FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCURS WITH U.S. ON SEVERAL ISSUES;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/8/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PTER MARR KNNP EFIN LT
SUBJECT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCURS WITH U.S. ON SEVERAL ISSUES;
CAMPAIGN HEATS UP

REF: (A) MASERU 60 (B) STATE 14457 (C) STATE 14071 (D) STATE 10275 (E) MASERU 27

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CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



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SUMMARY
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1. (S) On February 7 ( and over the course of the past 3 weeks)
Ambassador raised key U.S. policy issues with Foreign Minister
Moleleki. We also discussed the issues facing the February 17
general elections. On the new U.S. Africa Military Command,
Moleleki was in complete agreement with the U.S. action and the
President's announcement. He expressed appreciation for the
U.S. role in trying to achieve calm in areas of conflict
throughout the continent. Concerning the sanctions on Iran,
Moleleki asserted the Government of Lesotho (GOL) was in full
support of that position and, in fact, feared that any increase
in Iran's nuclear capability posed a threat not only to the
West, but to Africa as well; and he was fully supportive of our
freezing of assets of the Dockrat Family which serves as a front
for al-Qaida.


2. (S) In terms of the February 17 campaign, the Foreign
Minister was certain that the ruling Lesotho Congress for
Democracy (LCD) party would win. He was vociferous in his
attacks on the opposition All Basotho Convention (ABC) Leader
Thomas Thabane and accused him of using criminals within his
party during rallies. He alleged a shooting on the weekend of
February 3-4 was instigated and carried out by the ABC against
sympathizers of the LCD. As he has previously, the Foreign
Minister stated the Libyans are providing funding to the ABC
Party. In a curious and complex twist, Moleleki argued that the
ABC would be receiving funds from South Africa, except for the
fact that the Republic of South Africa was also aware of the
North African/Islamist influence within the ABC party.
Moleleki's outburst comes as no surprise to us. As we have been
reporting over a year, he has intense feelings about Thabane and
his perceived role in the Foreign Minister's attempted
assasination of 2006. His statement that the GOL stands firmly
with the U.S. on counter-terrorism issues is consistent with
Lesotho's policies and stances to date. End Summary

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African Command
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3. (C) We reviewed the talking points on the African Command
and the establishment thereof by President Bush with Moleleki,
emphasizing that "Africa matters" to the U.S., and that we want
to assist in a concrete military force for the achievement of
stability across the continent. Such stability would also help
to develop a stronger economy and the decision demonstrates the
U.S.'s long-term commitment to strengthening its ties to the
continent. Moleleki responded that he was delighted to learn
of AFRICOM and pointed to the on-going problems in Somalia and
Sudan as indicative that Africa does indeed need such a
dedicated area of operation. He stated that Lesotho would be
supportive as needed and/or as requested by the U.S. if there is
any way the country could assist in the command.

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UNSC 1737: Iran
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3. (S) Concerning the effective implementation of the
resolution to prevent Iran's continued nuclear development, we
emphasized the threat that Iran presents to the international
community and therefore we are taking the appropriate steps to
implement the resolution, including seizing the assets of the
individuals and/or organizations designated. We urged the GOL
to take steps to implement their obligations as well. Moleleki
stated the GOL again was in complete agreement with the U.S.
position and feared that Iran's nuclear program presented a
threat certainly to the international community, but given the
conflict in the Middle East and East Africa, Iran also posed a
threat to the continent. Concerning the Dockrat issues
(freezing of assets) (Ref D),Moleleki offered that the GOL was
very concerned about the rise of Islam within its borders. He
indicated that the GOL had observed an increase in the numbers
of converts to Islam over the past few years. When asked why
that would be the situation here, his response was that Islam,
and Libya in particular, was viewed as a source of financial
enrichment; some Basotho felt that by aligning themselves with
Islam, they could eventually benefit from the resources the
religion and its followers offered. The GOL considered Islam a
religion rife with fanaticism and was eager to keep such
elements out of the country. (Comment: Per Ref D Dockrat, the

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Minister of Finance advised Ambassador on February 1 that the
Central Bank would immediately act on freezing these assets in
Lesotho. Post has already been contacted by the Acting Governor
of the Central Bank. We have been assured that the GOL will
follow up on the request. End Comment)

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Pending Elections
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4. (C) Before the Ambassador could raise the subject of
Lesotho's general elections, Moleleki seized the opportunity to
point out that, in his view, the ABC Leader Thomas Thabane
continued to receive financial support from the People's
Republic of Libya. (We note here that Libya intends to send
observers to the February 17 elections in Lesotho.) The Foreign
Minister also accused the ABC of recruiting raucous youths who
insult members of the ruling party by seeking them out in rural
areas where rallies are being held and insulting them by
stripping naked and shouting vicious chants. More than that, he
alleged the ABC had killed an LCD supporter over the weekend of
February 3-4. Post has not been able to substantiate this
completely, although we have learned from our own team that a
reporter of a radio station leaning towards the ruling party had
attempted to cover the funeral of an ABC member over the weekend
and had been shot. The UN Resident Representative's security
team also reported that the ABC had assaulted an adherent of the
LCD at the same time. Post continues to seek fuller information
about this incident.


5. (C) We encouraged the Foreign Minister and his party to
engage in dialogue/debates with other parties and to be certain
that all parties had access to media because of the importance
of stability across the country. Moleleki in his florid style
said "these people do not understand talk about peace. The
Prime Minister can go on the radio and talk about the future of
the country as NGOs and the international community have
continued to encourage peace and free and fair elections."
However, "these people," he said, referring to Thabane's party,
"do not understand the word peace, they only understand fear."
I asked Moleleki what he meant by that, and he answered that we
"have to be prepared." He said there would not be violence at
the polling places, but when the results were announced, he
anticipated that the opposition parties would then become
incensed at the results since, he contended, the LCD would win.
We reinforced the point that we have made to all government
officials, that it was important for Lesotho, as it continued on
the road to the institutionalization of democracy, to ensure
that elections proceeded in a tranquil manner and that
authorized methods of discourse occur only by dialogue. The
Foreign Minister did not disagree. He felt that the GOL could
rely strongly on the army (Lesotho Defense Force),but had
little confidence in many elements of the police force whom many
in the GOL viewed as supporting Thabane. (See Ref E)

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Comment
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5. (C) While Moleleki is very dramatic in his presentations to
us and charismatic in his oratory to public audiences, we cannot
dismiss his evaluation of the animosity that exists between the
LCD and the ABC. The international community as a whole, as
well as on a bilateral level, continues to hold or support the
use of dialogue and debates during this pre-electoral period.
At the same time, we are separately and together making
appropriate security arrangements for individual citizens as
well as our larger community.


6. (S) In terms of the African Command and the threats posed by
Iran and al-Qaida, we believe Lesotho is on the same page as we
are, and one expects appropriate follow through from the GOL.
Moleleki was very complimentary again about the U.S. role in
tracking down terrorists and particularly in terms of trying to
keep the lid on matters in Somalia. He did express the fear
that operative Islamic militant groups would seek further
shelter in Southern Africa. Because South Africa also faces
this problem, he believes South Africa has not supported Thabane
as it might have in the past given their fear that Islamist
elements are providing support to the ABC party. Based on our
February 7 conversation with the South African High
Commissioner, we believe there may be some basis for Moleleki's
analysis since the Republic of South Africa representative here
told us that South Africa remains extremely concerned about
Islamic factions trying to use Lesotho as an access point into
South Africa. End Comment.
PERRY