Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LISBON3013
2007-11-27 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:  

PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

Tags:  PREL MOPS NATO PO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLI #3013/01 3311623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271623Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6457
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0048
C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 003013 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR CHIEF OF STAFF JOSHUA BOLTEN
DEPARTMENT FOR S - BRIAN GUNDERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

REF: LISBON 2882

Classified By: Ambassador Alfred Hoffman for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 003013

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR CHIEF OF STAFF JOSHUA BOLTEN
DEPARTMENT FOR S - BRIAN GUNDERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT ON AFGHANISTAN DRAWDOWN

REF: LISBON 2882

Classified By: Ambassador Alfred Hoffman for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) I went alone to my courtesy call on President Cavaco
Silva on November 26. It was a warm meeting in which we both
described the excellent state of bilateral relations but
focused mostly on a constructive discussion of the recent
Portuguese decision to draw down combat forces in
Afghanistan. Cavaco Silva attributed the decision to the
need to relieve overstreched commando and paratrooper units
but said Portugal is considering other ways in which it might
contribute. He shared his view that NATO should be doing much
more to train Afghan security forces and should be reducing
its role in combat operations. I pressed him to commit to
the principle of equivalent substitution; he replied only
that they are considering the possibilities. I believe there
is flexibility in Cavaco Silva's position, and suggest that a
meeting with President Bush would make a difference. End
Summary.


2. (C) In my farewell call on President Cavaco Silva on
November 26, the President described U.S.-Portugal relations
as "wonderful." He congratulated me for strengthening
bilateral linkages in the business and education sectors, and
said his wife had great affection for Mrs. Hoffman and
considered her a friend. I thanked the President and relayed
a recent conversation I had with former President George H.W.
Bush, saying the former President hoped to see Cavaco Silva
in Kennebunkport next summer.

Afghanistan
--------------


3. (C) I told Cavaco Silva I had thoroughly enjoyed my
two-year assignment in Portugal and believed the bilateral
relationship was in very good shape. I then noted I had had
two big disappointments during my time here. First had been
my inability to arrange a meeting between Cavaco Silva and
the current President Bush, and the second had been
Portugal's recent decision to reduce its company-size
deployment to ISAF in Afghanistan in August 2008 (reftel).
The latter issue had been particularly troubling, I

emphasized, given that it came only six weeks after President
Bush had praised Prime Minister Socrates in the Oval Office
for its contributions in Afghanistan, and Socrates had
expressed Portugal's strong commitment to NATO efforts there.
I expressed regret that I still had not received an
explanation for the drawdown decision.


4. (C) Cavaco Silva replied that the decision had been
motivated by a desire to relieve the enormous strain on
Portuguese paratroopers and commandos, who have been
regularly rotated into Afghanistan for some time now. Allied
efforts, he said, should focus increasingly on training
Afghan forces to provide for the country's security and less
on combat operations. Portugal is now examining other ways
to contribute; deployment of an OMLT and a C-130 are a step
in that direction, and he had asked his "people" to look at
other possible contributions.


5. (C) In examining its options, I asked whether the
President would commit to the principle of "equivalent
substitution," ensuring that Portugal's commitment would
change only in nature but not in scope. He made no promises,
saying only that Portugal was considering the possibilities.
He recalled that he had earlier, at the Ambassador's request,
increased Portugal's participation in the NATO Training
Mission in Iraq from six personnel to nine, as a gesture of
support for U.S. efforts in that country. As Portugal looks
to August 2008, it would keep a similar objective in mind.
Asked when he might be in a position to commit to equivalent
substitution in Afghanistan, he replied "Perhaps I will have
some more news when next I see you (in Kennebunkport)."

Comment
--------------


6. (C) The principal impression I took away from this
meeting was there is some flexibility in Cavaco Silva's
position. He clearly thinks NATO should be doing much more
to train Afghan security forces, and I suspect he will give
serious consideration to increasing the number of Portuguese
OMLTs there. In separate discussions, senior military
leaders have dismissed the argument that ISAF operations
have placed an undue strain on Portuguese paratroopers and
commanders -- they insist they are fully capable of continued
combat deployements in Afghanistan. Virtually everyone in
government, from the Prime Minister down, was not supportive
of the drawdown decision.


7. (C) I suspect Cavaco Silva's pressing hard for a
reduction in Portuguese combat forces was driven in part by
personal pique at having his request turned down for a
meeting with President Bush last June, during the former's
first visit to Washington as Portugal's commander-in-chief.
I am convinced that confirmation of a meeting with President
Bush -- regardless of venue -- prior to August 2008 would
make a difference in leading Cavaco Silva to reconsider his
push for a Portuguese drawdown in Afghanistan. Such a
commitment from Cavaco Silva should, of course, be made in
advance of any meeting.
Hoffman