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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
07LISBON3194 2007-12-20 14:53:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:  

PORTUGAL CLAIMS EU DELIGHTED WITH BALI RESULTS

Tags:   KGHG SENV ENRG PO EUN 
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					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LISBON 003194 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEE CORECTION)

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/PGI - DAVID TESSLER; EUR/ERA - ERIC LUFTMAN;
EUR/WE - KEVIN OPSTRUP; NSC FOR JONATHAN SHRIER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2027
TAGS: KGHG SENV ENRG PO EUN
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL CLAIMS EU DELIGHTED WITH BALI RESULTS

REF: STATE 168849

LISBON 00003194 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Dep P/E Counselor Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
-------



1. (C/NF) Fausto Brito e Abreu (protect), Advisor to
Portugal,s Secretary of State for Environment Humberto Rosa,
told post the EU was delighted with the final Bali text as a
starting point for negotiations. He said the EU never would
have imagined that, following the Major Economies Meeting in
Washington, DC, in September, the United States would have
signed a document even resembling the Bali Action Plan three
months later. He told us the EU was pleased both at how the
U.S. had engaged towards the end in Bali and that Washington
had not closed the door to setting of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission targets. In the end, the meeting was a success for
everyone, as all participants had been required to "cut off a
finger" to achieve some of their key objectives. He was
critical of Indonesia's organization of the event and
expressed some EU discomfort with the frequency and agenda of
the scheduled Major Economies Meetings (MEM) as well as U.S.
dominance of process. End Summary.

Dropping Specific Targets


--------------------------




2. (C/NF) Brito e Abreu (protect) said one of the EU's main
objectives for the Bali Climate Change Conference was to have
the USG more engaged in the UN process. He acknowledged the
difficulty of bringing three divergent views into line --
with the EU mandate to engage the USG, USG insistence on
inclusion of major developing nations, and the G-77 and China
call to put the onus on developed nations. Since the USG
would not accept mid-term goals that did not include major
developing nations, and the G-77 and China would not accept
long-term goals without a USG commitment to mid-term goals,
the EU determined early on to drop specific reference to
quantifiable targets, Brito e Abreu (protect) said. However,
it took three days to coordinate internally and overcome the
objections of France, which was apparently the lone hold-out.



3. (C/NF) Note: The EU found itself having to overcome the
media's negative reporting of the EU's "cave-in" on targets,
Brito e Abreu noted. In an effort to be transparent, the EU
had provided the press with its initial draft text. The
press played all subsequent revisions to the text as a loss
for the EU despite its expressed satisfaction with the final
document, he said. He added that the EU was comfortable with
the footnote reference to recommended targets, and that
despite dropping specific targets from the final text, the EU
would continue its efforts to convince the USG to accept the
validity of targets. End Note.

Applying Media Pressure


--------------------------




4. (C/NF) Brito e Abreu noted two instances when the EU was
able to engage the media to its advantage. He said the EU
and many other nations were dismayed by the USG's lack of
engagement during initial negotiations in Bali. He said the
USG delegation "just sat there and didn't say anything" while
many other countries presented their proposals and offered
their opinions. Further discouraged by the USG's apparent
continued relunctance to participate in later discussions, he
said, the EU decided to engage the media, accusing the USG of
refusing to demonstrate leadership. While this might have
ratcheted up the pressure on the USG, it did not result in
the desired outcome, he said.



5. (C/NF) Due to continuing differences between the U.S. and

LISBON 00003194 002.2 OF 003


other delegations, Brito and Abreu said, the EU decided to
step up the pressure even further to move towards an
agreement. According to Brito e Abreu, the EU decided to go
for the USG's "soft spot" -- the Major Economies Meeting
(MEM). Having heard rumblings throughout the Bali meetings,
Portugal coordinated internally with EU member-states as well
as with China, India, South Africa and Brazil to gauge their
thoughts on the usefulness of the MEM process minus a Bali
agreement. In a carefully worded statement, Rosa noted that
it did not make sense to have a MEM in January if nations
could not agree to a roadmap in Bali. According to Brito e
Abreu, German Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel's comment
regarding a boycott was entirely his own and did not reflect
Portuguese thinking.



6. (C/NF) According to Brito e Abreu, this is the tactic that
broke the logjam. Despite the confusion during the final
plenary on December 15, Brito e Abreu said all parties
acheived most of their objectives even if everyone "had to
cut off a finger" to get there. In addition to greater USG
engagement, the EU was pleased with the building blocks
outlined in the text on mitigation, adaptation, technology
and financing.

Back-Up Plan for Success - Just in Case


--------------------------




7. (C/NF) Brito e Abreu noted that the EU had come prepared
with a back-up plan to declare the Bali talks a success in
the event that agreement on a text could not be reached. In
that instance, the EU planned to highlight enhanced action on
adaptation, including the "one country/one vote" victory for
developing nations on Adaptation Fund spending and
"fast-track approval" for small forestry projects to increase
allowable acreage.

Critical of Indonesian Organization


--------------------------




8. (C/NF) Portugal was critical of the Indonesian
organization of the Bali Conference, noting that the failure
of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate
the final plenary session with the Ministry of Environment
resulted in confusion and ire on the part of some
participants. In particular, the Chinese demanded to know
why the plenary had been called while their minister was
still conducting negotiations outside the conference hall.
According to Brito e Abreu, UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer
responded by hanging his head, saying he did not know why,
and leaving the room visibly upset.

Suggestions for Major Economies Meeting Process


--------------------------

--


9. (C/NF) Brito e Abreu noted that the Portuguese would be
forwarding the MEM invitation from the U.S. to the Slovenian
presidency in preparation for the January meeting in
Honolulu. He took the opportunity to express general EU
discomfort with the frequency and content of the scheduled
meetings as well as U.S. dominance of the process. He
recommended two political meetings (vice four) and perhaps
several workshops before the summer. He also expressed EU
concern that the MEM agenda mimicked the UNFCCC process. He
recommended focusing on technology and finance and dropping
adaptation and forestry from the agenda. He also mentioned
that many in the EU thought that the USG was not familiar
with the UNFCCC process and that this unfamiliarity had shown
in discussion and correspondence. On the plus side, he noted
that the EU anxiously awaited President Bush's announcement
of the USG's long-term goal for GHG reduction during the
summer MEM Summit.


LISBON 00003194 003.2 OF 003


Comment


--------------------------




10. (C/NF) Brito e Abreu's account was certainly
self-serving, casting the USG as intransigent and the EU as
level-headed. Nonetheless, his account provided useful
insights into EU perceptives, tactics and strategy as well as
a window into the EU's thinking on the MEM process. His
enthusiasm with the results achieved in Bali was genuine and
his pleasure at having a "greater engaged" U.S. likely
reflects EU sentiment as well.

Bio Note


--------------------------




11. (SBU) Fausto Brito e Abreu, born July 21, 1970, has
served as advisor to Portugal's Secretary of State for
Environment Humberto Rosa since 2005. He is clearly
dedicated and very accesible, offering good insight into both
Portuguese and EU thinking on environmental issues. He has
degrees in science from NYU, the University of Lisbon and
Oxford and has worked as a lecturer at Oxford and in
financial investment at Goldman Sachs International and
Deutsche Bank AG in London. He is also licensed as a
commercial pilot and certified in scuba diving. In addition
to Portuguese, he speaks English and Spanish fluently and is
comfortable in French.
Stephenson