URUGUAY ON THE PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGE AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L MONTEVIDEO 000345

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR WHA/BSC,IO/PHO AND PM/PPA
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO MOPS MARR UY
SUBJECT: URUGUAY ON THE PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGE AHEAD

REF: A. STATE 027147

B. 06 STATE 134133

Classified By: Ambassador Frank E. Baxter
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: This telegram provides local context on the
challenge of finding enough troops, military observers and
police to staff new UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (ref
A). Uruguay is likely to maintain its unmatched per capita
contributions to PKO, and it appears well disposed to join
some of the missions in Africa, probably Darfur/Chad.
However, GOU officials have expressed some frustration with
the way PKO has been managed. They hope for improvements so
that future opportunities are not lost. One problem seems to
be a lack of effective communication between the UN's
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the
military command here. For whatever reason, Uruguayan senior
officers often find out late or never about upcoming PKO
missions and related issues. Officials also complain that the
UN is months in arrears on PKO payments for salaries and
equipment. This places a heavy burden on the cash-strapped
armed forces here. Finally, the GOU would welcome any
DOS/GPOI funds that can be used to refurbish its PKO training
area. End Summary.

PKO and Foreign Policy
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2. (C) Uruguay's foreign relations have historically
reflected the efforts of a small nation to advocate
self-determination, non-intervention, respect for human
rights and the rule of law, the pacific settlement of
disputes, and economic cooperation. Uruguay's enthusiastic
participation in international peacekeeping operations can
partly be attributed to the country's dedication and faith in
international organizations. Prestige, on-the-job training
and economic benefits for the poorly-funded military services
are other important considerations. Except for a few far-left
radicals, there is no domestic opposition to PKO here. We
note that Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos recently
congratulated Uruguayan troops for their actions in Kinshasa.
We also note that UY's MOD Azucena Berrutti -- a long-time
Socialist and human rights activist -- recently told the
Ambassador that, "Bringing peace is a most noble mission for
our military."

Problems
--------------

3. (C) However, if Uruguay's civilian leadership appears
content with the political benefits of international PKO, it
also tends to delegate most of the logistical and
decision-making responsibilities for PKO to the UY military,
mainly the Army. The apparent apathy -- whether by Uruguay's
diplomatic mission in New York, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) here or UNDP's mission in Uruguay -- this trait
translates into poor coordination and miscommunication
between the end user (DPKO) and the service provider (the UY
military high command).


4. (C) For example, last August the Embassy demarched the MFA
on the urgent need to send troops to Lebanon in support of
UNIFIL (ref B). As far as we can tell we were the only
country to do so and even the UN mission here did not
demarche the MFA. (We note that the Foreign Minister is very
anti-American and that sometimes US demarches can actually be
counter-productive. End note.) Senior army officers
privately told us that they were inclined to provide troops
to UNIFIL because it represented the "big leagues" of PKO.
They also reported that President Vazquez was on board, but
that a "special invitation" from DPKO to Uruguay was needed
to provide political cover for such a risky mission. Whatever
the reason, the invitation never materialized and
consequently Uruguay never signed up for UNIFIL. Some UY
officers blame Uruguay's liaison to DPKO (Col. Devercelli)
for failing to follow through on the request for an
invitation. We do not know the full story, but it's
disappointing that something as innocuous as a missing
invitation could have prevented Uruguay from signing up for
such an important mission.


5. (SBU) In another area, some Uruguayan officers claim that
the UN is $14 million in arrears on PKO reimbursements for
equipment (9 months in the case of MINUSTAH in Haiti and 11
months in the case of MONUC in DROC). They also assert that
salaries for peace keepers are behind to the tune of $7
million. If true, this represents $21 million in arrears to a
military that can ill afford it. We note that the GOU
recently scaled back its troop deployments from nine months
to only six. Officials explained that the move was made to
reduce disciplinary problems among returning vets and to
lessen family stress associated with prolonged deployments.

Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
--------------

6. (SBU) The Uruguayan military is also eager for more
participation in GPOI. The UY military badly needs to
refurbish its joint services PKO training area so that it can
expand training opportunities for peace keepers here and
abroad. Though a small country, Uruguay's instructors have
gathered considerable expertise in the field over the course
of many PKO missions, and they are willing to share it. The
Embassy supports Uruguay's efforts to privide more and better
PKO trainers.

Comment:
--------------

7. (C) While the left-leaning GOU is often suspicious of US
security cooperation, it has no qualms about participating in
blue helmet operations. Embassy considers Uruguay's
continued, robust PKO participation to be in line with US
national interests and have incorporated it as major goal in
our Mission Strategic Plan (MSP). I frequently congratulate
GOU officials for Uruguay's participation in PKO. Perhaps it
is time to help them with something more concrete. We would
welcome any efforts by the Department to encourage the GOU's
commitment to PKO, including assistance to resolve
communications problems, clear up arrears and/or support
Uruguay's greater participation in GPOI. End Comment.
Baxter