AMBASSADOR THANKS IRAN DEMOCRACY ADVOCATES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 003983

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PHUM IR UK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR THANKS IRAN DEMOCRACY ADVOCATES FOR
THEIR WORK

REF: STATE 108924

Classified By: Ambassador Robert H. Tuttle for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Per reftel request for Chiefs of Mission
worldwide to underscore U.S. support for democracy advocates,
Ambassador met October 11 with two UK-based Iranian
expatriate journalists to thank them for their years of
advocacy for human rights and democracy in Iran and to lead
their discussion of Iranian government and popular views of
U.S. policy on Iran nuclear and security issues. Nazenin
Ansari, who heads the UK,s Foreign Press Association and
writes for leading English and FARSI newspapers and on-line
services, and Ali Reza Nourizadeh, author and daily
commentator on VOA FARSI broadcasts to Iran, briefed the
Ambassador on the appetite of the Iranian public for outside
news, Iranians, views of the nuclear confrontation, and on
the measurable effects international financial sanctions are
having on Iranian trade. Ansari said a U.S. military attack
on Iran, whether limited or full-scale, would hurt rather
than help those within Iran who support democracy and human
rights. Both thanked the Ambassador for U.S. leadership in
bringing pressure on the Iranian regime and argued the UN
should broaden travel and visa restrictions to include the
family members and close associates of regime leaders not now
affected by UN and U.S. anti-terrorism or
anti-proliferation-based designations. Ansari said USG
policy on Iran must be closely linked to human rights in
Iran; failure to do so will discredit other U.S. agendas in
Iran among Iranians. Nourizadeh said U.S. messages to the
Iranian people are most effective when senior U.S. figures
publicly communicate respect for Iranian culture and national
sensibilities; senior U.S. figures should use this approach
repeatedly, whenever they want to make any policy point to
the Iranian public. End summary.

Non-Regime Media Has an Audience
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador asked about Iranian regime views of
Nourizadeh's commentaries on Voice of America satellite radio
broadcasts, which Nourizadeh claimed are heard by 15 million
persons per day inside Iran; Nourizadeh did not explain the
source of his figures. Nourizadeh claims the regime
leadership, keenly aware of the internal Iranian audience VOA
enjoys, also listens to VOA broadcasts and often crafts the
IRI's next-day messages to respond to VOA information or
reports displeasing to the regime.

Impact of Military Action in Iran
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether Iranians view U.S.
military action as inevitable, in light of widespread UK and
international media speculation about the possibility of the
U.S- Iran confrontation escalating into war. Ansari said a
U.S. military attack on Iran, whether limited or full-scale,
would hurt rather than help those within Iran who support
democracy and human rights. A U.S. military strike aimed
specifically at Iran's nuclear facilities would have the
effect of uniting the country behind the regime, including
the millions of Iranians who are not at present enthusiastic
about Iran's nuclear stance. She argued that, even if such
military action prompted unrest among certain Iranians or
civil disturbances within the country, the regime would
quickly regroup, and support within the regime's working
class and rural core constituencies, as well as its firm hold
on the security services, would be unshaken. Arguing "in
Iran, perception, not reality, is everything," she said
whatever politically benign motives underpinned U.S.
Government action would be lost amid the regime's
comprehensive, highly effective propaganda countermeasures;
she also warned of very costly "regional consequences" in the
event of a U.S. attack. Despite her cautions, Ansari also
argued that behavior change by the Iranian Government is
impossible without regime change; she maintained that the

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current regime, due to its essential character, "will never
change its behavior," but that U.S. policy objectives do not
take this political dynamic into account. (Embassy comment:
UK-based Iranian expats with whom we speak have, in the
months following the USG's increased emphasis on behavior
change by Iran, adopted "behavior change requires regime
change" as a standard polemic. End comment.)


4. (C) Nourizadeh said that, although many callers to his
VOA broadcast make emotional appeals for a U.S. attack, the
regime is highly confident of success in the event of a U.S.
attack. The IRI, as the USG was already aware, had focused
heavily on its asymmetric warfare capabilities; he remarked
that new IRGC commander Jafari has been developing his own
thinking on asymmetric warfare for many years. Both
Nourizadeh and Ansari told the Ambassador that the regional
repercussions of any American attack would be enormous, and
further argued that the regime's international comments on
the possibility of a nuclear confrontation are aimed
primarily at the Arab street. Both maintained that Iran's
defiance of the West on nuclear development is far more
popular in the Arab world than within Iran, where Iranians,
starved for multiple sources of information, are alternately
proud of their country's growing stature, but also worried
and uncomprehending.

U.S. Position on Nuclear Development Unknown to Iranians
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked what the view of the Iranian
street was on the nuclear issue: Nourizadeh stated that the
United States has never effectively communicated its policy
to average Iranians. Whether this gap has been due to regime
repression or to inadequate strategic communication by the
USG, Nourizadeh was uncertain. He was adamant, however, that
Iranians, universally, do not comprehend that the West has
been offering Iran support for a peaceful nuclear program.
He has repeatedly reported the West's offer in his own radio
commentaries, but a gap in popular Iranian understanding and
perception persists on the nuclear issue.

Sanctions Are Biting: Enlarge the Pool
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that the United States will
continue to lead the international effort on international
sanctions, both in the UN context and, increasingly, via EU
partners. Both Nourizadeh and Ansari agreed international
financial sanctions are a good way to pressure the regime and
"are biting," and asked for more of the same. Nourizadeh,
who travels frequently to Dubai, claimed that the increasing
difficulty of obtaining any letters of credit worth over one
million dollars are making the lives of Iranian exporters and
importers much harder there.


7. (C) The Ambassador asked for views on possible additional
points on which the United States could usefully pressure the
regime: Ansari argued for a broadening of U.S. and
international travel and visa restrictions to include the
family members and close associates of regime leaders not now
affected by UN and U.S. terrorism or proliferation-based
designations. She and Nourizadeh said it was frustrating to
Iranian democracy advocates, and a mockery of international
sanctions policy, that immediate family members and known
close business associates of senior regime leaders could
travel freely, study, bank and holiday in the United States
and the West, even if "their father or husband or boss" were
designated under existing U.S. or international authority.
They pointed to recent international travel by family members
of ex-President Rafsanjani as one example. Poloff noted hard
data and specifics on international travel, study and banking
by close relatives and associates of senior IRI personnel
would be welcome data (Embassy comment: Embassy recognizes
there are competing considerations in whether to target
individuals and family members for travel restrictions,
including the opportunity in some cases to reach out to

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decision-makers. The comments of these and other Iranian
democracy advocates with whom we speak in London suggest,
however, that the U.S. Government may want to weigh that
consideration against the belief of democracy advocates that
broadening restrictions on the travel of close regime
associates and family members does affect the behavior of
recalcitrant authoritarian regimes. End comment.)

Iran in Iraq
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked Nourizadeh, an Arabic speaker,
about Nourizadeh's observations following his recent visit to
Iraq. Nourizadeh claimed to have seen Quds Force personnel
establishing a significant business and retail presence
throughout southern Iraq; he agreed Iran is "paying off
everyone in southern Iraq." Ambassador noted U.S. forces
will continue to defend themselves in Iraq, including
decisive action when necessary against the Quds Force in
Iraq; Nourizadeh agreed pressure on the Quds Force has a
strong, desirable impact on Iran regime decision-makers, who,
according to Nourizadeh, are most responsive "to this kind of
pressure." Nourizadeh commented that he had, many months
before recent U.S. Government public statements on the Quds
Force ties of Iranian Ambassador Qomi in Baghdad, made
similar revelations about Qomi in his own on-line and radio
reporting.

Human Rights Matter in Iran
--------------


9. (C) Ansari closed by arguing that whatever course U.S.
Government policy on Iran takes it needs to be linked very
directly and publicly to human rights within Iran; failure to
do so will discredit other U.S. agendas in Iran among
Iranians. Nourizadeh said U.S. outreach is most effective
when senior levels repeatedly and publicly communicate their
respect for Iranian culture and national sensibilities: such
a recitation should regularly accompany any and all key
policy points U.S. leaders wish to make to the Iranian
public.



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