Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07LILONGWE320
2007-04-25 15:29:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Lilongwe
Cable title:  

MALAWI PKO - MOD RULES OUT SOMALIA, SUDAN A

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IO MI 
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VZCZCXRO6651
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLG #0320/01 1151529
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251529Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4133
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0971
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEPGDA/USEUCOM JIC VAIHINGEN GE
RUEPGCA/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0544
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000320 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/S
STATE FOR INR/AA
STATE FOR AF/RSA
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IO MI
SUBJECT: MALAWI PKO - MOD RULES OUT SOMALIA, SUDAN A
POSSIBILITY

REF: A. SECSTATE 51828

B. LILONGWE 84

C. LILONGWE 203

D. LILONGWE 299

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 LILONGWE 000320

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/S
STATE FOR INR/AA
STATE FOR AF/RSA
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IO MI
SUBJECT: MALAWI PKO - MOD RULES OUT SOMALIA, SUDAN A
POSSIBILITY

REF: A. SECSTATE 51828

B. LILONGWE 84

C. LILONGWE 203

D. LILONGWE 299


1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Eastham met with Minister of
Defense Davies Katsonga and separately with Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs Henri Mumba on April 24 to renew our
request that Malawi commit to sending a battalion of
peacekeepers to join either the AMISOM or AMIS peacekeeping
operations. Both officials effectively ruled out Malawi's
participation in AMISOM, while Katsonga (as he has often
done) assured the Ambassador that Malawi is "ready for
Darfur." He could not, however, provide a timeline for
joining the mission. Mumba was much more conservative,
noting that any decision to join the AMIS mission would have
to be made above the ministerial level, by the President and
his Cabinet. Katsonga, who has previously gotten himself
into trouble by getting too far ahead of President Mutharika
on peacekeeping deployments (reftel B),however promised to
have a timeline for deployment to the Ambassador within a
week. We,ll be seeing him again on Thursday, April 26, at
his request. In a subsequent meeting on April 25, Chief
Secretary Bright Msaka suggested that once financial details

SIPDIS
were ironed out for an AMIS deployment, a push by Assistant
Secretary Frazer might finally persuade Mutharika to act. We

SIPDIS
still hold out hope that if financial and equipment issues
can be addressed, the Malawians could eventually decide to
put a battalion into AMIS. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Eastham first met with MOD Katsonga, who
had returned April 23 from a trip to Addis Ababa to discuss
peacekeeping operations. The Ambassador complimented the
Malawi Defence Force,s abilities, noting the substantial
investment made by the United States to prepare Malawi,s
forces for PKO operations. He used the points in ref A to
urge Malawi to decide favorably as soon as possible, and if a
decision was made to send troops to AMIS, to make a public
announcement of the decision. The Ambassador reiterated (per
emails from AF/RA Bittrick) that some U.S. funding, up to $1
million per battalion, could possibly be made available for

equipment needed by the MDF to support the deployment. The
Ambassador said we could work on what form this (no
weapons/no ammunition) would take, perhaps by providing it to
the MDF in situ in Darfur or by delivering it in Malawi to
replace consumables.


3. (SBU) As Katsonga described his meetings in Addis, it
became clear that the GOM has substantial reservations about
the Somalia mission. Katsonga said that the African Union
was not prepared for what is now happening in Somalia. He
strongly stressed the point that not enough is being done
diplomatically to bring the two sides together, with the
result that the prospects are good for continued lethal
combat. This, he said, meant that any troops sent into the
present situation would be engaged in combat, not
peacekeeping. He also complained that during that trip to
Addis, the Director of the Peace and Security Committee
claimed he had no information regarding casualties in
Somalia. Katsonga said he found this exceedingly strange,
that the AU would not be able to describe to a potential
contributor the scale of the violence in terms of casualties
suffered by Finally, Katsonga said there seemed to be a
reluctance by the U.N. to fund AMISOM, which did not lend
confidence to the mission. For these reasons, Katsonga said
the GOM had decided that it would be better to attempt to
positively influence the political dialogue, rather than to
deploy its forces to join the mission. Katsonga said the GOM
had requested a meeting of the Peace and Security Committee
within the next three weeks to discuss these issues.


4. (SBU) Katsonga then moved on to the AMIS mission in
Darfur, first discussing the various political issues
surrounding the conflict. He again expressed concern that
not enough effort had been made at "bringing together" the
various factions, stating that while a lot of pressure had
been put on the government of Sudan, equal pressure had not
been placed on the "rebel Forces." Katsonga then
contradicted himself, stating sympathy for those who have

LILONGWE 00000320 002 OF 003


lost their lives, criticizing President Bashir and asking
"when is enough enough?" The Ambassador reminded the
Minister that a decision by Malawi to send its forces to AMIS
would answer the question, putting Malawi on the side of
those who wanted peace in Sudan and who were willing to
protect the civilian population in Darfur.


5. (SBU) Addressing the AMIS mission itself, Katsonga said
the GOM wanted to see "how serious Bashir is in agreeing to a
hybrid force." However, he went on to state that the GOM has
a "full battalion trained and on stand-by to deploy."
Katsonga noted there were some equipment issues the MOD was
waiting to resolve, particularly the receipt of a number of
Armored Personnel Carriers the MOD had ordered from South
Africa (Comment: 12 APCs funded by Taiwan). Katsonga said it
should be weeks, not months, before the MDF is fully ready to
deploy. Katsonga said that he would meet with Malawi Defense
Force Commander Gen. Marko Chiziko shortly to determine when
the MDF will be "action-ready" for the mission. Katsonga
promised to come back to the Ambassador by May 2 with a
timeline for the next steps towards deployment. The
Ambassador urged Katsonga to get a firm decision, communicate
it to the AU and the UN, put forward a timeline, and announce
it publicly in order to enable us to begin to identify what
support we might be able to provide.


6. (SBU) During this conversation, Katsonga said that Malawi
has "50" milobs deployed in Darfur at present, and that to
his great surprise, during the trip to Addis he had learned
they were not being paid. According to Katsonga, the answer
received from the AU when he raised this question was that
the money was on hand but "we need to develop a system to
disburse the funds". Katsonga speculated that lack of pay
and the recent casualties among AMIS forces were demoralizing
the troops in that mission.


7. (SBU) Ambassador Eastham then met with the Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs Henri Mumba on the same issues. Mumba
confirmed the message Katsonga had given regarding possible
Malawian participation in AMISOM, and reiterated President
Mutharika's statements on the mission (reftel B). Mumba,
however, expressed greater reservations than Katsonga had
regarding MDF participation in Darfur,
stating that the GOM had not discussed additional troop
commitments among the ministries. Mumba said he would pass
along the request that the GOM make a public statement on
their readiness to commit troops, but noted that the decision
to deploy peacekeepers would be made above the ministerial
level, by the President in consultation with his Cabinet.


8. (SBU) Finally, on April 25, Ambassador and DCM met over
lunch with GOM Chief Secretary Bright Msaka. Msaka confirmed
extreme reluctance on AMISOM and a continuing somewhat
positive attitude toward Darfur. He believed that if a clear
understanding of how the deployment would be funded could be
reached (and this is a pre-condition for the deployment),
President Mutharika could be persuaded to issue the
deployment order. He thought that a meeting between
President Mutharika and AF Assistant Secretary Frazer might
seal the deal - once funding is worked out.


9. (SBU) Ambassador,s Comment: It,s now clear that Somalia
is a non-starter, and the show-stopper is the prospect of
heavy casualties in combat. But on the other hand, I think
we are inching very slowly, one step at a time, toward a
Malawian contribution to AMIS in Darfur. It is difficult to
assess to what degree Malawi,s equipment shortages will have
to be addressed before the MDF leadership and the Ministry
would recommend a "go" decision; we hope to obtain some
additional information on what the MDF actually thinks it
needs when we see the Minister again on Thursday afternoon.
Assuming that part is reasonable, that would leave the actual
movement and sustainment costs to be addressed; as President
Mutharika told me (ref C),he does not want to spend any of
Malawi,s money for this. Addressing how this deployment
will be funded is a key prerequisite to any high-level push
directly toward Mutharika directly. He has high regard for
Assistant Secretary Frazer and we would certainly recommend
that she be engaged, perhaps by phone, in the effort, if/if

LILONGWE 00000320 003 OF 003


we can get some additional clarity and assurances regarding
funding. End Comment.

EASTHAM