SPANISH VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000807

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO NPT COLLECTIVE; DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE
AND ISN/MNSA (SCOTT DAVIS); GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: ENRG MNUC PARM PREL KNNP NPT SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH VIEWS ON NPT PREPCOM

REF: SECSTATE 54147

Classified By: Hugo Llorens, Deputy Chief of Mission, Reasons: 1.4 b &
d


1. (U) ESTHOFF passed reftel points April 24 to MFA Deputy
Director General Ignacio Sanchez, requesting Spanish thoughts
on the U.S. agenda for the May PrepCom for the 2010 NPT
RevCon. Sanchez, who had clearly given considerable thought
to the U.S. nonpaper, relayed GOS views to ESTHOFF during an
April 27 meeting.


2. (C) Sanchez said that Spain agreed with most of the
points related to the review process, but lamented our lack
of reference to the importance of universality (i.e., the
fact that India, Pakistan and Israel are not NPT
signatories). Spain believes the NPT is in crisis. Many
states believe the core NPT bargain has not being respected
and that the treaty has lost validity. Spain, however,
believes the NPT remains a cornerstone of the global
nonproliferation architecture. At least 140 of the 144
members are complying with their obligations.


3. (C) The task, according to Sanchez, is to reverse the
trend of the NPT's declining credibility and to start to
reinforce it. This will not be possible without engaging on
the universality issue. Spain realizes that an overly
forceful approach on universality could stall the 2010
RevCon, but believes there is a way to include the theme
without deadlocking the RevCon.


4. (C) Spain, according to Sanchez, would also like to see
a greater U.S. emphasis on disarmament. Article 6 of the NPT
talks about disarmament and the 1968 NPT bargain was not
supposed to be freeze the arsenals of the nuclear power
states but to instead create a framework for the gradual
elimination of nuclear weapons. Madrid understands that the
key is U.S.-Russian strategic arms reductions, but believes
that a stronger emphasis on disarmament during the RevCon,
combined with demonstrable progress on the ground (e.g,
further U.S.-Russian reductions),would serve to build the
NPT's credibility among the non-nuclear weapons states.


5. (C) Warming to the theme, Sanchez said that many
non-nuclear weapons states think that they have carried the
burden while the nuclear weapons states have not made serious
disarmament efforts and the three states outside the
framework (India, Pakistan, and Israel) have in many ways
benefited from staying outside (e.g., India gaining better
access to U.S. and Russian nuclear technology).


6. (C) Sanchez said that Spain mostly liked our points on
compliance and verification. Spain agrees that the
Additional Protocol needs to be made universal and supports
the U.S. view that while the overall verification system
works for declared nuclear materials, it is failing to
effectively curb clandestine nuclear programs.


7. (C) Regarding the nonproliferation points, Spain takes a
more holistic view than the U.S. Spain thinks that nuclear
materials can't be effectively controlled unless the nuclear
fuel cycle is better regulated via the FMCT and CTBT. 10
countries, including the U.S., have still not ratified the
CTBT and Spain would like to see Washington reconsider.


8. (C) Sanchez said it was clear that there is growing
global interest in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The
international community needs to develop a consensus on the
terms for expanded global use of nuclear energy. Should
countries be allowed to master the entire fuel cycle or only
parts of it? Objective criteria need to be developed. There
can be no double standards or "arbitrary access criteria".
Spain thus supports international strategic management of the
fuel cycle with clear rules of the road. Spain's preference
is that new entrants into the nuclear power circle not be
allowed to master the entire fuel cycle (for obvious
nonproliferation concerns),but this needs to be clarified
and rules-based.
Aguirre