SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 000022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS BA IZ IR BILAT OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GATES'
JANUARY 17-19 VISIT TO BAHRAIN

Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Mr. Secretary, we warmly welcome your January 17-19
visit to Bahrain. The fifty-year U.S. Navy presence in
Bahrain is the centerpiece of the U.S.-Bahrain bilateral
relationship. Bahrain considers the Navy to be its defense
against external threats, starting with Iran, and has
recently taken important steps to enhance bilateral relations
further. Bahrain generally supports our Iraq policy but
believes we should draw down our forces, leaving only a
rapid-reaction force in country. The GOB wants the Iraqi
government to shoulder the bulk of the security
responsibilities and work more closely with its Arab
neighbors. The Bahraini government hopes the U.S. Navy will
initiate a process allowing for the return of dependents to
the country, citing the deterioration in the everyday,
people-to-people contact that family members previously had
with Bahrainis. Your trip closely follows Secretary of the
Navy Winter's late November visit and Chief of Naval
Operations Mullen's late December visit.

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Objectives
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2. (C) What we want from the visit:

-- Public expression of support for U.S. policy in Iraq and a
commitment, along with that of its fellow GCC member states,
for pro-active Bahraini engagement with Iraq's leadership.

-- Close coordination on Iran policy and development of
strategies that go beyond sanctions contained in UNSCR 1737.

-- Continued cooperation on regional maritime operations,
including in Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 152 in and
around the Gulf.

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Issues of Interest to Bahrain
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3. (C) The Bahrainis will want to hear from you on:

-- A reaffirmation of the Navy's long-term commitment to
Bahrain and a status update on the possible return of Navy
dependents.

-- A briefing on the way forward in Iraq, with particular
emphasis on the Iraqi government's responsibilities and ways
the GCC can engage and assist.

-- Strategies to contain Iran while avoiding a military
confrontation.

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Key Issues to Raise
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4. (C) We suggest you raise the following points:

-- Recognize the long history of mil-mil cooperation with
Bahrain, most notably through hosting NAVCENT. Reaffirm the
commitment of the U.S. Navy in Bahrain.

-- Praise Bahrain's support for OEF, OIF, and U.S. policy on
Iraq and Iran. Commend Bahrain for sending its Special
Forces contingent to Afghanistan in support of OEF, hosting
and participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
exercise Leading Edge in October, and formally joining the
regional coalition naval task forces.

-- Identify steps Bahrain can take to support our Iraq
policy, both politically and in practical terms.

-- Pledge to continue the close coordination between our two
countries on Iran.

-- Congratulate Bahrain for holding parliamentary and
municipal elections in November/December and for the
participation of all registered political societies,
including oppositionists, in the elections.

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Issues Background Briefs
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Military Relations
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5. (SBU) The U.S. Navy has worked closely with Bahrain for
more than 50 years. When the U.S. Fifth Fleet was
re-commissioned in 1995, Bahrain took the then-controversial
step of being the first Gulf state to provide host government
support for regionally "home-ported" U.S. Navy forces, and
Bahrain remains the only country in the region which hosts a
permanent component command headquarters. NAVCENT directs
naval operations in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Gulf
of Aden in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom, CJTF Horn of Africa, as well as Maritime
Interception Operations to enable freedom of navigation and
to prevent oil smuggling, piracy and various other operations
in support of the Global War on Terrorism.


6. (C) Bahrain's relatively stable and secure political
environment allows deployed U.S. Navy ships to stop,
replenish supplies, and provide crews much needed onshore
rest and recreation opportunities. Bahrain is currently one
of the U.S. Navy's busiest overseas ports. In direct support
of OEF and OIF, Bahrain in 2003 deployed 1,500 troops, a tank
battalion task force, and its frigate the RNBS Sabha to
defend Kuwait. Bahrain also flew combat air patrols over
Kuwait and Bahrain and continues to keep F-16s on 24-7 strip
alert. A special operations unit embedded in a UAE
contingent deployed to Afghanistan in 2005. Bahrain assigned
three shore-based naval officers to work in the command post
for maritime task force CTF-150, which covers the Strait of
Hormuz to the Sea of Aden. For CTF-152, which covers central
Gulf waters, Bahrain has provided one frigate and two
corvettes. Bahrain is the only GCC country to participate in
the CTFs.


7. (C) Bahrain has the smallest economy in the GCC and is
quickly depleting a very limited petroleum reserve. We have
had active FMF and IMET programs in Bahrain for several years
but the FMF program in particular has declined precipitously
in recent years, from $90 million in 2003 to a budgeted $15
million for FY 2007. We are working closely with the
Bahrainis to upgrade their early warning and air defense
radar systems, an initiative that has been promoted in the
USG-led interagency Gulf Security Dialogue. Future programs
include the sale of nine Blackhawk helicopters to the
Bahraini Air Force ($200 million) and six Bell helicopters to
the Ministry of Interior ($50 million).

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Next Steps on Iraq
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8. (C) The GOB publicly supports U.S. operations in Iraq,
but as King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman have told several
recent U.S. delegations, it believes Iraqi forces should be
moving to the front lines in place of coalition forces. This
would force Iraqis to take responsibility for their own
security and put the GOI into the position of requesting
assistance from its Arab neighbors, which the Bahrainis feel
it has not yet done in a meaningful way. The Crown Prince
has recommended that the U.S. draw down and consolidate its
military footprint in Iraq to a 50,000-member rapid-reaction
force based outside of major population centers. The GOB's
greatest concern related to Iraq is that sectarian violence
could spill over into Bahrain, which has a Shia-majority
population ruled by a Sunni-controlled government. The
timing and manner of Saddam's execution exacerbated sectarian
tensions in Bahrain. GOB officials will support long-term
measures to reduce sectarian violence while recognizing that
the near-term situation in Iraq is extremely difficult.

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Dealing With Iran
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9. (C) The Bahraini leadership is greatly concerned about
the threat posed by Iran and increased tensions between Iran
and the international community. Crown Prince Salman has
suggested several times that the U.S. and GCC countries hold
a significant military exercise in the Gulf, which would send
a strong signal to Iran. Bahrain hosted and participated in
PSI exercise Leading Edge in October, and the
boarding/interrogation portion took place just outside its
territorial waters. NAVCENT personnel were impressed with the
Bahraini Navy's professionalism and aggressiveness during the
exercise. Bahrain has been an enthusiastic partner in the
Gulf Security Dialogue initiative.

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10. (C) Bahrain's relationship with Iran is complex. The
Bahraini leadership is united in its suspicion of Iranian
intentions regarding Bahrain and often sees an Iranian hand
in incidents involving Bahrain's Shia community, which
comprises some two-thirds of the country's citizens. They
are convinced Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons and
assert its influence around the region. At the same time,
Bahrain faces the reality that it must live with its large
neighbor across the Gulf. Bahrain maintains "correct" but
not warm diplomatic relations with Iran, with Bahraini
leaders meeting with Iranian officials when they visit.
Bahraini officials repeatedly assert their strong view that
the international community should engage in diplomacy to
deal with Iran, and not resort to a military solution. They
recognize, however, that a robust military posture can
facilitate diplomacy. Bahrain supports UNSCR 1737 but may be
wary of implementing additional sanctions that go beyond the
language of the resolution. It is not clear that the
Bahraini leadership has come to grips with how it will handle
efforts to ratchet up the pressure on Iran if that includes
cutbacks in trade and engagement.

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Return of U.S. Dependents
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11. (C) Bahraini officials often reiterate their request
that the U.S. Navy permit dependents to return to Bahrain.
Crown Prince Salman, who is a graduate of the DOD Bahrain
School and whose children now attend the school, is a
particularly strong advocate for the everyday,
people-to-people contact that is fostered by the presence of
dependents. Bahraini officials may urge that you reconsider
the Navy's 2004 decision removing dependents from Bahrain.

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Elections
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12. (C) Bahrain in November/December conducted its second
set of parliamentary and municipal elections since the
adoption of the 2002 constitution. Some 70 percent of
registered voters and all political societies participated in
the elections, with oppositionists winning 18 of 40 seats in
the elected lower house Council of Representatives.
Thirty-five of the 40 seats are held by Islamists (Sunni and
Shia) and membership is marked by a stark Sunni-Shia divide.
One woman, Lateefa Al Qaoud, ran unopposed and is Bahrain's
first female elected member of parliament. Local election
monitors have not yet released their findings, but the
elections are seen as a major step forward in the King's
democratic reform program.


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