UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH, YUSHCHENKO SEEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 000841

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH, YUSHCHENKO SEEKING
COMPROMISE, BUT NO ROLE FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador's separate conversations with
Prime Minister Yanukovych and President Yushchenko on April 9
and 10, respectively, indicated both sides expressed
preference for resolving the current crisis via a political
compromise instead of a Constitutional Court (CC) ruling or
going straight to the polls, but neither side was fully ready
to yield on key points. Yanukovych requested international
mediators, including Ambassador, become involved while
Yushchenko rejected the idea. Both were concerned about how
to handle any possible Russian role, with 20 Russian Duma MPs
reportedly heading for Kyiv April 11. Both underscored that
they believed there was a legislative/legal solution to this
crisis--new and better laws that had wide backing could pull
Ukraine out of this mess.


2. (C) Yanukovych said that if Yushchenko suspended the
decree disbanding the Rada, they could agree on what the
coalition should look like, limit the flow of MPs between
factions, and work on constitutional and legislative fixes
for the current political imbalances. He added, however,
that if Yushchenko pushed forward with demands for elections
now, he would insist on waiting for a CC ruling, which he was
confident would be in his favor, and/or concurrent early
parliamentary and presidential elections. In turn,
Yushchenko said he would be willing to suspend his decree if
they could agree on early elections, restore the coalition to
its former size, declare illegal all Rada and CabMin
decisions made after the latest wave of opposition MPs
started to join the majority in late March, and put an end to
street protests. Both PM and President agreed the window for
compromise was closing.


3. (C) Comment. Time appears to be on Yanukovych's side. The
Constitutional Court is poised to open hearings on an appeal
of Yushchenko's decree. Initially announced for April 11,
the hearing was pushed back until April 17, perhaps to give
more time for negotiation, or to delay the inevitable; one
judge told us April 9 that 12 of 18 judges are prepared to
rule against Yushchenko. It is a positive sign that both
Yushchenko and Yanukovych are looking for political
compromise and that both think legislation is the best way to
resolve the lack of clarity in the 2004 political reforms
that have led to this fight for power. The two leaders are
meeting daily, but there are still large gaps to be bridged,
starting with Yushchenko's insistence on early elections and
rejection of all offers for mediation and Yanukovych's
refusal to consider early Rada elections absent early
presidential elections. Finally, the Tymoshenko factor
remains a wildcard; Yushchenko appears concerned that any
broader settlement or even coalition, such as Yanukovych's
team has advocated, would not be acceptable to the
opposition. With Yushchenko refusing outside facilitation,
we will continue our usual pulsing of all parties to the
conflict, urging compromise for the sake of Ukraine's
interests. End summary and comment.

Yanukovych Wants International Mediation
--------------


4. (C) At an April 9 meeting, Prime Minister Yanukovych
requested Ambassador mediate the political crisis between the
PM and President. Yanukovych saw two possible resolutions to
the current situation--either wait for the Constitutional
Court to rule on Yushchenko's dismissal of the Rada or find a
negotiated political solution. In his view, the first option
would result in a ruling against Yushchenko, which would
significantly weaken the President. He had told Yushchenko
on April 6 that the second option was the far better for both
sides, but he stressed a number of times that time was
running out for Yushchenko to agree to a political decision,
warning the situation would soon reverse itself: Yushchenko
would be coming to Yanukovych with requests, and it would be
too late for Yushchenko to get anything.


5. (C) Yanukovych's initial proposal for mediation was for a
large group of international observers, including Ambassador,
and Ukrainian political and legal forces that could work out
all the details of a compromise: the Austrian Chancellor; EU
and Polish politicians; Yushchenko; himself; Speaker Moroz;
the leaders of all Rada factions, and lawyers from the
Presidential Secretariat, Cabinet, and Rada. In response to
Ambassador's suggestions, Yanukovych agreed that a small,
Kyiv-based group of negotiators and only a few Ukrainian
participants from the President's and PM's teams would make
the process go faster and more smoothly. He also agreed that
this process should be low-key and out of the public eye.
(Note: Yanukovych's Chief of Staff Lyovochkin suggested to
Ambassador April 10 that the group be kept at three:
Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Ambassador, perhaps also the

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German Ambassador to represent the EU Presidency. End note.)
The PM was less comfortable with the suggestion that the
Russians be kept in the loop and Ambassador's offer to brief
Ambassador Chernomyrdin.

Yushchenko: No Outside Help, We Will Find Compromise
-------------- --------------


6. (C) At an April 10 meeting, President Yushchenko thanked
Ambassador for the offer of assistance, but declined it,
stressing he did not see any format in which international
participation would help. There was a Russian problem--Putin
had offered to mediate in an April 9 phone conversation, but
given the Duma's recent resolution supporting the Rada, the
impending arrival of 20 Duma MPs April 11, and the certainty
of press attention to the Russian presence, it would be hard
for the Russians to play a constructive role. This was a
parliamentary crisis--not one between the PM and
President--and it should be resolved as such. He had met
Yanukovych April 9 and 10 and would meet the PM daily if
necessary, but the Rada was corrupt, and the possibility of
fixing it lessened every day. Moreover, increasing
attention, and with it pressure, was shifting to the
Constitutional Court and Central Election Commission. The
latter was prevented from working by four commissioners
calling in sick, denying it a quorum. This was unacceptable.

What Yanukovych Wants
--------------


7. (C) In terms of demands for a compromise, Yanukovych
argued that Yushchenko's suspension of the decree must happen
immediately; it was almost a prerequisite for talks, but if
negotiations progressed quickly enough, there could be an
agreement by end of the week. After that, the President
could cancel his decree and Regions MPs would withdraw their
CC petition. It was his position that although a
constitutional commission could work on improving the
constitution, the bulk of work should be done in the Rada by
amending legislation and passing new laws.


8. (C) Yanukovych agreed that the key points for an agreement
between Yanukovych and Yushchenko were: there should be no
more MPs going back and forth between factions; a
constitutional commission should be created to make changes
in the constitution and other laws; and some of the Universal
should be made into law. However, if Yushchenko insisted on
discussion of new elections in 2007 as part of negotiations,
then Yanukovych would insist on waiting for a Constitutional
Court ruling or concurrent Rada and presidential elections.
He also argued that Ukraine could not have early elections
until a legislative basis was prepared, including a new
election law and making the CEC conform to the CEC law. He
also would request that the CC rule on imperative mandate,
noting that the Venice Commission has already indicated that
imperative mandate did not comply with European standards.

What Yushchenko Wants
--------------


9. (C) Yushchenko offered to suspend his decree if the two
parties came to agreement on other key points. First, the
issue of the majority coalition's format needed to be
resolved; every decision made by the Rada and CabMin after
March 22 should be considered illegal and reversed. (Note:
Kinakh's MPs left OU and joined the majority on March 23.
End note.) Yushchenko also required a return to March 2006
faction sizes, a mechanism for preventing pressure on the CC
and CEC, and a moratorium on calling people into the streets.
Legal decisions, not protests, should decide this conflict.
If the Rada agreed to conditions, including passing laws on
imperative mandate and the opposition, as well as fixing the
Rada rules, if Yushchenko and Yanukovych agreed on a way to
monitor whether the Rada was meeting those obligations, and
if all sides agreed on conducting early elections at some
point, he would leave the decree suspended. If within 2
weeks, these tasks were not met, he would bring the decree
back into force. Yushchenko said he had discussed 15 points
with Yanukovych and the two were in agreement on about half
of them; his first demand, early elections, remained a
stumbling block.


10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor