Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MASERU191
2007-03-27 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maseru
Cable title:  

SADC/LESOTHO NEGOTIATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM LT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6684
PP RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMR #0191/01 0861629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271629Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MASERU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2820
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 3171
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000191 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM LT
SUBJECT: SADC/LESOTHO NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) MASERU 185 (B) MASERU 177 (C) MASERU 183 (NOTAL)

MASERU 00000191 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



---------
Summary
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000191

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM LT
SUBJECT: SADC/LESOTHO NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) MASERU 185 (B) MASERU 177 (C) MASERU 183 (NOTAL)

MASERU 00000191 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) This message provides a basic chronology and substantive
background on our bilateral and multilateral engagements during
Lesotho's pre-election, electoral and post electoral
developments. The latter more closely involved Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Executive Secretary Salomao and his
team. Our active engagement began with our 2006 request for
funding to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) or the
International Republican Institute (IRI) for training through
the funding of 300 USG supported observers. Bilateral and
multilateral talks with the Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC) re-opened in early 2006 to demonstrate our commitment to
support Lesotho's 2007 national elections much as we had done
during the 2005 first post-independence municipal elections.
All stakeholders, encompassing opposition and ruling party
leaders, participated in one-on-one donor pre-election talks and
group roundtables, as did Commonwealth, the SADC delegation, the
SADC Parliamentary Forum, African Union, Electoral Institute of
South Africa (EISA) and NDI representatives.


2. (C) Following the elections, challenges by the new main
opposition party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC),prompted
further requests to donors for assistance in stabilizing the
country. Chiefs of Mission (COMs) met with the SADC team to
request mediation/facilitation of dialogue between the
Government of Lesotho (GOL) and the joint opposition parties.
Even so, despite promises to avoid potential trouble, the ABC
called for a "stay-away" (strike) which resulted in the loss of
millions of dollars to the economy and inflicted hardship on the
neediest Basotho. The international community together, and the
U.S. alone, requested a written communiqui from the SADC Council

of Ministers on peace and security in both Lesotho and Zimbabwe.
Statements were issued on March 22 and 23 attesting to SADC's
willingness to facilitate. On Sunday, March 25, a political
rally led by the opposition parties concluded with a speech by
ABC leader, former Communications Minister Thabane, saying there
would be no more strikes since SADC was mediating in Lesotho and
had the Zimbabwe issue to handle. We take Thabane at his word
and hope it will stick this time. End Summary.


3. (C) Donors' plea for peace and stability culminated in the
March 18 meeting with SADC Executive Secretary Salomao. After
hearing the history of the opposition's request to diplomatic
missions to break an alleged stalemate between the government
and themselves, the international community (IC) thought it wise
to take advantage of Salomao's presence as an honest broker.
(We learned, although the opposition continued to say their
leaders had not met with GOL counterparts or the Prime Minister,
there had never been a request to do so.) The Executive
Secretary's agreement to talk with all leaders was the final

SIPDIS
step in the IC's series of discussions urging dialogue, yet
making clear interference in national politics was not the goal.
Rather, an atmosphere where democracy and peace could reign was
indeed all donors' concern.


4. (C) In terms of a timeline, the U.S. and the UN had met in
September to coordinate support for the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). The Irish Embassy later pledged its support
as well. We promoted capacity building through NDI training and
its daily interaction with the working staff of the IEC. The UN
and Irish provided vehicles and computer technology assistance.
On the substantive side, we met monthly with the IEC Chair and
Commissioners to reinforce the need for the "snap" 2007 national
elections to be free, fair and peaceful. Although the IEC would
have preferred more time to prepare, with donor assistance, the
Commission was able to resolve technical problems and proceed
with information campaigns. Simultaneously, the development
partners received frequent requests from opposition parties to
hear their grievances (pre-election) concerning the timing of
elections, voter registration issues, and repetition of the 1998
crisis that had devolved into violence. At each session former
military leader General Lekhanya (Basotho National Party)
presented the entire history of the Lesotho nation while
disgruntled opposition leader Thabane (a former ruling party
member) expressed his unhappiness with the ruling Lesotho
Congress for Democracy (LCD).

MASERU 00000191 002.2 OF 002




5. (C) Donors' from all sides impressed upon these leaders, and
those of smaller parties (from November through the elections in
February) the necessity of taking their grievances to the
appropriate bodies such as the IEC, Parliament and the courts.
At one such roundtable to which all political parties were
welcome, the GOL Deputy Prime Minister came with staff.
However, he did not say much and the opposition did not raise
all the question it could have. Thus, the unhappiness with the
timing of elections (February instead of March, April or May)
was seen as perfectly legal (as it was) by the LCD and as a loss
of campaign time by the opposition parties.


6. (C) Before the February 17 polling date, a SADC delegation
led by former Botswana President Masire, a SADC Parliamentary
Forum observers team (funded by the U.S.),a Commonwealth
delegation, the NDI observers and trainers plus the Electoral
Institute of South Africa (EISA) were all in place. Each had
held stakeholder meetings with political parties, civil society
representatives, diplomatic mission and NGOs. The election
itself was declared free and fair by international observers.
Nevertheless, political parties and donors heard comments from
the Commonwealth team that the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
system could be misused. (Note: It took New Zealand four
election cycles to get it right, according to their Commonwealth
delegation head -- a former assembly leader from Wellington.
End Note.) The presence of then Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Monyane Moleleki) at several polling stations in his
constituency was a cause for concern, but the international
observer teams did not consider his presence to have violated
the entire national elections process.


7. (C) After promising the public and other stakeholders he
would peacefully accept the results, Thabane broke his word by
raucous March 15 actions during Parliament and calling for a
work "stay-away" to begin March 19. Despite the international
community's plea, and SADC's, not to do a stay-away, he
paralyzed the capital, Maseru. According to the DPM, the police
(seen as partisans of the ABC),those who burned tires, threw
oil in the streets and threatened retaliation to workers who
tried to walk to their jobs, were removed by the army. He
alleged the police would not follow his orders as Minister of
Home Affairs. There were no complaints about these "removals,"
to our knowledge. There seemed to be a true desire on the part
of street vendors to restaurateurs to carry on business as
usual, but they felt threatened by Thabane's ABC, the BNP and
the monarchist party faithful.


8. (C) SADC continued to meet with both LCD and opposition
leaders during the strike and convinced the ABC to "suspend" its
action. We and other diplomats met with Salomao and Tanzanian
Foreign Minister Membe March 23. The SADC Ministerial Council
did issue a statement on March 23 (see reftel) saying it would
look into complaints further during its upcoming summit. For
his part, Thabane said he would not hold further "stay-aways" as
his concerns were under consideration by the regional body.
(Note: In our bilateral talks with Salomao and GOL officials
from the Prime Minister on down, the U.S. Ambassador and DCM
also pressed hard on the Zimbabwe situation and the need for
Basotho and regional leadership to address the Mugabe
crackdowns. End Note.)


9. (C) Comment: Regarding Thabane's latest pledge, we assume
as long as SADC keeps talking, he will keep still. We have also
encouraged the GOL, via the Ambassador's private conversations
with the Foreign and Finance Ministers, to open the door to
dialogue with the opposition leaders, despite the lack of a
formal request. Foreign Minister Tsekoa, a confidant of the
PM's, has promised to follow through on this idea. Our guess is
hardliners, like the DPM, will be reluctant to become forward
leaning toward Thabane -- in their eyes a "deserter." End
Comment.
PERRY