Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MAPUTO1278
2007-11-05 08:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Maputo
Cable title:  

PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S

Tags:  KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ 
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RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHTO #1278/01 3090808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050808Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8150
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0066
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0108
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001278 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Todd C. Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MAPUTO 001278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV MASS MCAP MOPS MARR PREL MZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY MINISTER ON ZIMBABWE, PKO'S

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Todd C. Chapman, Reasons 1.4(b) & (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Charge raised Mozambican PKO
participation and the Zimbabwe crisis with Minister of the
Presidency Antonio Sumbana on 10/31. Sumbana stated that
the GRM wanted to participate in PKO's, and that he would
speak to President Guebuza about notifying the UN's DPKO of
Mozambique's interest. On Zimbabwe, he said that while the
GRM had contact with ZANU-PF party members who wanted
change, Mugabe still exerted almost complete control.
Neighboring countries had to avoid isolating Zimbabwe,
which would only exacerbate the domestic situation. End
Summary.

--------------
Peacekeeping Operations
--------------


2. (SBU) The Charge met on 10/31 with Antonio Sumbana,
whose title was recently changed from Chief of Staff to
Minister of the Presidency although the functions are the
same. The Charge reiterated the USG's strong interest in
seeing Mozambique participate in PKO's, emphasizing the
opportunity for professionalization of the country's
military. He indicated that while the USG and other donors
could evaluate what type of logistical support could be
mustered, the next step needed was a strong statement of
political will by the GRM. When Sumbana queried how that
statement should be best communicated, the Charge replied
that the GRM's PermRep in New York should advise the UN's
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of
Mozambique's interest. This notification, he continued,
would likely trigger an evaluation process resulting in a
concrete list of areas for improvement before the military
could deploy--the logical point where donors could provide
targeted support. Sumbana responded that the GRM wanted to
participate in PKOs, and that he would speak to President
Guebuza about notifying DPKO of Mozambique's interest.


--------------
Zimbabwe
--------------


3. (C) Moving to Zimbabwe, the Charge said that the
situation was reaching a critical point, and the USG was
seriously concerned about the status of democracy and human
rights. He asked if GRM officials had maintained channels
of communication (alluded to in a previous conversation one
month ago) with a new generation of ZANU-PF party leaders
who recognized that Mugabe was not serving the long-term
interests of the nation. Sumbana noted that he had served
as the Mozambican Ambassador to Zimbabwe in the 1990s and
knew the situation intimately. He said that the GRM does
indeed talk with ZANU-PF party members, but indicated that
almost all fear Mugabe's retribution. He noted that only a
'half-dozen or so' senior advisors are benefiting from the
current situation. When asked about Mozambique's public
stance, Sumbana replied that publicly isolating Zimbabwe
would only worsen Mugabe's attitude, which could result in
thousands of Zimbabweans killed. Therefore, the GRM
supported SADC and President Mbeki's efforts, which he
believed had recently been showing promising signs of
success.

--------------
Opposition Parties
--------------


4. (SBU) Finally, the Charge advised the Minister that he
intended to meet with members of the central committee of
the FRELIMO party, and to also begin reaching out to
opposition parties including RENAMO, as part of a series of
regular diplomatic calls. Sumbana thanked the Charge for
this information, recognizing that the Charge was not
required to advise the government of such visits. He asked
the Charge to relay the message that FRELIMO wanted a
moderate opposition that would be open to constructive
dialogue--a patriotic duty to do what was best for the
country as a whole. Sumbana lamented that RENAMO's leader
Afonso Dhlakama refused to meet with President Guebueza,
despite numerous invitations. (Note: Dhlakama claims
publicly that he has never been invited to meet with
Guebuza.) The Minister of the Presidency claimed that some
in RENAMO were far more extreme than Dhlakama, who
otherwise would be willing to participate in some national
day celebrations. Therefore, he concluded, it was in
FRELIMO's best interests to ensure Dhlakama remained at
RENAMO's helm.


MAPUTO 00001278 002 OF 002


--------------
Comment: PKO's Possible; Zimbabwe Challenging
--------------


5. (C) The Minister,s line of questioning on PKO's
indicates that the GRM is still contemplating PKO
participation, even if a bit unsure on how to proceed. The
Charge and DATT will meet November 7 with British, French,
Dutch, and Canadian counterparts to discuss what joint
approaches and support might be possible to help chart a
course for eventual Mozambican participation in PKO's. On
Zimbabwe, Sumbana's acknowledgement that the GRM is in
contact with ZANU-PF party members suggests that the GRM is
broadening efforts--albeit gingerly and behind the
scenes--to at least remain engaged and to prepare for an
eventual post-Mugabe bilateral relationship. That said,
the GRM is clearly averse to being too forward or public in
its approach, for fear of any backlash from Mugabe or the
appearance that it is out of step with SADC and Mbeki.
Chapman