Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MINSK187
2007-03-05 11:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Minsk
Cable title:  

KOZULIN'S LAWYER TALKS POLITICS, SHOWS IMPRESSIVE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5236
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSK #0187/01 0641115
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051115Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5721
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1441
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000187 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: KOZULIN'S LAWYER TALKS POLITICS, SHOWS IMPRESSIVE
VISION

REF: A. 06 MINSK 731

B. MINSK 003

C. MINSK 177

D. 06 MINSK 1278

E. 06 MINSK 1301

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: KOZULIN'S LAWYER TALKS POLITICS, SHOWS IMPRESSIVE
VISION

REF: A. 06 MINSK 731

B. MINSK 003

C. MINSK 177

D. 06 MINSK 1278

E. 06 MINSK 1301

Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) On March 1, Ambassador met with former opposition
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin's attorney, Igor
Rynkevich, as an act of moral support following politically
motivated threats against Rynkevich's law license and person.
Rynkevich, himself a member of Kozulin's party, confirmed
that Kozulin supports the upcoming congress of Belarusian
pro-democracy forces to draft a common opposition plan for
democratizing Belarus. Moreover, he supports Aleksandr
Milinkevich's participation in that congress but criticizes
his non-partisan civil society movement. In other comments,
Rynkevich demonstrated far greater balance and insight into
the state of the opposition and Belarus' European prospects
than we are used to hearing. End summary.

GOB Pressure on Kozulin's Lawyer
--------------


2. (C) On March 1, Ambassador met with Igor Rynkevich, the
lawyer for imprisoned opposition leader Aleksandr Kozulin, to
offer him moral support after the Minsk Regional Bar
Association issued him a politically motivated disciplinary
warning for alleged "violations of labor discipline" and
several GOB threats to revoke his law license. Rynkevich was
Kozulin's principal defense counsel during his July 2006
trial on politically motivated charges of "hooliganism" and
disturbing the peace (ref A). Despite a February 16 decision
by prison authorities to bar Rynkevich from visiting Kozulin,
Rynkevich later met with Kozulin and shared much of their
conversation on issues of Belarusian opposition politics with
Ambassador.

Kozulin Seeks Milinkevich's Participation in the Congress

-------------- --------------


3. (C) Rynkevich confirmed for Ambassador that Kozulin
supports holding a democratic congress (preferably before the
April 26 Chernobyl demonstration) and encouraging opposition
coalition de facto leader Aleksandr Milinkevich's
participation. Noting Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Chair
Vintsuk Vyachorka's recent efforts to secure Milinkevich's

participation in the congress, Ambassador asked Rynkevich
whether Kozulin would support the BPF leader's proposal to
elect Milinkevich as president of the coalition's Political
Council and create an executive council with rotational
leadership composed of other democratic coalition
representatives. Rynkevich responded affirmatively and
recalled how he recently communicated to Milinkevich a
similar suggestion from Kozulin. Rynkevich stressed that
Kozulin regards Milinkevich as deserving special leadership
status. Nevertheless, Kozulin insists that Belarus'
pro-democracy parties should convene a congress of opposition
forces with or without Milinkevich's participatio
n.

Kozulin on the Purposes of an Opposition Congress
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Kozulin believes that the principal purposes of such
a congress should be a common opposition declaration on the
illegitimacy of Lukashenko's presidency and the drafting of a
short common opposition plan, or "Little Constitution," for
the transformation of Belarus from a totalitarian state to a
liberal democracy. The little constitution would be a legal
framework for the coalition's eventual election of an
opposition shadow government that would seek recognition from
the international community as the legitimate alternative to
the Lukashenko regime.


5. (C) According to Rynkevich, Kozulin would prefer a more
ambitious shadow government, what he calls a "people's
government," that would also include members of the 13th
Supreme Soviet, as well as the Belarusian diaspora, and would
directly challenge Lukashenko's constitutional authority
(Note: Lukashenko disbanded the 13th Supreme Soviet, the
country's last freely-elected parliament, after Belarus'
bogus 1996 constitutional referendum. End note.) However,

MINSK 00000187 002 OF 002


Kozulin regards his proposal for a smaller, more modest
shadow government as a necessary concession to elicit the
participation of Milinkevich and other major opposition
leaders who regard Kozulin's broader desiderata as "too
radical."

Kozulin Criticizes Milinkevich's "Non-Party Movement"
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Despite Kozulin's support for Vyachorka's compromise
on the leadership issue, Kozulin remains opposed to electing
Milinkevich as the sole opposition plenipotentiary. Noting
that no totalitarian government in recent history has ceded
power to an opposition leader not backed by an opposition
party, Rynkevich argued that Milinkevich made his first
serious mistake by investing his post-election political
capital in his non-party "For Freedom" civil society movement
that has done little since its creation in mid-2006.
Rynkevich attributed the movement's shortcomings to a lack of
organizational structure and member enthusiasm that only
political parties can generate. Accordingly, Rynkevich
predicted that "For Freedom" turnout during the upcoming
March 25 opposition demonstrations would fall significantly
short of Milinkevich's projections (ref B).

...And His Misunderstanding of Geo-Politics
--------------


7. (C) Rynkevich also criticized Milinkevich for failing to
appreciate Russia's interests in Belarus prior to the recent
energy conflict with Gazprom (ref C). Kozulin maintains that
any realistic plan for democratizing Belarus must address
Russian interests and recognize that only the United States
has the moral and political will to mediate with Russia.
Rynkevich added that the United States had proved its
strength by raising the plight of Kozulin and other
Belarusian political prisoners at the UN Security Council
(UNSC) on December 13, 2006.

Kozulin's Condition and Gratitude to United States
-------------- --------------


8. (C) When Ambassador inquired about Kozulin's health,
Rynkevich replied that Kozulin was recovering slowly since he
had been very close to death just before ending his 53-day
hunger strike (ref D). He then reminded Ambassador of the
letter from Kozulin's wife, in which she credited the U.S.
effort in the UNSC with saving her husband's life by enabling
him to end his fast (ref E). As the meeting concluded,
Rynkevich expressed to Ambassador the Kozulins' most
heartfelt gratitude to the U.S. government and the American
people.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) If Rynkevich presented us with an accurate picture of
Kozulin's views, the imprisoned opposition leader (and his
faithful attorney) demonstrate a keen understanding of the
challenges facing the opposition and viable solutions to
overcoming them. Kozulin's receptiveness to Milinkevich's
participation in the congress and to Vyachorka's compromise
proposal is surprising and encouraging.


10. (C) While Rynkevich went to great lengths to promote
Kozulin's perspective, Rynkevich proved to be an intelligent,
thoughtful, articulate, and therefore impressive figure in
his own right. We concluded the meeting thinking, "if only
this guy were catapulted to a senior leadership position in
the opposition coalition."


11. (C) Biographical note: Rynkevich has acted as Kozulin's
primary spokesman on political issues since Kozulin ended his
53-day hunger strike in December 2006. Formerly an attorney
for the Belarusian Association of Journalists, he is also
Co-Chair of the "Freedom to Kozulin" Committee and was
recently nominated by Kozulin to become Belarusian Social
Democratic Party "Gramada" Deputy Chair. In partnership with
prominent human rights defenders Igor Lednik and Vyacheslav
Sivchik, Rynkevich is currently working on a strategy to
advance the goal of eventual Belarusian membership in the
European Union.

Stewart