Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MASERU107
2007-03-01 15:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Maseru
Cable title:  

PERSPECTIVE OF IEC CHAIR ON RECENT ATTACKS OF U.S. TARGETS

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PTER LT 
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VZCZCXRO1899
OO RUEHMR
DE RUEHMR #0107/01 0601530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 011530Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY MASERU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2678
INFO RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 3027
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE PRIORITY 0316
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0827
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000107 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S; DS/DSS/OSAC AND DS/IP/AF; GABORONE FOR RSO; PRETORIA
FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2017
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER LT
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVE OF IEC CHAIR ON RECENT ATTACKS OF U.S. TARGETS
INCLUDING SECURITY OF CHIEF OF MISSION

REF: (A) MASERU 105 (B) MASERU 94 (C) MASERU 93 (D) 06 MASERU 617 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MASERU 000107

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF/S; DS/DSS/OSAC AND DS/IP/AF; GABORONE FOR RSO; PRETORIA
FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2017
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER LT
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVE OF IEC CHAIR ON RECENT ATTACKS OF U.S. TARGETS
INCLUDING SECURITY OF CHIEF OF MISSION

REF: (A) MASERU 105 (B) MASERU 94 (C) MASERU 93 (D) 06 MASERU 617 AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: June Carter Perry, Ambassador, EXEC , STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1. (S) Following the February 27, 12:30 a.m. grenade and heavy
gun shot attack on the residence/office of Partners-In-Health
(PIH) staffed by a U.S. citizen (and Canadian spouse) (Ref B),
Ambassador received a call from the Independent Electoral
Commission Chair (IEC) Thoahlane. With this attack coming just
months after the killing of a Dutch volunteer with the
U.S.-based Clinton Foundation (Ref D),the IEC Chair had been
trying to get in touch with the U.S. Ambassador throughout the
day. When we did connect, he said that he saw the bombing as
having occurred with the view that certain elements are
"harboring plans that are anti-American." He said he was
particularly concerned about the safety and security of the
American Ambassador. Thoahlane did not want to go into detail
on the phone about the instigation behind the two attacks on
American organizations and their staff, but he inferred that
outside elements might be involved. As we have noted in
previous messages, concerns have been expressed by the
Government of Lesotho as well as by the South African High
Commissioner that there has been a rather consistent flow of
South Asian and Middle Eastern individuals through Maseru.


2. (S) On February 28, the IEC Chairman called on Ambassador at
the Chancery to speak directly about his concerns. Thoahlane
found it disturbing that the attacks against U.S.-based
organizations active in the anti-AIDS program so needed by
Lesotho would be a target twice. (PIH is a subcontractor of the
Clinton Foundation.) He felt the characterization of the Deputy
Prime Minister of the November attack as purely political needed
further analysis. (Comment: Ambassador also met February 28
with the South African High Commissioner prior to the
conversation with the IEC Chair. The RSA envoy had telephoned
Ambassador the night of February 27. Following up on that call,

in a one-on-one discussion, he also dismissed the DPM's view of
both the November and February attacks as cursory and lacking in
deeper analysis of potential, underlying causes other than
seemingly obvious political animosity. End Comment)


3. (S) Thoahlane said he feared, in the aftermath and confusion
of post-electoral activities, organizations (he specifically
pointed to al-Qaida) would use Basotho "front" para-military
assailants while the population at large was distracted by
potential traffic boycotts and the like. A former Ambassador to
the U.S. and recognized serious thinker, Thoahlane said he felt
the American community and the Ambassador could be future
potential targets. He then alluded to the open borders that
surround Lesotho (a point also made by the South African High
Commissioner); the vulnerability of the country to outside
elements was more profound now due to the lack of rain which
allowed individuals to literally walk across dried-up creeks and
riverbeds undetected. We indicated our February 27 late evening
conversation with the Deputy Prime Minister during which the DPM
said to us he saw the grenade explosion and shootings as "just
political." The Ambassador told him a close investigation was
required and that she intended to take up the matter with the
Prime Minister as soon as possible. The DPM agreed that should
happen. (Note: In conversations with the Government Secretary,
Ambassador was advised that the earliest opportunity to meet
would be next week as the PM was meeting with the King and
trying to form the new government this week with the swearing-in
now scheduled for March 2. End Note.)


4. (S) During the discussion with Thoahlane, the IEC Chairman
made clear his position (after reviewing the attack site) was
that the attackers had hoped to frighten the occupants out of
the house and then kill them. (Note: This is his personal
view, but has not been substantiated; the investigation
continues.) He revealed that the ruling Lesotho Congress for
Democracy (LCD) Deputy Executive Secretary, the owner of the
property where the attack occurred, is his sister (a former
Minister) who was badly shaken by the incident. We note that
Mrs. Ntsinyi had told us last year that she was happy to rent
the residence/office to Partners-in-Health. (She certainly
never anticipated such an assault.) Thoahlane indicated he
planned to advise the PM of his concern that this situation cast
a shadow on Lesotho and portended an indescribable presence
willing to use "decoy" Basotho at a delicate time when the
country had completed an election. We responded that the
negative image, and fear, among U.S. linked health workers would
have a chilling effect and it was important that the nation
address security matters quickly. I added that we were
officially engaged in major health and economic initiatives as
well as public/private projects to support Lesotho on its upward
trajectory. The Prime Minister had alluded to his hopes for
continued movement in these areas while speaking with the U.S.
Ambassador at his own swearing-in February 23 (Ref C ).


5. (S) Comment: The precautions taken at the CMR include the

MASERU 00000107 002 OF 002


presence of the local guard force, described by post security
officer (PSO) as simply a "deterrent." Lacking an RSO, PSO is
pursuing enhanced police patrols in the area. American citizens
have been alerted through Consular/Security warnings of the
assault and political developments following the elections. It
is difficult to obtain concrete evidence of the IEC Chair's (and
the South African High Commissioner's) views, but noteworthy
that they both share mutual concerns about the proximate causes
of these attacks. Post requests Department's fulfillment of
August 2006 commitment to provide resident RSO in order to
reinforce safety and security. End Comment.
PERRY