TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIANS WARN AGAINST PREMATURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS DAVID KRAMER AND COLIN FURST

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2017
TAGS: OSCE PREL PBTS MD RS UP SP
SUBJECT: TRANSNISTRIA: RUSSIANS WARN AGAINST PREMATURE
RESUMPTION OF 5-PLUS-2 TALKS

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Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (U) January 25, 2007; 11:30 a.m.- 6:00 p.m.; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain.


2. (U) Participants:
Observers
United States - DAS David Kramer
European Union - Amb. Adriaan Jacobovits, EU Special
Representative

Mediators
Ukraine - Deputy FM Andriy Veselovsky
Russian Federation - Amb. Valeriy Nesterushkin, Special Amb.
for Transnistria
OSCE - Amb. Louis O'Neill, Head of Mission to Moldova

Chair in Office
Spain - Jose Maria Pons Irazazabal, DG for Europe and North
America
Amb. Jose Angel Lopez Jorrin, Coordinating Ambassador for
Spanish OSCE CIO
Amb. Fernando de Galainena, Special Ambassador for OSCE
"frozen conflicts"


3. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 25 meeting in Madrid,
representatives of the 3-Plus-2 (Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE
plus the U.S. and EU) on the Transnistria conflict agreed to
invite the Moldovans and Transnistrians to a full-fledged
5-Plus-2 meeting on February 15-16. This would be the first
5-Plus-2 meeting since the Transnistrians announced their
boycott over the introduction of strict Ukrainian-Moldovan
customs rules in March 2006. Russian envoy Nesterushkin
warned that the Smirnov regime would reject the invitation,
thereby "destroying" the 5-Plus-2 process. Transnistria, he
claimed, had no intention of returning to negotiations until
after resolution of the Kosovo final status question; the
"Kosovo precedent" would allow the separatists to return to
the table with "quite different intentions." Nesterushkin
offered a thinly-veiled threat that the EU and the U.S. might
not be invited to participate in future Transnistria
negotiations if the 5-Plus-2 process broke down. As Spanish
Chairman-in-Office, Director General Pons expressed Spain's
commitment to the Transnistrian settlement but promised that
Spain would not propose a new direction for the talks. END
SUMMARY.

KRAMER CITES TIRASPOL'S INTRANSIGENCE
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4. (C) DAS Kramer expressed hope that the 5-Plus-2 could move
forward in 2007 but noted that 2006 had not seen nearly
enough progress. He noted that, unlike Chisinau, Tiraspol
did not want to meet and had no interest in talking to the
Moldovans. He therefore said that Moldova was right to
approach the Russians directly. O'Neill concurred, noting
that he had recently met with Transnistrian "foreign
minister" Litskai, who had told him that he would not meet
with Moldovan Reintegration Minister Sova under any
conditions.

CIO OFFERS SPANISH EXPERTISE
--------------


5. (C) DG Pons expressed the Spanish view that the final
outcome of negotiations should respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Moldova. The ultimate fate of
Transnistria, he added, rested with Moldova. Pons objected
to the term "frozen conflict," saying it implied that parties
could live with the frozen state; it failed to make clear
that such situations are unacceptable to the parties and
carry with them a cost. As evidence of Spain's credentials
in territorial disputes, he offered Spanish expertise to the
mediators on the success of decentralization and made
reference to the recent agreement with the United Kingdom on
confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in
Gibraltar. Pons suggested that CSBMs may be necessary to
resume the 5-Plus-2 talks and asked the mediators what Spain
could do to help.

UKRAINE OPTIMISTIC ON 2007
--------------


6. (C) Deputy FM Veselovsky expressed optimism that the
Madrid talks, coming as they did in early 2007, meant that
something positive might be accomplished by the end of
Spain's OSCE presidency. He said that clear beacons had been

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set by both parties to the conflict, and there was general
agreement on how best to proceed. Ukraine hoped that the
5-Plus-2 could resume quickly, and Veselovsky saw no
obstacles to reconvening the negotiations in the near future,
either with the unfinished previous agenda or an entirely new
agenda. He also noted that Russian President Putin had
called for the resumption of talks during a visit to Kyiv.
Veselovsky said that the mediators had already made good
progress on some CSBMs such as the railway issue and
Transnistrian export of some agricultural products. He
suggested that work on integrating the two banking systems as
well as ending extortion at the administrative border between
Moldova and Transnistria could be areas for mutual confidence
building.

DESTRUCTION OF THE 5-PLUS-2?
--------------


7. (C) Nesterushkin said resumption of the talks might have
been possible in 2006 if not for objections to Transnistria's
proposed transit protocol. However, now that Transnistria
had resolved some of its economic problems and Kosovar
independence was on the horizon, the separatist regime could
live with the current situation. Nesterushkin warned that
although the observers were ready to resume negotiations, the
parties to the conflict were not. He stressed the need to
keep Transnistria in the 5-Plus-2 and to make the two sides
talk. Jacobovits replied that if the three mediators were to
agree to ask the parties to return to negotiations, it would
be difficult for them to refuse. Nesterushkin objected,
saying that such a plan would be doomed to failure; Litskai
did not have Smirnov's permission to return to negotiations
and therefore an invitation would only prove the
powerlessness of the 3-Plus-2 and jeopardize the 5-Plus-2
process. Kramer and Jacobovits pointed out that the 5-Plus-2
had not accomplished anything in almost a year, and they
therefore had nothing to lose. Kramer added that informal
inquiries had yielded no success and would continue to fail,
so a formal invitation was the proper way to proceed.
Nesterushkin became increasingly agitated and asked why the
observers would want to destroy the 5-Plus-2. He suggested
that if the negotiations were to collapse completely, the
U.S. and the EU would surely not get a seat at the table at
any future negotiations. The Transnistrian leadership, he
concluded, did not see the need for the 5-Plus-2 and felt
that Moldova and Transnistria could resolve their differences
in Moscow.

THE BASQUE MODEL?
--------------


8. (C) Nesterushkin next pointed to Spain's ongoing internal
debates and negotiations on balancing local nationalist
desires with the need to preserve its territorial integrity.
By contrast, he alleged that Chisinau preferred to negotiate
with Moscow rather than negotiating with their "countrymen"
in Tiraspol. However, he cited the autumn restoration of
rail service between Moscow and Tiraspol as an example of
Russian and Ukrainian success in the region and criticized
Moldova for "not trusting" the Transnistrians to secure
Moldovan trains, which take a circuitous route from Chisinau
to Moscow bypassing Transnistria.

MOLDOVA'S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
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9. (C) Kramer noted that the Moldovans had offered a
comprehensive plan that deserved to be discussed. The plan
was significant as it represented the first effort at
settlement by a party to the conflict; as such, it would be
an excellent tool to resume negotiations. Should the
3-Plus-2 agree to meet again, he proposed that such a meeting
ought to include the Moldovans; they should not be punished
through exclusion from future meetings by Transnistrian
intransigence. Veselovsky and Jacobovits agreed that the
Moldovan paper was a serious proposal worthy of debate.
Jacobovits added that if the mediators agreed that the plan
was serious, then there was no reason not to take it to the
5-Plus-2. Jacobovits observed that several plans already
existed and that additional plans were not needed. He also
cautioned against looking to a federal solution or to the
autonomy plans of other nations such as Spain or Belgium for
possible solutions, since Transnistria posed a unique
problem. Nesterushkin refused to give his views on the
Moldovan paper, saying that he was not authorized to discuss
it as he had understood it was a confidential document. He
did say it was "unrealistic," however, and claimed that the

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Moldovans had submitted several different versions to Moscow.


KOSOVO'S IMPACT
--------------


10. (C) Nesterushkin predicted that Tiraspol would delay its
participation in the 5-Plus-2 until after resolution of the
Kosovo status question. The "Kosovo precedent" would allow
them to return to the negotiating table with "quite different
intentions." O'Neill responded that the same questions of
Kosovo, rail service, and the transit protocol had all been
on the horizon in 2006; Nesterushkin's argument therefore
seemed disingenuous. He complained that the goalposts for
resumption of the talks keep being pushed back. Jacobovits
noted that authorities in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and
Nagorno-Karabakh had previously renounced comparisons of
their situations with Kosovo and expressed their wishes not
to be associated with the Kosovo question. For that and
other reasons, Jacobovits reiterated that the EU did not
accept the idea of Kosovo as a precedent for Transnistria;
Kramer agreed with Jacobovits.

VORONIN-SMIRNOV TALKS
--------------


11. (C) Veselovsky suggested that Moldova could make progress
by sharing some of its 1.2 billion euros in EU donor funds
with Transnistria. In response, Nesterushkin said that such
financial enticements constituted "seduction" of Transnistria
by Europe. He reiterated that Moldova needed to direct its
negotiations toward Tiraspol and not Moscow. To that end, he
recommended that the Ukrainian government arrange a bilateral
meeting between Transnistrian "president" Smirnov and
Moldovan President Voronin; no other figures in either
government had the authority to make the necessary decisions.
Veselovsky interjected that Ukraine had already made such a
proposal to Smirnov, who responded that if he were to attend
a meeting with a foreign president, it would be as "President
of Transnistria" and would be a "meeting of Presidents."
O'Neill offered that Litskai had told him he was tired of
small steps and wanted to deal with the final resolution of
the conflict. O'Neill urged Russia to force Smirnov to send
Litskai to the negotiating table.

AGENDA FOR PROPOSED 5-PLUS-2
--------------


12. (C) Attendees closed the meeting with a more amicable
discussion of a possible agenda for a 5-Plus-2 meeting.
Citing O'Neill's statement that the Transnistrians were tired
of confidence building, Veselovsky suggested that the meeting
could simply be an exchange of views followed by a discussion
of the Moldovan proposal. Nesterushkin cautioned that asking
the Transnistrians to share their views could be
counterproductive, but added that he would enjoy watching
these "embarrassing games" at such a meeting. DAS Kramer
said he hoped that Nesterushkin would do more than sit on the
sidelines in future talks. Kramer also proposed an informal
discussion on internationalizing the peacekeeping forces in
Transnistria.


13. (C) COMMENT: Throughout the day, Veselovsky was
consistently successful in corralling Nesterushkin and
bringing him along, including during the drafting of the
5-Plus-2 invitation letter which Nesterushkin reluctantly
signed. Nesterushkin was himself mildly more agreeable than
during previous meetings, perhaps in an effort to make a good
impression with the Spanish chair. The Spaniards appeared
somewhat caught off guard at first by the severity of the
debate, but they warmed to the issue and handled the meeting
with typical multilateralist charm and hospitality. At one
point, however, when Pons presented the attendees with a
draft meeting protocol in English, Nesterushkin lectured Pons
on the established agreement that all official documents and
meetings of the 5-Plus-2 be in Russian. Nesterushkin asked
if Pons was trying to "break with precedent," at which point
a shocked Pons assured him that Spain had no idea. Spanish
diplomats then hustled admirably to round up
Russian/English/Spanish speakers and a Cyrillic keyboard.
END COMMENT.


14. (U) DAS David Kramer cleared this message.

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Aguirre