NIGER DELTA:"STATE OF INSURRECTION" PART II

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LAGOS 000064

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W (SILSKI)
STATE FOR INR/AA
USDOC FOR BUREAU OF THE CENSUS: OFFICE OF AFRICA - NIGERIA
DESK
CIUDAD JUAREZ FOR DONNA BLAIR
ISTANBUL FOR TASHAWNA SMITH
SAO PAULO FOR ANDREW WITHERSPOON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM NI
SUBJECT: NIGER DELTA:"STATE OF INSURRECTION" PART II

REF: A: 07 LAGOS 20

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Classified By: Consul General Brian L. Browne for reasons 1.4
(b an d)


1. (C) Summary: During a January 21 conversation with the Consul
General, Bayelsa State Secretary Godknows Igali stressed that the
activity of militant groups in the Niger Delta was approximating
a "state of insurrection." Amending previous estimates of aggregate
militant strength, Igali asserted the number of armed Ijaw youth
had swelled to over 10,000. Complicating matters, smaller bands
of a more virulent militancy have begun to splinter from the more
established groups. There is a strong political component to
militant demands. They want increased Ijaw representation in
mainstream politics and Delta State-based militant leader Tom
Polo has threatened significant action unless they get it.
Across the board, groups view the continued detention of militant
leader Dokubo Asari as a symbol of GON animus toward the Ijaws and
will continue to cite Asari as justification for the unrest
they cause. End summary.

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Militia More Numerous, Becoming Institutionalized
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2. (C) During a late January conversation with the Consul
General, Bayelsa SSG Godknows Igali contended the region was
lurching toward a state ofinsurrection notwithstanding his
state's best efforts to calm militant ardor. Militant numbers
were increasing, as was the geographic breadth of their
informal writ. Their demands were steadily becoming less
pecuniary and more political. In prior conversations, he
had estimated total militant numbers at a few thousand.
This time, he gauged that aggregate militant strength had
irrupted to over 10,000 in the three core Delta states.


3. (C) Igali warned that membership in the groups was an
increasingly attractive life for many Ijaw youth. The groups
themselves were becoming part of local lore. Joining a
militia was now a badge of honor for not only unemployed
Ijaw youth but also for young professionals and university
students. Thus the groups are not just attracting recruits
from the remote creeks but also youth from the cities.
Igali said he was amazed at the influx of people he saw when
he visited militant camps. Moreover, he noticed a general
improvement in the regimen of these camps. In most of the
camps, heavy emphasis was placed on weapons training and
physical fitness, he recounted. He added that, while each
group had a core of members who permanently resided at the
camp, most members cycled in and out of the camps, receiving
training and a small stipend when they were there.


4. (S) To support their tumescent growth, groups are extorting
higher ransoms for hostages and also higher fees for more petty
forms of extortion being exacted mostly from foreign companies.
Igali, involved in negotiating the release of Italian Agip
hostages, said he presented N 500,000 for "fees" to help
facilitate the hostages' release. Joshua McGuyver, the militant
leader responsible for the kidnapping, scoffed at the amount
as being mere "drink money" for the growing number of militants
under his charge. McGuyver admitted to Igali that he needed
to make money to keep his followers fed and the group intact.
With basically no avenue for legitimate revenue, McGuyver
professed that kidnapping was the only means available to
procure funds sufficient to maintain his operation. Thus,
his ransom demands were high. According to Igali, AGIP paid
McGuyver 165,000 million naira (USD 1.3 million) for what
amounted to be the release of only one hostage.

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Political Demands Drive Militant Activity
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5. (C) The groups are becoming increasingly political,
observed Igali. Across the board, all groups wanted the
release of Ijaw militant leader Dokubo Asari, in federal
custody for treason. The January 20 kidnapping of six

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Filippino oil workers by Tom Polo's militant group coincided
with two events, said Igali. First, it was rumored that Asari
would be freed on January 19. Second, January 19-20 marked the
anniversary of Polo's first kidnapping. When this date came
and went without Asari's release, Polo decided to act.


6. (C) While Asari has little direct hold over the militant
groups, he has come to symbolize the unfair treatment of
Ijaws, Igali noted. Illustrating this, Igali said he was
close to securing the release of the Italian hostages when
news was broadcasted that Gani Adams, leader of the militant
pan-Yoruba Oodua People's Congress, had been released from
federal custody. Ijaw militants flashed angry that Asari
remained on the wrong side of the stockade while Adams,
facing similar charges, was freed. They attributed this to
ethnic bias. Adams is of the same ethnic group as
President Obasanjo and the Attorney General. Since Asari's
ethnicity has no cachet with President Obasanjo, Asari still
languished in confinement, the militants concluded.
Perceiving ethnic discrimination, the militants seized the
Asari cudgel more firmly. As a result, the near-agreement
for the release of the Italian hostages was shelved. Only
one was freed, and then only for a prince's ransom,
Igali explained.


7. (C) Igali expressed frustration on the Asari issue.
He has talked with President Obasanjo, during which Obasanjo
promised Asari's release. Each time, however, Obasanjo
retreated from the promise, Igali groused. Igali's failure
to deliver has caused him to lose face with Ijaw militants and
the Ijaw community, he admitted. Igali was also concerned that
this failure, should it continue, would erode his ability to
influence militant leaders. These leaders often warn Igali in
advance of their intended misdeeds,which affords Igali an
opportunity to dissuade them. Often, he has. Most recently,
he claimed to have discouraged a splinter group of FNDIC from
kidnapping several expatriates. Nevertheless, Igali lamented
his dialogues with militant leaders have become strained
because he has been unable to deliver Asari.

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Political Disenfranchisement May Result in Broadening Violence
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8. (C) Polo confirmed he kidnapped the six Filippinos, Igali
affirmed. Until this act, Polo's group had been dormant, hoping
their good behavior would encourage the government's delivery on
promises of development and access to mainstream politics.
However, when Ijaws were denied key nominations in the PDP
primaries in Delta State, Polo's patience ran out.


9. (C) Expressing his growing frustration, Polo threatened to
take more hostages and attack oil facilities, Igali warned.
While Delta is not included in Igali's official brief, he is
in contact with Delta officials and the PDP in the hopes of
mediating a potentially explosive situation. To soothe tensions,
Igali had been trying to secure key government appointments
for Ijaws, such as Delta Secretary.

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Igali's Political Future Promising But Uncertain
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10. (C) With Bayelsa Governor Goodluck Jonathan now the
People's Democratic Party (PDP) vice-presidential candidate,
Igali's name has been bandied as a possible successor.
Upon receiving the PDP VP nomination, Jonathan first engineered
in Chief Francis Doukpola as his successor on the PDP
gubernatorial ticket. However, Doukpola is poorly regarded by
most PDP figures in Bayelsa. Doukpola twice ran for governor
and lost. Each time, he filed improbable lawsuits which
subsequently reached the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding
entreaties from tribal elders to accept defeat graciously,
Doukpola pressed his case beyond the bounds of acceptable
local political manners. As a result, Doukpola has the
reputation of being an unrealistically stubborn loser with
little personal charm, offered Igali.

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11. (C) Obasanjo answered the discontent by fingering Igali
as his favorite to replace Jonathan. While Ijaw, Igali has
spent little time in Bayelsa and only one and a half years
in his present position. As a result, many politicians see
him as a Johnny-come-lately. In addition, Igali hails from
the same area as former Governor Alamieyeseigha. Veteran
politician from other areas of the state cried foul, Igali
revealed. To resolve the impasse, President Obasanjo formed
a committee to designate a consensus candidate. One of the
rules the committee has decreed is that the candidate should
be someone who ran in the primaries. This verdict effectively
sidelined Igali, who, at the time, did not run since his boss,
Jonathan, was in the race.


12. (C) Igali said he would be content to forego the
gubernatorial nomination if that would ensure peace for both
the PDP and Bayelsa State. Igali said Jonathan had also offered
him the position of Chief of Staff, should Jonathan become
Vice-President. According to Igali, this was a sign that
Jonathan did not know the political inner workings at the
federal level. Igali, who hails from the same state and ethnic
group as Jonathan, would not be an acceptable choice for Chief
of Staff. This key position would have to go to someone from
another area in order to maintain the ethnic and geographic
balance necessary for ruling Nigeria.

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Comment
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13. (C) Comment: If accurate, Igali's estimate reveals far
greater numbers of militants than previously. Unless the
government engages in serious diplomacy, militancy will
continue; the scale and damage of their actions will increase.
Igali said that he would like to reach out to the UN and other
organizations with experience in demobilization of irregular
combatants after a civil insurgency. While he will likely meet
stiff opposition from within the GON from those who view the
militants as only criminals, Igali's idea seems like a prudent
one from our vantage point. End comment.

BROWNE