Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MADRID1256
2007-06-25 11:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Madrid
Cable title:
SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE
how-toVZCZCXRO4829 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHMD #1256/01 1761114 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 251114Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY MADRID TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2864 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5217 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0551 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0366 RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1183 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0134 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1287 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 0260 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0639 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 1152 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1333 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 6026 RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2851 RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0204
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUR FOR A/S FRIED AND PDAS VOLKER
EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE, CLEMENTS, AND CERVETTI
PM FOR A/S STEVE MULL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR VZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE
MADRID 00001256 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001256
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUR FOR A/S FRIED AND PDAS VOLKER
EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE, CLEMENTS, AND CERVETTI
PM FOR A/S STEVE MULL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR VZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE
MADRID 00001256 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) USCIS Director Emilio Gonzalez met with MFA Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs Bernardino Leon June 21 to
compare notes the major immigration issues affecting both
countries. In the context of Leon's discussion of increased
migration to Spain through West Africa, the DCM suggested
that Spain should revisit its 2005-2006 decision to sell
naval vessels to Venezuela. The DCM said it might be more
beneficial to Spain's strategic interests to sell
"ocean-going patrol boats" (as Spain has termed the vessels)
to a West African country in order to help combat the growing
threats posed by illegal migration and drug trafficking. By
contrast, it was difficult to see how aiding Venezuela's arms
buildup would be helpful to Spain, given the current state of
affairs.
2. (C) The DCM pointed to Venezuelan President Chavez's
comments to the media indicating that Venezuela would
"distance itself" from Spain in the wake of criticism of the
Venezuelan Government's actions on RCTV by Spanish FM Miguel
Angel Moratinos during the June 1 visit to Madrid by the
Secretary. Separately, Venezuelan FM Maduro insulted high
SIPDIS
profile Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon as "a clown" for his
defense of RCTV during a recent visit to Venezuela. Under
these circumstances, suggested the DCM, Spain should
reconsider its decision to sell eight naval craft to
Venezuela, perhaps with a view to providing these ships to a
country that could bolster, rather than undermine,
international stability. He said the USG might be able to
provide a list of countries that might be in the market for
such ships, including some in West Africa that might be more
capable of assisting Spain to counter seaborne threats if
they had the equipment to do so.
3. (C) Leon said that he had always opposed the sale of
Spanish-build aircraft to Venezuela and was pleased when that
sale was derailed in 2006. He agreed that, given the
direction of events in Venezuela, it was time to review the
sale of naval vessels as well. Leon noted, however, that he
was not familiar with the contractual obligations imposed by
the agreement to sell the ships to Venezuela and would have
to investigate this aspect before moving forward with a
review of the sale itself.
//COMMENT//
4. (C) Our sense is that Spain's approach towards Venezuela
is in a period of flux, most recently after Chavez's reaction
to Moratinos' statements on RCTV, and that this is an
opportune moment to try once more to impede the sale of
Spanish naval craft to Caracas. With this in mind, the
Ambassador had requested that the DCM use any opening in the
Gonzalez-Leon meeting to press the issue with Leon. Unlike
Cuba, where Spain has opted unequivocally for engagement, the
MFA appears dissatisfied with the results of its efforts to
establish a good working relationship with Chavez. Spain is
unlikely to break with its pro-dialogue diplomatic style by
publicly dropping the ship deal, but if it were to let the
deal fall apart, this would be a clear signal to Chavez, to
Latin America, and to Spain's EU partners. (NOTE: As far as
we know, the Spanish Government has never acknowledged the
dissolution of the EADS CASA aircraft sale to Venezuela. END
NOTE). Apart from the obvious value of blocking a weapons
sale to the Chavez government, such a move would encourage
increased Spanish readiness to engage more deeply with
countries that are actually working to bring stability and
development. It is not a coincidence, for example, that
Spain is considering establishing a preferential "strategic"
relationship with Colombia at the same time that its
relationship with Caracas is moving into a period of tension.
This is a big shift from the early days of the Zapatero
Government, when Spain blocked a minor weapons sale to
Colombia at the same time that it arranged a major sale to
MADRID 00001256 002.2 OF 002
the Chavez Government. We may be able to work quietly behind
the scenes to encourage this trend.
AGUIRRE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EUR FOR A/S FRIED AND PDAS VOLKER
EUR/WE FOR ALLEGRONE, CLEMENTS, AND CERVETTI
PM FOR A/S STEVE MULL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR VZ SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN/VENEZUELA: PRESSING MFA ON NAVAL SHIP SALE
MADRID 00001256 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens; reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) USCIS Director Emilio Gonzalez met with MFA Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs Bernardino Leon June 21 to
compare notes the major immigration issues affecting both
countries. In the context of Leon's discussion of increased
migration to Spain through West Africa, the DCM suggested
that Spain should revisit its 2005-2006 decision to sell
naval vessels to Venezuela. The DCM said it might be more
beneficial to Spain's strategic interests to sell
"ocean-going patrol boats" (as Spain has termed the vessels)
to a West African country in order to help combat the growing
threats posed by illegal migration and drug trafficking. By
contrast, it was difficult to see how aiding Venezuela's arms
buildup would be helpful to Spain, given the current state of
affairs.
2. (C) The DCM pointed to Venezuelan President Chavez's
comments to the media indicating that Venezuela would
"distance itself" from Spain in the wake of criticism of the
Venezuelan Government's actions on RCTV by Spanish FM Miguel
Angel Moratinos during the June 1 visit to Madrid by the
Secretary. Separately, Venezuelan FM Maduro insulted high
SIPDIS
profile Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon as "a clown" for his
defense of RCTV during a recent visit to Venezuela. Under
these circumstances, suggested the DCM, Spain should
reconsider its decision to sell eight naval craft to
Venezuela, perhaps with a view to providing these ships to a
country that could bolster, rather than undermine,
international stability. He said the USG might be able to
provide a list of countries that might be in the market for
such ships, including some in West Africa that might be more
capable of assisting Spain to counter seaborne threats if
they had the equipment to do so.
3. (C) Leon said that he had always opposed the sale of
Spanish-build aircraft to Venezuela and was pleased when that
sale was derailed in 2006. He agreed that, given the
direction of events in Venezuela, it was time to review the
sale of naval vessels as well. Leon noted, however, that he
was not familiar with the contractual obligations imposed by
the agreement to sell the ships to Venezuela and would have
to investigate this aspect before moving forward with a
review of the sale itself.
//COMMENT//
4. (C) Our sense is that Spain's approach towards Venezuela
is in a period of flux, most recently after Chavez's reaction
to Moratinos' statements on RCTV, and that this is an
opportune moment to try once more to impede the sale of
Spanish naval craft to Caracas. With this in mind, the
Ambassador had requested that the DCM use any opening in the
Gonzalez-Leon meeting to press the issue with Leon. Unlike
Cuba, where Spain has opted unequivocally for engagement, the
MFA appears dissatisfied with the results of its efforts to
establish a good working relationship with Chavez. Spain is
unlikely to break with its pro-dialogue diplomatic style by
publicly dropping the ship deal, but if it were to let the
deal fall apart, this would be a clear signal to Chavez, to
Latin America, and to Spain's EU partners. (NOTE: As far as
we know, the Spanish Government has never acknowledged the
dissolution of the EADS CASA aircraft sale to Venezuela. END
NOTE). Apart from the obvious value of blocking a weapons
sale to the Chavez government, such a move would encourage
increased Spanish readiness to engage more deeply with
countries that are actually working to bring stability and
development. It is not a coincidence, for example, that
Spain is considering establishing a preferential "strategic"
relationship with Colombia at the same time that its
relationship with Caracas is moving into a period of tension.
This is a big shift from the early days of the Zapatero
Government, when Spain blocked a minor weapons sale to
Colombia at the same time that it arranged a major sale to
MADRID 00001256 002.2 OF 002
the Chavez Government. We may be able to work quietly behind
the scenes to encourage this trend.
AGUIRRE