Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LISBON1858
2007-07-18 17:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Lisbon
Cable title:  

U.S.- EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSSES KOSOVO,

Tags:  CVIS MOPS PHUM PREL PO EUN UN XA AF ZL RS 
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FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6064
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEC/MIDDLE EAST MULTILATERAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1475
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LISBON 001858 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: CVIS MOPS PHUM PREL PO EUN UN XA AF ZL RS
XF
SUBJECT: U.S.- EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSSES KOSOVO,
RUSSIA, AFRICA, AND MIDDLE EAST

Classified By: Dep Pol/Econ Counselor Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

Summary
-----------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LISBON 001858

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: CVIS MOPS PHUM PREL PO EUN UN XA AF ZL RS
XF
SUBJECT: U.S.- EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS DISCUSSES KOSOVO,
RUSSIA, AFRICA, AND MIDDLE EAST

Classified By: Dep Pol/Econ Counselor Cari Enav for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)

Summary
--------------

1. (SBU) A/S Fried met July 13 in Lisbon with Political
Directors (PolDirs) from the 27 EU member states and with the
EU Troika political directors. The agenda included Kosovo,
Russia, NATO coordination in Afghanistan, conflicts in
Africa, institution building in the Palestinian Territories,
and Iran's troubling activities in the Middle East. The
Visa Waiver Program and Guantanamo were also raised. DG for
External and Political-Military Affairs Robert Cooper
represented the EU Council Secretariat and Portugal's PolDir
Vasco Bramao Ramos represented the EU Presidency.

Kosovo
--------------

2. (C) Kosovo was front and center in A/S Fried's one-on-one
discussion with Portugal's PolDirector Bramao Ramos and
during lunch with all 27 member-states' PolDirs, carrying
over into the Troika meeting later in the day. Bramao Ramos
told Fried he and his EU counterparts had spent three hours
on July 11 developing an "increasingly" common position and
would have another meeting July 23 to flesh out the details.
Serbian President Tadic is ready privately to look the other
way so that we "just get it done," according to Bramao Ramos.
He said the EU needs 120 days to pull it together. A/S
Fried noted that helping develop a common EU position on
Kosovo that allowed us to move to supervised independence
together would be a major and laudable accomplishment for the
Portuguese Presidency. It could also set a precedent for
effective U.S.-EU collaboration when there is blockage in the
UNSC.


3. (C) Over lunch with the 27 member-states' PolDirs, Fried
outlined his recent trip to the region. The current UNSC
draft represented a huge compromise on our part, but is
nevertheless likely to be rejected, he noted. Serbian PM

Kostunica, who told Fried that he would permit Serbia only to
discuss "supervised autonomy," not independence, lambasted
the Sarkozy plan from the G8 Summit as "an American proposal
from a French mouth." He rejected the new "minimalist"
resolution without having seen it. President Tadic, on the
other hand, claimed to recognize the reality of the situation
but lamented that he could not allow himself to be
rhetorically outflanked by the nationalists.


4. (C) A/S Fried commented that Serbia, like Russia, is
misreading Europe and the U.S.: what appears to them as
insurmountable divisions were merely open discussions towards
a common position. Fried underscored President Bush's
commitment to Kosovo's independence and noted that President
Sarkozy also described independence as "inevitable." To
further demonstrate the point, most EU PolDirs replied that
their governments' opinions were in line with that of the
United States. The Greek and the Spaniard were the two
exceptions. The Greek was hostile, adamantly stressing his
government's absolute need to have a UNSCR. The more
conciliatory Spaniard underlined the need to avoid a choice
between unity and a UNSCR. The British representative noted
that if Russian intransigence forced recognition of Kosovo
without a UNSCR, it would be the Russians themselves who
forced such an outcome. The Italian strongly enorsed the
British and U.S. view.


5. (C) A/S Fred pledged not to force a UN vote or risk a
vetowithout consultation with the EU. He underscored te USG
desire to achieve a UNSCR yet noted that w must also prepare
contingency plans. The Kosovrs will not likely declare
unilateral independenc because they have faith in the West's
ability t achieve a resolution. Despite the fact that the
Kosovars have agreed to delay precipitate action,the West's
time is not unlimited, and we will no be able to ask the
Kosovars to delay again, Frie underscored.


6. (C) Discussion of Kosovo contiued into the Troika
following lunch. A/S Fried cmmented that the U.S and the EU
have a very goodchance to make this work. We will get there
togther, replied Bramao Ramos, but must continue to be
flexible. Robert Cooper added that the differenes the U.S.
has seen and heard on Kosovo from th EU are not
irreconcilable, "they only reflect mmber states working

LISBON 00001858 002 OF 004


through their differences." Solana, Cooper reported, had
delivered the same message to the Kosovars during a recent
trip: "You know you will have independence -- what matters
is how to get there."

Russia
--------------

7. (C) A/S Fried noted that the U.S. needs to find away to
avoid its two customary modes with Russia -- extreme
enthusiasm and extreme disappointment. There are some issues
on which we work well with the Russians, such as
non-proliferation and counterterrorism, and others where we
do not. On missile defense (MD),the USG is working hard to
move discussions forward. The Russians were surprised by our
agreement to cooperate on MD, particularly our willingness to
work with Russia following their offer to discuss MD
cooperation involving the Garbala radar station in Azerbaijan
and even facilities in Russia itself. If Russia's aim,
however, was merely to block cooperation between the U.S. and
our Polish and Czech allies, they will fail.


8. (C) Russia has a mixed record on energy. Western
companies are active there, but Russia,s monopolistic
efforts to corner transport of Central Asian gas and increase
leverage over European consumers are unhelpful, Fried said.
Russia's willingness to suspend gas supplies to the Ukraine
was worrying and is a likely preview of further negative
actions. The USG supports southern routes and, in
particular, the European-backed Nabuco pipeline project to
diversify supply and to allow Central Asians to access the
European market without Russian control.

NATO-EU Cooperation
--------------

9. (C) Council Secretariat DG for External and
Political-Military Affairs Robert Cooper noted operational
difficulties in Afghanistan for the EU's ESDP mission.
Cooper noted that the U.S. could be a great help by offering
to use common command, control, communications, and
intelligence (CCCI) equipment. Also, without an operational
agreement between NATO and the EU to share situational
awareness reports, the EU mission would be in unnecessary
danger. Cooper suggested that direct relations with the U.S.
could allow for relevant information to be passed, avoiding
the political blockages that exist through multilateral
channels. A/S Fried agreed that the theological dispute
between NATO and the EU was unwise and promised to follow up
on Cooper's suggestions. (Note: Cooper noted that he had
also forwarded these suggestions directly to his Pentagon
contacts. End note.


10. (C) Slovenian PolDir Mitja Drobnic also commented during
the Troika meeting that Turkey was blocking NATO efforts and
could damage the NATO mission in Afghanistan if unchecked.
He requested U.S. support in pressuring Turkey to do the
right thing. A/S Fried agreed that the U.S. at times shared
Europe's frustration with Turkey but wanted to move it in the
right direction while ensuring its stability and development.
He said an unstable Turkey could have a catastrophic affect
on the region.

VWP
--------------

11. (C) As requested by the EU, A/S Fried described U.S.
efforts to reform the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, noting that
the current situation is inadequate and that we are working
to include all EU states. We propose to strengthen security
provisions, using the Australian model that does not require
a visa but instead uses electronic advance notice, while also
allowing flexibility so that all EU states are covered. The
current legislation has amendments that restrict that
flexibility, but the administration -- along with EU
Embassies in Washington -- is working to improve the text.

African Issues
--------------

12. (U) Following lunch, the Troika meeting turned to Africa
and the Middle East.


13. (C) SUDAN: The international community has to work
together to establish at least minimum stability in Sudan,
according to Portuguese PolDir Bramao Ramos. After the June
26 meeting on Africa, he said he was cautiously optimistic.

LISBON 00001858 003 OF 004


The EU would continue to support the security mission in
Darfur until the end of 2007 and wanted to help establish a
hybrid UN-AU mission follow-on. Cooper stressed that the EU
recognized Sudan/Darfur as a medium to long term problem but
was not willing to make an open-ended commitment. A/S Fried
affirmed US support for the slight uptick in international
response in Darfur and noted that the international community
would have to work together to maintain pressure on Khartoum.
EC Deputy PolDir Lars-Erik Lundin noted that the AU Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) program had 400 million euros overall but is
now facing a two-month funding gap of 45 million euros.
Would the U.S. be able to help cover the gap? A/S Fried
promised to convey the request to the Department's Africa
Bureau.


14. (C) CHAD: Cooper reported that the humanitarian crisis
had become a regional conflict affecting neighboring nations.
Chad was seeking international protection, and Cooper raised
the possibility of establishing a UN presence to manage
refugee and internally displaced camps. Bramao Ramos added
that the EU viewed Chad's problems in connection with the
situation in Sudan and wanted to help the African Union (AU)
establish a larger role in the international response.


15. (C) SOMALIA: The EU was concerned about how best to
create conditions to prompt Ethiopia to withdraw from
Somalia. Bramao Ramos suggested that perhaps U.S. and EU
counterterrorism experts could establish an information
sharing program to discuss the terrorism threat in Somalia
and Eritrea.


16. (C) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: Bramao Ramos noted
that opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba, who is still in
Portugal for medical treatment, is aware he would not be
allowed to remain indefinitely. However, Bemba could decide
against returning to DRC out of personal safety concerns and
instead decide to stir up problems as an exiled opposition
leader. Another equally dangerous scenario would be if
Kabila struck out against Bemba supporters in a preemptive
attack to crush the opposition. Either move could be
disastrous. Bramao Ramos asked that we monitor the situation
closely.


17. (U) AFRICA SUMMIT: A/S Fried hailed the Portuguese
effort to hold an EU-Africa summit but expressed his hope
that Portugal would send a strong signal of support for good
governance by not extending an invitation to Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe. Bramao Ramos responded that
Portugal would find a solution and that the need to Europe to
develop a joint strategy with all of Africa could not be held
hostage to the EU's concerns about one country.

Middle East
--------------

18. (C) Cooper was hopeful that Tony Blair could improve
institution building in the Palestinian Territories and make
the most of the current opportunity to work with Fatah
leaders. A/S Fried agreed that institution-building and
engagement with Fatah was the best we could do presently.
Rather than fearing the development of a "three state
solution" with Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, A/S Fried
stressed that we should work with Abbas to find a positive
way forward. EC Deputy PolDir Lars-Erik Lundin encouraged
pressing Israel to loosen border controls which were creating
an economic crisis in Gaza. International assistance was not
a sustainable replacement for indigenous economic activity,
he said.


19. (C) All parties agreed that Iran was dangerous, played a
negative role in the region, and remained largely opaque to
the international community. Given the difficulties of
gauging the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and the
true level of internal political opposition, it was
impossible to judge the timing horizon on Iran's nuclear
ambitions. Despite the lack of momentum in the international
community's efforts to turn up the heat on Iran, A/S Fried
agreed that the Solana/Larijani dialogue should continue in
the hope of a future breakthrough. In response to A/S
Fried's mention of enhancing international sanctions, Cooper
noted that the EU already had implemented sanctions against
Iran that exceeded UNSCR 1737 requirements and, in some
areas, even surpassed US measures.


LISBON 00001858 004 OF 004


Guantanamo
--------------

20. (C) Slovenian PolDir Mitja Drobnic commended State's
Legal Adviser John Bellinger for his work on counterterrorism
issues and international humanitarian law but added that
Guantanamo was damaging the image of the US in Europe. A/S
Fried agreed that Guantanamo was a complex issue and urged
European partners to be constructive in efforts to resettle
detainees. He stressed that we needed to establish a
dialogue and an international strategy to respond effectively
to the terrorist threat.

Hoffman