PORTUGAL AND THE INFORMAL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LISBON 000216

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PO
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL AND THE INFORMAL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERIAL

REF: SECSTATE 7434

Classified By: Pol Chief Troy Fitrell, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (U) Summary: Portugal is unlikely to make further
commitments for Afghanistan given existing contributions to
several overseas operations coupled with the current
austerity budget. MFA staff will, however, recommend an
enhanced public diplomacy effort by their principals and they
look forward to discussions on enhanced counter-narcotics
efforts, the OMLTs, and other issues. End summary.

Afghanistan
--------------

2. (U) Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Director
of the NATO Policy Office Adelino Vieira da Silva noted that
Portugal's existing contributions to several overseas
operations coupled with the current austerity budget
precluded any further commitments to Afghanistan in the short
term, as requested reftel.


3. (C) Regarding counter-narcotics, Vieira da Silva noted
that the MFA's International Organizations Bureau is
reviewing various proposed contributions, including
eradication efforts, but that no decision has been made. He
continued, however, that the MFA looks forward to reviewing
proposals to enhance the counter-narcotics portion of the
NATO/ISAF operational plan, noting that criminal activity was
an integral part of the violence and instability in
Afghanistan.


4. (C) As his office was responsible for the first draft of
the Minister's remarks, Vieira da Silva was interested in an
enhanced public diplomacy program. Vieira da Silva agreed
that few Portuguese citizens understood the reasons behind
Portugal's commitment to ISAF and that the failure to engage
the public would be magnified in the event of a tragedy
involving Portuguese soldiers. For that reason, he said that
he would recommend to the Foreign Minister's staff that the
Minister expand his outreach efforts regarding the ISAF
mission in Afghanistan.


5. (C) Vieira da Silva was impressed by the concept of the
Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (OMLT). Admitting that
he was unfamiliar with the specific proposal, he agreed that
it appeared to be an excellent way to maximize the value of a
state's contributions. Vieira da Silva promised to research
the proposal more thoroughly so that the Government of
Portugal could make an informed decision.

Kosovo
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6. (C) Vieira da Silva noted that the ministerial would
discuss Kosovo as well. He believed that the compromise
brokered by Ahtisaari was a good one, albeit years too late.
He worried that Russia would accept the proposal, but then
work to undermine it in the future. Moreover, he worried
that Russia would likely use the idea of limitations on
sovereignty as a tool for its own conflict regions.

NATO Summit Host
--------------

7. (C) Vieira da Silva also brought up the issue of hosting
the next NATO Summit. He suggested that, since Portugal has
a solid majority of member states supporting its candidacy,
that the decision be worked out quietly and soon to avoid any
appearance of discord within NATO.

Comment
--------------

8. (U) Portugal's ISAF contributions have been justifiably
lauded by President Bush and allied commanders, but the
Portuguese are stretched by other commitments in Kosovo, East
Timor, Lebanon, and elsewhere. While we do not expect major
force or financial contributions to be forthcoming, the OMLT
concept may be a way to take advantage of Portuguese
experience and expertise.


9. (U) Portuguese officials at all levels continue to press
Portugal's candidacy to host the 2008 NATO Summit. In
response, we have indicated that USG support for Romania's
candidacy remains unchanged.
Hoffman