussions toward the goal of deploying
missile defense interceptors in Poland and a mid-course radar
in the Czech Republic (Ref D). Russia was also informed that
this was not a decision to move forward on deployment.
Senior DoD officials had briefed Russian Defense Minister
Ivanov on these plans in November 2005, and the United States
had also used NATO meetings to provide transparency on the
issue. U/S Joseph urged that the United States and Russia
continue to work together so Russia had the information it
needed to have confidence for its assessment. The United
States had worked hard to ensure this deployment was not
misperceived as a threat to Russia. We should continue this
discussion in MFA and MoD channels.


30. (C) ASD (Acting) Benkert added that senior DoD officials
had explained to Minister Ivanov in November why the physics
and geography were such that the interceptors and radar in
Europe would not pose a threat to Russia. The number of
interceptors would be too small and the radar would not be
well-positioned to counter Russian strategic missiles.
Secretary Gates intended to discuss this issue further with

SIPDIS
Minister Ivanov. The United States recognized that the
November discussions may not have fully convinced the
Russians, and it was willing to continue the dialogue to
address Russian concerns, including at expert levels.
Responding to statements by Russian officials that Iran did
not pose a strategic threat, DASD Green added that the United
States had recognized it would take a long time to deploy a

missile defense system against such a new missile threat.


31. (C) European/NATO Missile Defense. DFM Kislyak continued
to link U.S. missile defense plans with any European/NATO
missile defense plan. He asked how a NATO-Russia missile
defense plan might be integrated into a U.S. or NATO
architecture. DASD Green responded that the NATO-Russia
theater missile defense plan would focus on shorter range
threats, while the U.S. missile defense would focus on longer
range threats. ASD(Acting) Benkert said NATO had completed
only a feasibility study on the question of missile defense
for NATO. He believed there was a need to add the NATO
question to future U.S.-Russia missile defense discussions.


32. (C) Patriot Missiles. DFM Kislyak asked whether the
United States would deploy Patriot missiles to protect the
missile defense silos in Poland. DASD Green replied that
there would be no technical reason to deploy Patriots for
missile defense purposes. Poland had expressed interest in
broader strategic relations with the United States, and this
would be discussed by the two countries.

--------------
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation
--------------


33. (C) U/S Joseph acknowledged the progress made toward
finalizing the draft U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful
Nuclear Cooperation ("Section 123 Agreement"). He noted that
issues including technology sharing and reprocessing had yet
to be resolved. The United States would soon provide Russia
proposed language relating to those issues. U/S Joseph
reminded DFM Kislyak that completion of the agreement
depended upon progress in working together on Iran. DFM
Kislyak challenged that President Bush had assured President
Putin there would be no objection to completing the
agreement. U/S Joseph cautioned that the agreement, once
signed, would need to set before Congress and that Congress
would weigh the agreement based on Russia's nonproliferation
record with regard to Iran. He had been very clear about
this from the outset.


34. (U) U/S Joseph has cleared this message.
RUSSELL