EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S OCTOBER 15 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001987

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ROUTING INDICATOR

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FOR EUR, ALSO FOR WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2017
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL SP KV CU
SUBJECT: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S OCTOBER 15 MEETING
WITH SPANISH FM MORATINOS


Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION HUGO LLORENS; REASON: 1.5(B) and
(D)


1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and CDA Llorens met October 15
with Spanish FM Miguel Angel Moratinos. A/S Fried briefed
Moratinos on 2 2 talks on CFE and missile defense, including
the possibility of major progress on CFE in time for the OSCE
ministerial Spain is hosting in November. A/S Fried prepared
Moratinos for the next steps in Kosovo, and although
Moratinos clearly continues to hope for an agreed solution,
he said Spain would "support EU consensus" on the issue
should the Troika fail. On Iran, Moratinos said Spain was
supporting the French and UK approach. Moratinos offered
whatever help Spain could provide on the upcoming Middle East
peace conference. On Cuba, he insisted to a skeptical A/S
Fried that Spain,s engagement with the regime could help
promote democratic transition. Finally, Moratinos reiterated
his interest in meeting with the Secretary sometime before
the OSCE ministerial. End summary.

CFE and Missile Defense
--------------


2. (C) A/S Fried briefed Moratinos on the October 12-13
U.S.-Russian 2 2 Ministerial. He explained that the U.S. had
presented the Russians with a creative proposal on CFE that
went beyond the parallel action paper. He said the proposal
included a number of ideas for additional steps on Georgia
and Moldova. He cautioned that there was still much to be
done. These ideas had yet to be discussed in detail with the
Georgians and the Moldovans, although that would happen
quickly. A/S Fried said he was headed from Madrid to
Brussels to brief NATO Permanent Representatives. He noted
the U.S. was waiting for the Russian response and warned the
initial positive Russian reaction could change.
Nevertheless, he wanted Moratinos to be aware of the details
since if all went well, this could have a profound and
positive impact on the OSCE ministerial Spain will host at
the end of November.


3. (C) Moratinos was quick to grasp the potential benefit to
Spain, the OSCE Chairman in Office, of such a positive turn
of events, and to offer Spanish support with Moldova and
Georgia. He mentioned that he had visited Moldova and
Transnistria and had discussed the issue with Russian FM
Lavrov (he mentioned that he had a testy meeting with a
gloomy Igor Smirnov in which he finally told Smirnov that he
was not going to stay and waste time with him. According to
an amused Moratinos, that broke the ice and they then had a
substantive conversation.) Moratinos offered to send
Spain,s envoy on Georgia there if the U.S. thought it could
be helpful.


4. (C) A/S Fried described the "joint regional architecture
proposals" on missile defense that had been shared with the
Russians in Moscow. He noted that the Russians seemed to
have been taken off balance by the forthcoming nature of this
proposal and not ready to respond other than to acknowledge
that this was a constructive offer. He emphasized that the
U.S. was being flexible and trying to include the Russians in
a cooperative MD system to the extent practicable.

Kosovo
--------------


5. (C) A/S Fried said the U.S. supported the Troika effort
but that everyone had to recognize what was likely to happen
after December 10 and prepare for it. He stressed that
Europe and the U.S. needed to continue to support Kosovo
post-independence. Walking away would be disastrous. A way
must be found, for example, to continue the OSCE mission
functions there, perhaps under another (UN or EU) umbrella.
A/S Fried explained that French, German, Italian, British,
and American lawyers had looked carefully at UNSCR 1244 and
concluded that it was not inconsistent with independence and
would continue to provide a mandate for the NATO and EU
presence in Kosovo even after independence. Javier Solana
had expressed the same view at the Secretary's "Transatlantic
dinner" with EU foreign ministers in New York during the
UNGA. Moratinos said Spain had not lost hope for the Troika
process. He noted that a Kosovar declaration of independence
and the absence of a new UNSCR would makes things difficult
for Spain and Europe. A/S Fried cautioned against hoping for
a miracle while failing to prepare for what was most likely
to happen. He emphasized that the U.S. looked for Spain,s
support as OSCE CIO. Moratinos said Spain would not "create
problems" for the U.S. or EU on Kosovo, and Spain would fall
in line with EU consensus. However, he cautioned that Cyprus

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might stand the way of EU consensus. He said a creative
approach would have to be found to deal with the Cypriots.

Iran
--------------


6. (C) Moratinos said Spain was backing France and the UK on
Iran. He noted the Spanish mission in Brussels had issued a
statement in support of their position. Spain supported
dialogue but also sanctions if dialogue failed. Moratinos
said a UNSCR would be best, but if Russia and China made that
impossible, then a united stand by Europe and the U.S. was
the next best thing. He said we needed more sticks and more
carrots with Iran.

MEPP
--------------


7. (C) Moratinos said Spain hoped the U.S. conference would
be successful and that Spain was ready to use its good
offices to support the effort. He mentioned that Spain had
good contacts with the Palestinians and would be willing to
approach them if the U.S. thought it could help.

Cuba
--------------


8. (C) While noting that both countries expressed their
support for a democratic Cuba, A/S Fried said the U.S.
disagreed profoundly with Spain,s approach. He stressed
that Spain needed to be careful lest it inadvertently
facilitate a transition from one dictator to another. He
urged that Spain reach out openly to the dissidents.
Moratinos replied that he had spoken publicly and privately
during the Secretary,s June visit of Spain,s support for
democracy in Cuba. He claimed the differences with the U.S.
were tactical but that our approaches could be complementary.
He said Spain sought to encourage those within the regime
who wanted transition. He said the transition was already
underway and that all power had passed from Fidel to Raul
Castro. He asserted that there were some in Raul,s circle
who at least wanted to begin to open the economy, and Spain
wanted to help them. He said Spain was supporting human
rights and democracy in Cuba and did not want to cause the
U.S. problems there. He urged that Spain and the U.S.
maintain a constant dialogue on Cuba. A/S Fried agreed to
dialogue but urged that Spain maintain a principled position.

Appointment with Secretary
--------------


9. (C) Moratinos said he hoped for a half hour appointment
with the Secretary in Washington sometime before the November
29-30 OSCE ministerial. A/S Fried replied that would try.
(Note: Embassy Madrid has discussed various options with
Moratinos, Chief of Staff, and it appears November 6-7 is
the best window. End note.)


10. (U) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
AGUIRRE