UFC LEADERSHIP IN CAMPAIGN MODE, UNLIKELY TO ENTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L LOME 000176

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED PARA MARKINGS)

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR POL -- D'ELIA AND KANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PINR TO
SUBJECT: UFC LEADERSHIP IN CAMPAIGN MODE, UNLIKELY TO ENTER
UNITY GOVERNMENT

REF: 06 LOME 1277

Classified By: Ambassador David Dunn, Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. The Union of Forces for Change (UFC),arguably
the largest opposition party in Togo, has ruled out
participating in the national unity government formed last
September. The unity government's primary mandate is to
prepare for free and fair legislative elections in 2007.
Although the UFC has declined to join government, it will
continue to have a role in other transitional institutions,
notably the national electoral commission (CENI) and the
follow-up committee to the National Dialogue. Party leaders
prefer this half-in, half-out status for reasons of
principle, practicality, and political expediency, but it is
not without risks for Togo and the UFC itself. End Summary.


2. (C) Conversations with UFC party leaders have revealed that
the party will not join the unity government formed in the
wake of last year's National Dialogue and is aligning its
campaign strategy for upcoming legislative elections
accordingly. In an unguarded moment, Eric Amerding, the
brother-in-law, confidant, and close adviser ("the only
person who can tell Gilchrist what he doesn't want to hear")
of party president Gilchrist Olympio told Ambassador in
mid-January that, "From the beginning, we did not want to
join government."


3. (C) Olympio, too, has told us that he sees a tactical
advantage in remaining outside government (ref). Indeed, in
an interview published in the February 5 edition of the
opposition biweekly "Forum de la Semaine," he declared that
the opposition was more effective on the outside, where it
could freely criticize the government's policies. He
distanced himself in the interview from the other two
"radical" opposition parties (and erstwhile UFC running
mates),the CAR, headed by PM Yawovi Agboyibo, and the CDPA,
headed by Leopold Gnininvi, both of whom have joined the
national union government. Should one or both decide to leave
government, Olympio added, they would be welcomed with open
arms by the UFC.


4. (C) Olympio's initial, angry reaction to the appointment by
President Faure of Agboyibo as prime minister last September
-- when Olympio told a French journalist that the UFC would
not accept a seat in a cabinet led by anyone other than a UFC
prime minister -- prompted a series of contacts and
negotiations between the Togolese presidency and the UFC over
the possible inclusion of UFC members in Agboyibo's
government. Regional leaders, notably Obasanjo and Compaore,
pressed the Togolese parties for such an outcome, a message
we reinforced. The negotiations eventually floundered over
the proximate issue of exactly which ministerial portfolios
would go to the UFC. Despite having told Ambassador Dunn and
Embassy Paris Africa watchers in October that he would join
government in return for a "super" ministry with
responsibility for implementing the National Dialogue's
Global Political Agreement, when offered just that (plus two
lesser ministries),Olympio declined. This was confirmed to
us separately by Amerding, Cooperation Minister Gilbert
Bawara, and Olympio himself. Bawara recently told us that the
GOT has not given up its efforts, even if the UFC is not
receptive.


5. (C) The decision by the UFC leadership to forego a role in
government was not embraced universally within the UFC. Party
chapters outside Lome in particular voiced unhappiness with
Gilchrist's hasty reaction, which in their view was a missed
opportunity both to help shape the electoral framework and to
provide jobs and benefits to UFC activists long-excluded from
the benefits of office. Eric Amerding (protect) told the
Ambassador before the UFC's executive committe meeting
February 3 and 4 that the party leadership had to squelch an
attempt by younger members to include the topic of party
"modernisation" on the agenda, which he described with a
nervous laugh as a euphemism for a critical appraisal of
Gilchrist's leadership. He added that the rank-ordering of
candidate lists for each of Togo's constituencies
(prefectures under the new, list-based proportional voting
system) for the upcoming legislative elections will be
decided by Gilchrist himself, an exercise that promises to be
a further "headache" for the UFC leadership.


6. (C) Nor has the UFC's decision to boycott cabinet
participation captured the imagination of the wider
electorate. Gilchrist's visit to Togo from February 3 to 9

had two purposes -- to preside over the UFC executive
committee meeting (above) and as a pre-launch of the party's
legislative election campaign. Throughout his stay -- his
longest in Togo since the early 90's -- Gilchrist's public
appearances failed to attract the large crowds that
characterized his infrequent visits to Lome in years past.
About 250 greeted him when he arrived by road at the main
Ghana border crossing, compared to past visits when his
greeters were so numerous that the border was effectively
shut down. A crowd estimated at 2500 to 3000 attended the
only scheduled public rally of the visit, at a square in
downtown Lome at the conclusion of the executive committee
meeting. Spontaneous gatherings in Aneho, a UFC stronghold at
the coastal border with Benin, and in the central city of
Atakpame, which experienced some of the worst of the
political violence in 2005, attracted limited but
enthusiastic throngs.


7. (C) While returning to Lome from Atakpame, Olympio's motorcade
was involved in a high speed accident. It occured when one of
the vehicles braked to avoid an errant motorcyclist and was
struck by another vehicle in the motorcade, causing one to
overturn. Amerding suffered painful but not life-threatening
injuries to his chest. The incident initially raised fears
that history might be repeating itself, in light of an armed
attack on Olympio's motorcade by Eyadema loyalists during a
visit to central Togo in 1992 that left several people dead
and Olympio seriously injured. When Olympio and his senior
advisors met with us just prior to his departure from Togo on
February 9, they characterized the recent incident as an
accident and nothing more and noted that protection from GOT
security services had been irreproachable throughout
Olympio's stay.


8. (C) Olympio's address marking the opening of the executive
committee was the major policy pronouncement of his visit. It
was a nuanced speech, alternating between criticism of the
RPT's policies of exclusion and discrimination over the years
and qualified support for last year's national dialogue and
global polical agreement, which he labelled as the "last
chance to reestablish confidence and peace among the Togolese
people." He defended the UFC's decision to remain outside
government and characterized the period leading up to
legislative elections as one of "consultation and shared
management" among the various Togolese parties. Olympio made
no mention by name of President Faure Gnassingbe, which is
just as well given his inclination to refer to Faure as "that
boy" in private conversations. Uncharacteristically, he
avoided the issues of military reform and bringing to justice
those responsible for human rights abuses in the past,
including attacks by security forces and militias loyal to
the regime against opposition supporters during the protests
that followed the 2005 presidential elections. Describing
tactics, Olympio defined the UFC's pre-electoral priorities
to include mobilizing resources, improving communications,
protecting its candidates, and ensuring the security of
polling materials and election results on the day of
elections. He said the party would favor the role of youth,
women, and Togolese abroad in its campaign platform, whose
central theme would be ending the clan-based politics of
repression of the past.


9. (C) Following its executive committee meeting, the UFC sent a
letter to the Prime Minister's office recommending that the
government undertake certain actions pertaining to
implementation of the global political agreement. These
included inviting the EU to help train Togolese security
forces before the legislative elections. The PM's office
responded with a letter questioning the appropriateness of
the UFC's demarche, in light of its decision to boycott
government and Olympio's comment to the press, clearly aimed
at Prime Minister Agboyibo, that he preferred not to join
those members of the opposition opting to try to change
things from within. The PM's office made public its response,
widening the controversy and prompting a barrage of
editorials in the Togolese media.


10. (C) Comment. The UFC is feeling pressure from a number of
fronts -- from the RPT, happy to exploit opposition missteps
and divisions, e.g., the exchange of letters between the UFC
and Agboyibo's office, from the other opposition parties, who
are vying with the UFC for the broader opposition vote, from
its own rank and file, who may be losing patience with
Olympio's impulsive leadership, and from the broader Togolese
population, hard pressed to understand why the UFC has not
exploited what many see as an unprecedented opening as well

as why it appears intent on violating the spirit of the
popular global political agreement. Exacerbating the UFC's
problems is the credibility problem it created for itself
when it declined to join the national unity government and,
more recently, when it declared it would not abide by an
agreement to settle differences within the national electoral
commission by vote rather than consensus. This measure was
adopted at the last meeting of the follow-up committee to the
national dialogue chaired by President Compaore in
Ouagadougou and was widely seen as the opposition's
concession in a trade-off with the RPT over the question of
photo-ID registration cards (Lome 0085).


11. (C) Comment continued. In our meeting with the UFC leadership
at the conclusion of Olympio's visit, it was clear that in
the face of these setbacks, the party has decided to dig in
its heels rather than opt for a more conciliatory approach.
Indeed, since its executive committee met, the UFC has become
more contentious. If the UFC's electoral fortunes were all
that mattered, we would not be overly concerned. It is the
nature of politics for parties to take broad gambles, reaping
the benefits if right and paying the price if wrong. The
UFC's contrariness, however, has broader implications for
democracy and stability. First, whether intentional or not,
the UFC has created a stake for itself in the failure of the
unity government and, by extension, the free, fair, and
transparent electoral process that is the new government's
primary mandate. This raises the prospect of a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, and related to the first,
the UFC has made no effort to find common ground with the
other parties, particularly the RPT, on issues related to the
elections. Squabbling among the parties has slowed electoral
preparations, increasing the likelihood of mistakes and/or
manipulation as work plans become compressed. Rather than
negotiating solutions among themselves, the Togolese parties
are relying on President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso to
force compromises. Not only are the Togolese denying
themselves an important part of the democratization process,
one must wonder how much time and patience Compaore, the
national dialogue facilitator, will continue to demonstrate.
Third, the UFC has estranged itself from its natural allies
in the opposition, the CAR and CDPA. Opposition unity proved
to be an important force in moving the RPT-dominated regime
in the direction of democratic reform, i.e., through the
national dialogue and global political agreement. Solidarity
among the three main opposition parties may be needed once
again to prevent backsliding, e.g., if the RPT fares poorly
in the legislative elections and there is a backlash against
Faure's policies from party hardliners. End comment.
DUNN