SPANISH POLDIR ON KOSOVO, HIZBALLAH, YEMEN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001331

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PHSA PBTS EWWT SP LE YM VE YI
SUBJECT: SPANISH POLDIR ON KOSOVO, HIZBALLAH, YEMEN,
VENEZUELA, ODYSSEY

MADRID 00001331 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 5 meeting on a separate
issue, Spanish MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar and
the DCM discussed key bilateral issues going forward.
Dezcallar said that a crucial priority in coming months
should be avoiding a unilateral declaration of independence
by Kosovo. He acknowledged that Spanish officials had
privately met with Hizballah after the June 24 VBIED attack
that killed 6 Spanish soldiers in Lebanon, and he said that
Hizballah is "a fact of life" in Lebanon and enhanced
security for Spanish forces requires contact with Hizballah.
Dezcallar affirmed that Spain wishes to keep pushing forward
with the U.S. in Latin America and would attend a bilateral
Latin America Working Group at UNGA. On Venezuela, Dezcallar
said that Spain's policy of engaging Chavez had not worked
and that the new approach would be more proactive and
critical if necessary. Finally, Dezcallar requested that the
Embassy provide a formal response to Spain's June 14
diplomatic note regarding the Odyssey Explorer. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During their July 5 meeting on a separate matter, the
DCM and Spanish MFA Political Director Rafael Dezcallar
discussed the key issues in our agenda in the coming months
as well as the state of the bilateral relationship. The DCM
expressed condolences for the loss of Spanish tourists in
Yemen and for the soldiers killed in Lebanon. Dezcallar said
that the consensus is that the victims in Yemen were Western
targets of opportunity, not explicitly targeted for their
Spanish nationality. Dezcallar said that he had actually
visited the Yemen shrine where the bombing occurred two years
ago, but that the MFA had always advised Spaniards that
travel to that area was very dangerous because of
kidnappings.

//"ABSURD" NOT TO TALK TO HIZBALLAH//


3. (C) The DCM asked whether recent press reports were true
that Spain was engaging with Hizballah in the aftermath of
the June 24 VBIED explosion which killed 6 Spanish soldiers
in southern Lebanon. Dezcallar, somewhat defensively, said
that Hizballah is not on the EU's list of terrorist
organizations and is an important part of the political scene
in Lebanon. He said that if Spain wants to know what is
going on in Lebanon, it must talk to Hizballah. He added,
"They are not our friends, but not to talk to them would be
absurd." Dezcallar said that Hizballah is "a fact of life"
in Lebanon, and he emphasized that the contacts were taking
place at the local level only. He drew a contrast between
Hizballah and Hamas, with which he said Spain has had no
contact at all. On his trip to Lebanon, Dezcallar said that
he met with Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri who was a
Shiite but not affiliated with Hizballah.


4. (C) The DCM underscored that Hizballah is an
international bad actor, regardless of whether the EU
considers it a terrorist organization. Referencing the DCM's
experience in Argentina and Hizballah's devastating bombings
of two Jewish community centers in Buenos Aires in the
1990's, the DCM emphasized that Spain should not want to be
associated with Hizballah. Dezcallar responded again that
Hizballah is not on the EU terrorist list, and that Spain's
need for enhanced security for its troops required contact
with Hizballah, but only at a local level.

//BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP//


5. (C) The DCM noted that the Ambassador did a two-year
review with Foreign Minister Moratinos (septel) and that the
Mission feels it has improved the relationship significantly
over the past two years. Dezcallar agreed that the
relationship was on a much stronger footing. He added,
however, that the Spanish were disappointed by the choice to
award the Joint Cargo Aircraft contract to Italy. Dezcallar
said that he hoped he would be able to plan a trip to
Washington in the fall. In the meantime, however, he had

MADRID 00001331 002.2 OF 003


extended an invitation to Assistant Secretary Boucher to
visit Madrid for consultations on Afghanistan.

//REMAIN CLOSE ON LATIN AMERICA//


6. (C) Noting Foreign Minister Moratinos' interest in
attending a Latin America Working Group at UNGA in September,
the DCM stressed that despite differences over Cuba, both
countries needed to work in common purpose in other areas of
Latin America. Dezcallar agreed and said that he understood
that the June visit of Assistant Secretary Shannon to Madrid
for the U.S.-Spain Council had gone well. The DCM said that
it was a positive gesture that Shannon had come and
co-chaired with Secretary of State for Latin America Trinidad
Jimenez a very friendly two-hour panel on Latin America.


7. (C) The DCM told Dezcallar that Moratinos' comments
criticizing the decision by Hugo Chavez to close RCTV had not
gone unnoticed in Washington. Dezcallar said that Spain had
realized on this issue that it was unable to exert any
influence privately, so Moratinos decided to speak out
publicly. He said that Spain still has many interests in
Venezuela and will continue to work within the diplomatic
space, but it will not hesitate to speak out about what it
views as problems. Dezcallar was encouraged to see the
reaction in Caracas to the RCTV decision, which signaled that
perhaps Venezuelan civil society is not completely cowed.

//DISTANCING ON KOSOVO//


8. (C) Dezcallar said that the United States needs to
seriously consider the impact that a unilateral Kosovar
declaration of independence would have on the EU. He said
that Spain simply could not recognize a territory that broke
away from a sovereign nation, given the political reality of
regional independence movements in Spain. Dezcallar added
that Spain is not the only nation in the EU which faces this
problem, and he suggested that a Kosovar declaration followed
quickly by a Kosovar Serb secession would create a dangerous
division in the EU. The Russian Federation, he said, would
be the net gainer of regional influence. He also warned that
U.S. recognition of Kosovo would weaken the transatlantic
relationship.


9. (C) Dezcallar therefore advised the U.S. to show patience
in moving the process forward. He said that Spain is
committed to helping in any way possible, but that unilateral
Kosovar independence would present an internal political red
line that the government could not cross. The EU's intent is
to sweeten relations with Serbia to the point that it would
be to their advantage to go along with Kosovar independence,
although Dezcallar acknowledged that this process is moving
very slowly.

//ODYSSEY//


10. (C) Dezcallar concluded the meeting by asking the DCM
for a formal response to the Spanish diplomatic note of June
14 requesting information about the Odyssey Explorer's
compliance with international law. The DCM replied that the
interagency process in Washington is working on a response,
but that the U.S. position is to encourage Odyssey to explain
itself directly to the Spanish government. Deputy Director
General for North America Pepe Moyano, who also attended the
meeting, said that the government of the U.K. had cooperated
fully with Spanish requests for information, and the current
perception was that the U.S. was being uncooperative on a
matter of great importance to the Spanish government. Moyano
asked that the U.S. provide the details of Odyssey's customs
declaration. The DCM assured Moyano that a formal response
to the diplomatic note would be forthcoming, but that it
might take a bit more time. He told Dezcallar that the
Ambassador had raised the issue with Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs John Bellinger, and that the matter had the
Department's full attention. After the meeting, Moyano told
the DCM that the Spanish were looking into a request for

MADRID 00001331 003.2 OF 003


information via the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.

//COMMENT//


11. (C) Spain's engagement with Hizballah is not surprising,
given Spain's demonstrated willingness to meet will all the
actors in Lebanon. Their apparent certainty that Hizballah
was not behind the bombing and their need to enhance the
contingent's security likely influenced the decision.
Dezcallar was more forceful and grave on Kosovo than he has
been previously, perhaps indicating increased anxiety in the
GOS that Pristina may go ahead without the Security Council's
blessing. Dezcallar and other Spaniards have recently
delineated a tougher line on Venezuela, clearly showing a
departure from their previous policy of constructive
engagement with the GOBRV, a policy which failed miserably.
Mindful of strong U.S. displeasure over their policy of
engagement with Cuba, the GOS appears newly receptive to
greater cooperation on Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin
America.

--------------
Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/
--------------
AGUIRRE