UK PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARS POSITIVE VIEWS ON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 000374

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MNUC PARM MOPS UK
SUBJECT: UK PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE HEARS POSITIVE VIEWS ON
RENEWAL OF UK STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT



1. (SBU) Summary: The Defense Select Committee of the UK
House of Commons met with five experts in nuclear arms and
defense policy on January 23 to hear views on HMG's recent
white paper endorsing a renewal of the UK's existing
submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Although the MPs heard
some voices in opposition to the timing of the government's
plans to upgrade its existing nuclear submarine force, the
general consensus of the experts was that UK national
security requirements, even in a post-Cold War world, require
a nuclear deterrent. End Summary.

Views of UK and U.S. Experts


2. (U) The Defense Committee asked a group of US and UK think
tank-based experts to testify on the Blair Government's
recent publication, "The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent: The White Paper," which spelled out the UK
Government's decision to retain and upgrade Britain's
submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability. The experts
appearing before the committee:

-Prof. Richard L. Garwin of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences
-Mr. Paul Ingram of the British American Security Information
Council (BASIC)
-Dr. Stephen Pullinger of the International Security
Information Service (ISIS) Europe
-Dr. Jeremy Stocker of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS)
-Dr. Lee Willett of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)


3. (U) The focus of the hearing, led by the Committee's
chairman James Arbuthnot, a Conservative Party MP, was to
review the arguments put forward by the Blair Government for
retention and renewal of the UK's current deterrent
capability. Key points made at the hearing are summarized
below.

Deterrent Still Needed, But When to Build?


4. (SBU) The MPs heard a general consensus from the experts
-- with the exception of Ingram (BASIC) -- that the Blair
Government's decision to replace the existing Trident system
was the right one, despite some drawbacks. Asked for an
overall assessment, Stocker of the IISS said that although
there were gaps, the White Paper "got everything right." Dr.
Pullinger (ISIS) endorsed retaining a nuclear deterrent, but
told MPs that the White Paper underestimated the threat to UK
national security of WMD proliferation to non-state actors
and did not prioritize it highly enough in laying out the
case for a nuclear deterrent. RUSI's Willett endorsed the
decision to retain and upgrade the existing system, as well
as praised the Government's "comprehensive" policy paper,
though he acknowledged the paper lacked details on deterrence
policy and counter-proliferation because these issues are
difficult to discuss in a public document.


5. (U) Ingram, the most critical of the witnesses about the
Government's plans, said the White Paper demonstrated
overcautiousness and "institutional momentum" in refusing to
consider dramatic new policies, such as disarmament. Ingram
argued that non-nuclear states would consider London's
decision to renew its nuclear capability "provocative" and a
breech of its NPT commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons.


6. (SBU) Professor Garwin of the U.S. National Academy of
Science argued that the White Paper's recommendation to begin
construction of additional submarines was premature. He
noted that in 1998 the U.S. extended the service life of its
Vanguard-class subs from 30 to 40-45 years. Considering the
U.S. subs spend two-thirds of their lives at sea, whereas the
British Vanguards spend only one-quarter of their time at
sea, Garwin questioned the White Paper's assertion that the
UK's subs would have to be retired in 2023-2029 and argued
that they could be extended at least an additional 15 years
like their U.S. counterparts. Garwin's argument was
rebutted, however, by RUSI's Willett who noted that the UK's
Vanguard submarines were a less expensive model than the U.S.
sub force (Embassy Comment: A point confirmed to us by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. End comment) so the
lifespan of the UK submarine force and the impact of its
shorter operational deployment schedule could not be
extrapolated from a strict comparison to the U.S. force.

Procurement Capabilities
--------------

7. (U) Much of the Committee's interest focused on the
experts' views of the optimal time frame required for
developing a successor submarine-based nuclear force.
Professor Garwin explained that costs often rise during

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production, therefore it was speculative for the White Paper
to argue that it is more cost effective to replace rather
than refurbish the existing force. He argued that a
refurbishment to extend the current force by 10 years would
allow HMG to invest in a smaller, more advanced submarine and
missile system later on. (Comment: Garwin also argued in his
written submission, but not in person, that the UK's security
is more imperiled than supported than supported by the
existence of nuclear weapons. End Comment.) Asked if the
White Paper's warnings were exaggerated about valuable
submarine-building skills within the UK work force being lost
if new submarines were not ordered now, Ingram replied these
skills are transferable and could be brought back to the UK
when needed, so it would be advantageous to delay the
decision on a new replacement to allow Parliament and the
British people to reach a full consensus on a deterrent.
Willett of RUSI disagreed, saying further delay would cost
more because a three-year refurbishment would be so costly
and only extend the UK submarines lifespan by 10 years.

Comment
--------------

8. (SBU) The expert witnesses by and large did not question
the Blair Government's recommendation to continue as a
nuclear weapon state, mirroring the apparent consensus on
this decision within Parliament and much of the British
media. The exception were Ingram and Garwin, who argued that
doing so would harm the UK's counter-proliferation goals.
The most heated discussion arose when Professor Garwin, the
American expert, advocated delaying the decision to build a
new sub force because a delay would not threaten the British
sub building skill base, a claim made in HMG's White Paper.


9. (U) For copies of the written testimonies by the experts,
please e-mail Terrence M. Dillon at DillonTM@state.gov

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm
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