UKRAINE: POLITICIANS CALCULATING ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000906

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: POLITICIANS CALCULATING ON
ELECTION/NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES

KYIV 00000906 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. While President Yushchenko and Prime
Minister Yanukovych continue to negotiate over whether there
will be new Rada elections at some point this year, political
playmakers from all parties are angling for best outcomes in
the face of possible political compromise or snap elections.
Opposition leader Tymoshenko, Our Ukraine MP and former party
chair Bezsmertniy, Our Ukraine MP and financial backer
Poroshenko, and Socialist Rada Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Shybko all told the Ambassador in meetings April
11-12 that a negotiated political compromise was a better
outcome than a Constitutional Court (CC) decision; they
disagreed, however, over early elections. Tymoshenko and
Bezsmertniy argued that early elections had to be part of the
solution; Tymoshenko pushed for a summer rather than a fall
vote, while Bezsmertniy adopted the Yushchenko line that the
date is flexible as long as there was agreement on holding
elections. Poroshenko, a representative of the OU wing
interested in broad cooperation with the Party of Regions,
and Shybko, whose Socialist party would be in danger of not
crossing the three-percent threshold in a new election, both
advocated a compromise that did not involve voting.


2. (C) Comment: Amidst uncertainty over how or whether the
CC will rule, many key players continue to express preference
for a political solution. Elections always produce winners
and losers, and likely losers not surprisingly do not favor
elections. Poroshenko has been edged out of OU's leadership
over the past six months and would have even less influence
after new elections; Shybko's comments underscore Socialist
concern that they could be cut out of the political puzzle
entirely after elections, with Regions, BYuT, and OU the main
three forces likely to emerge if elections are held, and the
Communists and Nataliya Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists,
rather than the Socialists, with better chances of getting
over the threshold. End summary and comment.

Tymoshenko: Court is Broken, Elections are Key
-------------- -


3. (C) Tymoshenko told Ambassador on April 12 that the CC was
essentially hung; there were not currently ten judges able to
agree to a decision. The coalition controlled nine
judges--Regions three, the Socialists two, the Communists
one, and former Presidential Chief of Staff Medvedchuk three.
On the other side were the five "brave" judges who had
publicly decried pressure--and who had the best legal
reputations on the Court, she claimed--three other judges who
felt the same way but didn't have the courage to say
anything, and Court Chairman Dombrovskiy, who was "scared of
his own shadow and did not want to do anything."

4, (C) Citing allegations emerging April 12 that two Deputy
Court Chairmen loyal to Medvedchuk just came into ownership
of expensive downtown Kyiv apartments, Tymoshenko claimed
that the Court and process had been so compromised and
politicized that a decision would be denounced by one side or
the other. The key would be the Court session April 17,
which she predicted would demonstrate the court's inability
to decide anything. This should be the signal for parties to
get serious about reaching a political compromise; she
encouraged international reinforcement of this message.


5. (C) Tymoshenko advocated that the main political forces
needed to agree on a menu of compromises in conjunction with
elections and to ensure that the compromise avoids possible
future crises. Tymoshenko advocated: a temporary 10-year
imperative mandate to solidify party loyalty as Ukrainian
politics develop; an improved CabMin law to clearly separate
Presidential and PM powers on mutually acceptable terms; a
law on the opposition; and a joint code of conduct to accept
the results and not blockade the Rada (as both sides,
including Tymoshenko's bloc, have done in the past year).
Outside facilitators should not act publicly because that
would complicate the process, but privately they could help
facilitate talks and communications where there was no trust.



6. (C) While professing not to be a participant in talks, she
understood Regions' current negotiating position as
simultaneous Rada/presidential elections in the fall.
Tymoshenko said that she had met Moroz two days ago and
discussed a theoretical reconstitution of the
OU-BYuT-Socialist coalition. She claimed the meeting was at
Moroz's initiative, because he was worried about being cut
out of the Presidential-PM negotiations and knew new
elections were his political grave. Elections should not be
postponed beyond late June/early July to the fall for three
reasons: autumn was too close to December Russian Duma

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elections, creating a single electoral campaign field; it
would allow Yanukovych to repeat his 2004 looting of the
budget to boost social payments, effectively buying votes;
and it would prolong the current dysfunctional political
arrangement between Rada and the President, with the PM
continuing to grab as much power as possible.


7. (C) Were elections to be held in the summer, she predicted
Regions would get 22%, Communists 4%; far-left Vitrenko 4-5%;
BYuT 25%; and OU/Lutsenko 15-17%. Yushchenko's numbers were
rising because his western Ukrainian electorate liked the
signs of a decisive leader taking action. The opposition
needed to run in just two columns; she had already picked up
Reforms and Order, but OU still needed Tarasyuk's Rukh and
Kostenko's UPP. If the smaller parties choose to form a
Union of Right Forces third column instead, they will strip
2% off of the orange vote and fail to get into the Rada
(note: an assessment shared by OU's Bezsmertniy).

Bezsmertniy: We Took Strong, But Necessary Action
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The ever-cynical head of the People's Union Our
Ukraine Executive Committee Bezsmertniy argued to Ambassador
on April 11 that given the developments of past year,
Yushchenko's decree was the only solution. The official
laws on the books were not the ones that actually governed
the country or the current situation. Yushchenko needed
strong instruments and to act robustly and quickly. It was
important now for all sides to recognize the decree as legal
and start preparing for elections. The President's team now
had to rally those presidential supporters who are not on
board with implementing the elections and find motivations
for Regions to participate in the elections. The date of the
elections was unimportant--holding elections was crucial.


9. (C) In terms of logistics, Bezsmertniy claimed necessary
changes in the election law and CEC could be done without
Rada approval or involvement. The current election law
already empowered the CEC to run early elections; Yushchenko
could issue additional decrees if need be to move the process
forward. Somewhat cryptically, he added that there needed to
be decisions taken regarding the PGO and some (unnamed)
ministers. Yushchenko's camp also had to ensure that NSDC
decisions were implemented (referring to the order to finance
the elections),and that those who refused were held
responsible. Finally, and validating rumors which had arisen
a week ago, Yushchenko could "if necessary" recall the six CC
judges on the presidential quota. Combined with two other
judges who had recused themselves on April 10, would leave
only 10 judges sitting, denying the Court of the necessary 12
to constitute a quorum. (Note: Poroshenko confirmed such
thinking within parts of OU but thought such efforts would
not be successful.)

Poroshenko: New Elections Bad, Political Compromise Needed
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) Our Ukraine "oligarch" Poroshenko, who largely
controlled OU's leadership in 2005-06 but was pushed aside in
late 2006 in favor of Presidential Head Baloha and current
party leader Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, who stripped regional OU
branches of many Poroshenko allies, expressed grave concern
about the current political situation April 12. He felt that
neither pre-term elections not a CC ruling could resolve the
current impasse because in either case it would ultimately
work to the benefit of the ruling coalition and hurt
democracy in Ukraine. He saw compromise between the
President and PM, facilitated by the international community,
before the CC reached a decision, as the only way out of the
crisis. He said he had told the President not to dissolve
the Rada, but had found little support in OU.


11. (SBU) Poroshenko suggested time was not on Yushchenko's
side--the economy is starting to suffer and an election would
divide the country anew. Elections would not supported by
most of the country and would be impossible to organize by
May 27. Yanukovych and Akhmetov had been willing to
compromise right after Yushchenko signed the decree, but now
Regions think they will win, either through a CC decision or
early elections. In a matter of weeks, Poroshenko claimed,
the coalition will have a majority in the CC; Yushchenko will
not be able to refute the Court's decision and could even see
impeachment proceedings started against him. The
international community had to help break the two leaders'
hardened positions and reach a compromise.

Shybko: We Do Not Want Elections
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12. (SBU) Socialist Party Member and Chairman of the Rada
Foreign Affairs Committee Shybko argued against elections and
placed the blame for the current situation squarely at the
President's feet. Yushchenko was trying to block the CC from
working--the President had met with the judges and if they
were now refusing to work, they must be afraid of the
President. (Note: Yushchenko met with the CC judges on March
27--one week before he issued the decree. A presidential
statement released after the meeting reported that Yushchenko
had urged them to defend the constitution and address a
series of important cases which had been appealed to the
court. End note.) The President's decree was
unconstitutional, Shybko alleged; there was no mention of
Article 90, which laid out the three specific circumstances
under which the President can dismiss the Rada. Without
this, there should not be early elections. If there were,
however, Shybko insisted there must be concurrent early
presidential elections and warned the Communists would insist
on a referendum on NATO. A political compromise was a much
better choice, Shybko argued; it would help Yushchenko save
face. Shybko complained, however, that Yushchenko and
Yanukovych had excluded Moroz from their negotiations.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor