URUGUAY ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000947

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE
CIA FOR NCTC
BUENOS AIRES FOR LEGATT (WGODOY) AND DHS/ICE (DFREEMAN)
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PTER KVPR PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS PBTS
UY
SUBJECT: URUGUAY ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION
COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING

REF: STATE 133921

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PETER X. HARDING
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Introduction: This telegram responds to reftel action
request for information. Methodology and sources used to
compile this report included an in-depth interview by
regional LEGATT (Buenos Aires) with Dra. Carmen Conte,
Director, Direccion Nacional de Migracion and with Comisario
Jorge Scelza Stiya, Director de Migraciones at Aeropuerto
Internacional de Carrasco on October 4, 2007. Additional
information was provided by the Embassy's RSO, Political and
Consular sections, other agencies at post and contacts. End
Introduction.


2. (C) Begin report.

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A. Watchlisting
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-- Q. If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many
records does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related?
-- A. The Direccion Nacional de Migracion (DNM) maintains a
computerized database with the names of INTERPOL fugitives,
Uruguayan fugitives, minors with travel restrictions, and
persons with civil and/or criminal travel restrictions. None
are terrorist-related.

-- Q. Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist?
-- A. The Direccion Nacional de Migracin (DNM),Ministry
of Interior

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B. Traveler Information Collection
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-- Q. What are the country's policies (legislation,
mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers
arriving in the country?
-- A. The DNM is only authorized to collect very basic
information regarding travelers and is not allowed to request
additional information. Collected information includes;
travel document (passport) information, mode and purpose of
travel, and destination.

-- Q. Are there different policies for air, sea, and land
entry and for domestic flights?
-- A. No, they are same for all.

-- Q. Who collects traveler information?
-- A. Direccion Nacional de Migracion (DNM). Customs also
collects information on transfers of money over $10,000.00

-- Q. What are the policies of the collecting agency to
share that information with foreign governments?
-- A. There are no formal policies, but DNM cooperates with
requests for information from other countries. The consular
section has received excellent cooperation in efforts to
locate American citizens (AMCITs) for welfare and whereabouts
inquiries, as well as verifying travel for Non-Immigrant Visa
(NIV) purposes.

-- Q. Does the host government collect Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?
Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement
purposes to screen travelers? Does host government have any
existing treaties to share PNR data?
-- A. Yes on the first question. No on the other two
questions.

-- Q. If applicable, have advance passenger information
systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information
systems (IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at detecting other national security threats, such
as wanted criminals?
-- A. Not applicable. DNM is not authorized to receive
passenger lists from the airlines.


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C. Border Control and Screening
--------------

-- Q. Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers of security interest?
-- A. No.

-- Q. Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only
non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information
is not actually recorded electronically? What is the
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
exits?
-- A. Entry and departure at major ports of entry is
tracked electronically. DNM provides travel history for NIV
applicants at the applicant's request. At land borders
crossings with Argentina and Brazil, inspection of vehicles
and identify documents is sporadic at best and at times
non-existent.

-- Q. Do host government border control officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this
authority (legislation, mandates, etc.
-- A. The DNM computerized database contains the list of
INTERPOL fugitives and Uruguayan fugitives, but wanted
persons are not denied entry to Uruguay. Instead, the
Uruguay National Police INTERPOL Office is notified and the
person is arrested.

-- Q. What are the host government's policies on
questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals
presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country?
Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry?
-- A. DNM is only permitted very limited questioning beyond
checking the traveler,s documents. No one is denied entry
to the country. If the traveler is a fugitive, the police
detain the traveler.

-- Q. How well does information sharing function within the
host government, e.g., if there is a determination that
someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified
with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved
internally?
-- A. The police are immediately notified and the police
detain the person, but the traveler is never denied entry
into Uruguay.

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D. Biometric Collection
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-- Q. Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs?
What are the systems and models used?
-- A. No.

-- Q. Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does
the host government target a specific population for
collection (i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric
collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure
the biometric presented matches the one stored on the
e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric
presented against a database of known biometrics)?
-- A. Not applicable.

-- Q. If biometric systems are in place, does the host
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?
-- A. Not applicable.

-- Q. What are the host government's policies on collecting
the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?
-- A. DNM is not authorized to collect fingerprints of
travelers.

-- Q. Which agency is responsible for the host government's
fingerprint system?

-- A. Policia Tecnica, Policia Nacional de Uruguay.
Individual's seeking residence in Uruguay submit police
clearances from each country they lived in for more than 6
months, and then INTERPOL then takes those fingerprints and
forwards them to the FBI for clearance.

-- Q. Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I,
EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant?
-- A. INT-I compliant

-- Q. Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled?
Which agency collects the fingerprints?
-- A. Rolled, taken by la Policia Technica.

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E. Passports
--------------

-- Q. If the host government issues a machine-readable
passport containing biometric information, does the host
government share the public key required to read the
biometric information with any other governments? If so,
which governments?
-- A. Machine-readable passports have been available for
the past five years, but not all passports issued during that
time are machine-readable. The consular section continues to
see hand-written passports from overseas Uruguayan missions
and official passports that are hand-written.

-- Q. Does the host government issue replacement passports
for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?
-- A. Emergency replacement consular passports are only
valid for eight days, one use and are surrendered upon return
to Uruguay. A regular 5-year passport can be obtained at
consulates, but requires all of the normal checks and IDs
which take about three months when requested in a foreign
country.

-- Q. Does the host government have special
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen
multiple times?
-- A. The Consular section is not aware of any special
procedures. No other information is available.

-- Q. Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration
passports)?
-- A. All passports issued in Uruguay are identical and
machine-readable. Consular emergency passports issued
outside of Uruguay are different in appearance and not
machine-readable.

-- Q. Do emergency replacement passports contain the same
or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?
-- A. Not Applicable

-- Q. Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in
the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of
prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?
-- A. No discernible increase in the use of 'clean'
passports, but the number of applicants that try and use this
tactic to disguise their travel is steady. When applicants
are unable to provide past passports in order to provide
proof of previous travel, the consular section (CONS)
requests that they obtain an immigration report from DNM. In
two cases, CONS found fraudulent immigration reports when
they cross checked with DNM directly. The DNM employees
involved were fired and prosecuted.

-- Q. Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic
number series or otherwise identified?
-- A. All passports have the same number as the Uruguayan
cedula. There is no identification or characteristic for
replacement passports, nor even a annotation indicating that
it is a replacement. This has created problems for the GOU
at POEs, because the passport number in the replacement
passport is the name as the old passport, which has been

reported as missing.

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F. Fraud Detection
--------------

-- Q. How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?
-- A. Fake documents are reported to the police.

-- Q. How are potentially fraudulently issued documents
taken out of circulation, or made harder to use?
-- A. Fake documents are given to the police.

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G. Privacy and Data Security
--------------

-- Q. What are the country's policies on records related to
the questioning, detention or removal of individuals
encountered at points of entry into the country? How are
those records stored, and for how long?
-- A. DNM records are maintained at DNM Headquarters, but
again DNM questioning is very limited and no one is denied
entry into the country.

-- Q. What are the country's restrictions on the collection
or use of sensitive data?
-- A. Not authorized.

-- Q. What are the requirements to provide notice to the
public on the implementation of new databases of records?
-- A. Any changes require new legislation. DNM has a
webpage with general information for the traveling public.

-- Q. Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information?
-- A. No. Only DNM internal regulations and practices.

-- Q. What are the rules on an individual's ability to
access data that homeland security agencies hold about them?
-- A. This information is confidential and not shared with
the public. However, an individual is able to request and
receive a record of their own entries and exits.

-- Q. Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
enforcement actions)?
-- A. Post does not have any information on this question.

-- Q. Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data?
-- A. Post believes that a non-citizen/non-resident has the
right to ask for their own record of entries and departures.
Police clearance records are also available to an individual
for clearance and immigration purposes.

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H. Immigration Data Bases
--------------

-- Q. What computerized immigration databases are used to
track entries and exits?
-- A. The DNM system is named Registro de Analysis de los
Movimientos Migratorios (RAM).

-- Q. Is the immigration database available at all ports of
entry (POEs)?
-- A. No, presently installed at Montevideo and Punta del
Este airports, Montevideo and Colonia seaports, and the
bridge at Fray Bentos. In six months RAM will be installed
at all POEs.

-- Q. If immigration databases are available at some POEs,
but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs
will receive the tool?
-- A. In six months RAM will be installed at all POEs.

-- Q. What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the

systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts,
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?
-- A. The RAM system has UPS to deal with power brownouts.
No other problems were mentioned.

-- Q. How often are national immigration databases updated?
-- A. The RAM system is continually updated.

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I. Watchlist and Information Sharing
--------------

-- Q. Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?
-- A. No.

-- Q. What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons,
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?
-- A. DNII and criminal warrants, including interpol.

-- Q. What international watchlists does the host
government use for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or
TSA No Fly lists, UN, etc.?

SIPDIS
-- A. The DNM system is named Registro de Analysis de los
Movimientos Migratorios (RAM) and includes INTERPOL fugitives.

-- Q. What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements
exist between host government and its neighbors?
-- A. NONE.

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J. Biometrics
--------------

-- Q. Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry
(air, land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to
install such a system?
-- A. No.

-- Q. If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but
not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool?
-- A. Not Applicable.

-- Q. What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics,
gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant?
-- A. Not Applicable.

-- Q. Does the host government issue a machine-readable
passport containing biometric information? If e-Passports
are issued, what biometric information is included on the
document i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc? If
not, does host government plan to issue a biometric document
in the future? When?
-- A. Not Applicable. No plans at present to issue
biometric documents.

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Identifying Appropriate Partners
--------------

-- Q. Department would appreciate post's assessment of
whether host government would be an appropriate partner in
data sharing.
-- A. New legislation would be needed before a data sharing
agreement could be entered into with the Uruguayan government.

-- Q. Considerations include whether host government
watchlists may include political dissidents (as opposed or in
addition to terrorists),and whether host governments would
share or use U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.
-- A. Not Applicable.

-- Q. Are there political realities which would preclude a
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement
with the U.S?



-- A. The left-leaning Frente Amplio government has been
reluctant to public acknowledge current and potential
security cooperation with the USG. Privately, the GOU has
been very cooperative with both the RSO and other agencies at
post. The DNII routinely shares data with the RSO, including
biographical information, wants/warrants, police records,
financial information, vehicle registrations/address, radical
affiliations, and other information (close hold this
information).
-- Q. Is the host country's legal system sufficiently
developed to adequately provide safeguards for the protection
and nondisclosure of information?
-- A. Yes.

-- Q. How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?
-- A. DNM shares information with the police, but there is
no consolidated database and the RAM system is only
accessible to DNM personnel.

-- Q. How does the country define terrorism? Are there
legal statutes that do so?
-- A. Uruguay is a party to all thirteen United Nations
conventions combating international terrorism. Uruguayan
Public laws 14.728, 17.835 and 18.070 address issues of
terrorism. Uruguay is also party to the Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism.

End Report.


3. (C) Comment. Embassy has identified and will report on
several possible ways for the GOU to improve its information
collection, screening and sharing activities, including
computer/database needs. End Comment.
Harding