SLOVENIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LJUBLJANA 000022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2017
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO SI IR
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

REF: SECSTATE 2659

Classified By: COM Thomas B. Robertson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Slovenia has a small mission in Tehran
headed by a charge and staffed with one additional officer.
The second officer speaks FARSI and both will be in Tehran
through Slovenia's EU presidency which will conclude in July

2008. According to MFA Iran desk officer Maja Novak, the
primary focus of the mission is commercial and Slovene
diplomats engage primarily with other western diplomats and
in multilateral fora. Slovenia follows the EU lead in its
engagement with Tehran and has not held high level talks or
supported high level visits since its accession to the EU in

2004. Nina Purkart from the MFA's Office of Human Rights
within the Division of International Organizations said
Slovenia has not engaged Iranian civil society directly and
works primarily through EU programs. While underscoring
Slovenia's small stature in Iran, Purkart did acknowledge
that if there were political will, the GOS might be able to
find a way to engage more directly along the lines of its
successful project in Iraq or through the "intercultural
dialogue" which will be a cornerstone of its EU Presidency.
End Summary.


2. (SBU) Polecon Chief met with MFA Iran Desk officer Maja
Novak and MFA Human Rights officer Nina Purkart January 16 to
discuss Slovenia's engagement in Iran and potential for
US-Slovenian collaboration. Slovenia keeps a low profile in
Tehran focusing primarily on its small trade relationship
($40 million in exports and $1 million in imports) and a
sizable debt owed by Iran. As in past discussions on Iran,
the MFA claimed to have very narrow interests and minimal
contact with the Government of Iran or Iranian civil society.
Poloff reminded Novak and Purkart that Slovenia had no
representation in Iraq and yet had developed a very
successful program there in collaboration with the Government
of Austria and the Slovenian NGO Together which continues
today. In fact, Together has a National Endowment for
Democracy funded program in Chechnya, an exceedingly
difficult and dangerous place to work, where it works with a
local NGO on building volunteerism.


3. (C) Purkart acknowledged the success of the Iraq program
saying that it was possible only because there had been
strong political support behind it initially. For Slovenia
to engage seriously in Iran, the personal support of the
Foreign Minister, at a minimum, would be required. She did
not discount this possibility especially in light of
Slovenia's upcoming EU Presidency and its interest in
promoting "intercultural dialogue," a concept which has not
yet been fully fleshed out. Novak and Purkart were both
curious about how the USG engaged in Iran and how it
identified its civil society partners.


4. (C) Comment: Though we hear this excuse less and less,
the "we are small" defense in response to pressure to engage
on global issues was not unexpected. However, given
Slovenia's growing exposure to problems far from its own
borders through its leadership of various international
organizations (OSCE in 2005, Human Security Network 2006/7,
IAEA 2007) this concern is now often followed by a
willingness to explore the possibilities. Slovenia also has a
keen interest in membership on the UN Human Rights Council
where, Poloff reminded Novak, Iran would surely be a topic of
discussion. Post believes Slovenia would be capable of
spearheading a modest yet effective program in the area of
human rights, volunteerism, women's issues or any number of
less controversial topics, but it would need some assistance,
both financial and conceptual, to get something off the
ground. End Comment.
ROBERTSON