ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE PLANS MINISTRY PURGE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001537

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PARM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE PLANS MINISTRY PURGE,
IDEOLOGICAL OVERSIGHT OF ARMED FORCES

REF: A. MANAGUA 1223

B. MANAGUA 0531

C. MANAGUA 0081 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Brennan for reasons 1.4 (b and d
)


1. (C) Summary: According to an internal memorandum obtained
by post, Acting Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Ruth Tapia Roa
plans to fire the few remaining officials from the previous
administration and replace them with Army-approved loyalists.
She also alerts President Ortega to the Army's "new
interests" and suggests a much closer relationship with
junior officers to assess their loyalties. Tapia's
suggestions would eliminate the historical memory and
residual technical capacity of the Ministry of Defense and
convert her into the ideological overseer of the armed
forces. End Summary.


2. (C) On June 13, post obtained a sensitive internal
memorandum from the Ministry of Defense, addressed to
President Daniel Ortega, that outlines recently-appointed
Acting Minister Ruth Tapia's plans for the future. In the
memo, Tapia recommends firing the few remaining functionaries
from the previous administration and keeping an eye on junior
military officers to measure their loyalty to the Sandinista
cause. She also refers to her June 4 meeting with Ambassador
Trivelli (septel) and describes relations with the Embassy as
"cordial." Notably, ours is the only foreign mission
referred to specifically in the memo. In addition, Tapia
recommends the creation of a Directorship of Correspondence
to ensure "improved control and security" of Ministry
information.

Government of "Peace and Reconciliation" Plans More Dismissals
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3. (C) In her report, Tapia recommends the dismissal of
several senior officials from the previous administration,
including Director of Inter-Institutional Affairs Silvio Diaz
and Legal Advisor Gerardo Bravo. Tapia justifies these
firings by calling into question the competence and loyalty
of the officers without providing any specific information.
She assures Ortega that the Ministry will not violate labor
laws as she will designate the posts as "positions of
confidence."


4. (C) Comment: Diaz and Bravo have been key contacts of post
for many years. They survived the previous Army-induced
purges of ex-Minister of Defense Jose Adan Guerra's team only
thanks to the direct intervention of the Embassy (ref B).
Ever since Guerra's forced resignation in 2005, the Army has
plotted to eliminate his pro-modernization/civilian control
group of senior advisors from the Ministry. Diaz and Bravo
specifically were involved in the Defense White Paper
process, anti-terrorism legislation, and several New Horizons
and other military exercises. They have both received
extensive training from the USG.


5. (C) Tapia mentions in her report that armed forces chief
General Omar Halleslevens has recommended replacements for
Diaz and Bravo -- Bismark Vanegas and Denis Palma. She
comments that Vanegas has "an attitude of complete obedience"
to General Halleslevens, and Palma "spends his free time as a
technical advisor for the FSLN Secretariat."

The Army's "New Interests"
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6. (C) Despite her apparent trust of General Halleslevens
recommendations for her senior staff, Tapia's memo indicates
that this sentiment does not extend to the Army in general.
She writes: "You know more than I that mentalities have
changed since the times of the Sandinista Popular Army. In
the senior ranks... people have new and self-interested
ideas..." Tapia suggests visits to military units to "better
understand with whom we need to work closely" and develop
"close relations" with the junior officers and rank-and-file.
She also implies that international assistance should be
directed to officers and units that are ideologically
suitable.

Comment
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7. (C) If Tapia carries out her proposals, the Ministry of
Defense will be converted into President Ortega's ideological
babysitter for the Army. Ironically, the Army's efforts to
eliminate Guerra's influence could do far more damage to the
armed force's cherished independence than Guerra's plans for
modernization and institutionalization. Post will continue
to monitor the evolution of the Ministry-Army relationship,
though this will now be much more difficult with the loss of
key contacts.
BRENNAN