PORTUGAL - MOVING TOWARDS EU CONSENSUS ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 001856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN PO UN ZL
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL - MOVING TOWARDS EU CONSENSUS ON KOSOVO


Classified By: DEP POL/ECON COUNSELOR CARI ENAV FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)

Summary
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1. (C) FM Luis Amado told A/S Daniel Fried on July 13 that
the issue of Kosovo's independence was the most pressing
near-term issue of Portugal's EU Presidency, aside from EU
treaty reform. The two compared notes from their recent
trips to the Balkans, confirming the challenges and next
steps the United States and the EU will face in the event of
Russian blockage of a Kosovo UNSCR. Amado acknowledged the
need for the United States and the EU to work together on a
"Plan C" (Kosovo independence without a UNSCR) and noted that
his Political Director Bramao Ramos was working diligently to
bring all 27 member states to consensus to support Kosovo
independence. To be able to apply maximum pressure on the
few dissenting member states, Amado said he needed to exhaust
every avenue with Russia. He suggested that Contact Group
Foreign Ministers hold a meeting in Moscow within the next
120 days should negotiations with Russia prove unproductive
and asked Fried to relay this request to Secretary Rice.

Context/Participants
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2. (SBU) A/S Daniel Fried called on FM Amado in Lisbon on
July 13 following a full day of meetings with the EU-27
political directors and the EU Troika political directors,
plus discussions with Portugal's Secretary of State for
Defense (reported septel) and the Prime Minister,s Senior
Diplomatic Advisor. Kosovo was at the center of every
discussion. FM Amado was accompanied by PolDir Vasco Bramao
Ramos, Chief of Staff Francisco Ribeiro Menezes, and
Diplomatic Advisor Paulo Lourenco. Fried was accompanied by
Charge Adrienne O,Neal and Dep P/E Counselor Cari Enav.

Dealing with Russia and Beyond
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3. (C) Both A/S Fried and FM Amado had just returned from
separate trips to the Balkans. Leaders in Belgrade and
Pristina reiterated their well known positions (septel),with
Belgrade refusing to accept Kosovo independence and Pristina
growing ever anxious at the delay in implementing the
Ahtisaari plan. Amado acknowledged the West would not be able
to ask the Kosovars to wait much longer after the agreed upon
120 days, so it was critical that the West engage Russia at
every possible level during this timeframe. Fried assured
Amado that the United States would explore every opportunity
to bring the Russians on board. However, in the likely event
that Russia would not agree to the current UNSC draft, the
United States and the EU would have to decide whether to pull
the text or force a veto. In any event, Fried stressed, we
would have to move forward together toward Kosovo's
supervised independence.

Developing a Plan C
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4. (C) Amado underscored the need for a coordinated U.S.-EU
approach to address Kosovo independence in response to a
Russian veto (Plan C) -- the same point Fried had been urging
throughout the day in his meetings with EU interlocutors.
Amado commented that "if Russia is on board, that's not bad.
If the EU and the U.S. are united but without Russia, that's
also not bad, but if we (the U.S. and Europe) are divided,
that's very bad." Fried noted that on this basis the U.S.
would work with Europe on Kosovo independence. (Note: In a
separate meeting, the PM's Senior Diplomatic Advisor Jorge
Roza de Oliveira agreed that moving forward was the only
realistic way to avoid chaos and bloodshed in Kosovo. He was
relieved to know the U.S. would continue to coordinate with
the EU post-UNSCR.)


5. (C) Amado noted that PolDir Bramao Ramos was working
diligently with other member states to develop consensus
within the EU on moving forward without Russian concurrence.
Bramao Ramos was taking a two-pronged approach. On the one
hand, he was trying to establish a legal basis for the ESDP
Mission. On the other hand, he was endorsing the concept
that EU unity would not require all member states to
recognize Kosovo's independence at the same time. Timing
would be a foreign policy decision for each member state to
determine.

Looking for "Legitimacy"

LISBON 00001856 002 OF 002


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6. (C) Amado reiterated his concern that there was not much
time left to secure a satisfactory outcome in Kosovo. The EU
understands the need for unity, but there are still a few
problematic member states (Greece and Spain in particular)
that would only move forward under the framework of a UNSCR.
To establish "legitimacy" to confront these partners and
force consensus, Amado insisted he needed to exhaust every
avenue with the Russians. He suggested that the Contact
Group hold a meeting in Moscow at the FM level within the
next 120 days should negotiations with Russia prove
unproductive. He asked Fried to relay this request to
Secretary Rice and noted that he would not mention this

SIPDIS
proposal to any other member state until he had spoken with
the Secretary about it.

Comment
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7. (C) Amado expressed commitment to Kosovo's independence,
and we were encouraged to hear him say that he is working to
achieve that outcome in the event of a Russian blockage at
the UNSC. As the EU pulls itself together towards consensus
in the face of Russian intransigence, Amado is looking for
"legitimacy" to pressure the few member-states yet to
acknowledge the inevitability of Kosovo's independence. By
seeking a Contact Group meeting in Moscow, he is also looking
for cover to fend off criticism by Russia and others that the
international community did not do everything possible to
address Russian concerns. PM Kostunica arrives in Lisbon on
July 16 to discuss developments further.
Hoffman