Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV784
2007-04-03 13:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OVER RADA DISMISSAL

Tags:  PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3138
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0784/01 0931353
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031353Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1796
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000784 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OVER RADA DISMISSAL
DECREE: YUSHCHENKO AND YANUKOVYCH VIEWS

REF: A. KYIV 746

B. EMBASSY KYIV-STATE 4/2 AND 4/3 EMAILS (VARIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000784

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL PHUM PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OVER RADA DISMISSAL
DECREE: YUSHCHENKO AND YANUKOVYCH VIEWS

REF: A. KYIV 746

B. EMBASSY KYIV-STATE 4/2 AND 4/3 EMAILS (VARIOUS)

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Justifying his April 2 decree dismissing the
Rada (parliament) and calling pre-term elections for May 27,
President Yushchenko told G-7 ambassadors April 3 that new
elections were a democratic instrument to resolve a political
crisis that stemmed from a parliamentary crisis. The decree
to hold new elections had been the only option left to him;
he warned that the democratic gains made the past two years
were at risk. Yushchenko refused to consider seeking a
Constitutional Court judgment on the decree. He had warned
heads of military and intelligence agencies against the use
of force. Yushchenko said he would soon telephone European
and North American heads of state to enlist G-7 countries'
support. In an earlier address before coalition members and
the Cabinet at the Rada, PM Yanukovych appealed to Yushchenko
to avert a disaster by agreeing to negotiate on an outcome
satisfactory to all sides but also vowed a firm response if
Yushchenko did not. Yanukovych also insisted the Rada would
continue operating until the Constitutional Court had ruled
on Yushchenko's decree.


2. (C) Comment: Yushchenko was rigid and inflexible in his
insistence on pre-term elections and ruling out further
negotiations, though his deputy Presidential Secretariat head
Oleksandr Chaliy signaled on the way out that three scenarios
remained in play: elections, a constitutional court ruling,
and a negotiated resolution to the crisis. Convincing
Yushchenko to reengage may well be difficult, since
Yushchenko appears now to feel that his efforts at working
with Yanukovych and Moroz the past eight months have been
spurned, or worse, taken advantage of. On the other hand,
elections will reopen wounds now starting to heal -- status
of Russian language and NATO -- and possibly exacerbate
tendencies toward disunity rather than national unity. For

its part, the governing coalition did not help matters by
voting late April 2 to reseat the Kivalov-led Central
Electoral Commission which declared Yanukovych President in
November 2004 based on the falsified election results which
sparked the Orange Revolution. End summary and comment.

Why the decree was necessary: Yushchenko's Rationale
-------------- --------------


3. (C) The April 3 edition of the Presidential Bulletin of
Ukraine officially promulgated President Yushchenko's April 2
decree dissolving the Rada and setting new elections for May

27. In an April 3 meeting with G-7 ambassadors (i.e.,
without Russian Ambassador Chernomyrdin) and the EU mission,
Yushchenko said that his decree to hold new elections had
been the only option left to him to resolve the political
crisis which had arisen from a parliamentary crisis. In his
view, the latter crisis had arisen because movements of
individual Rada MPs from the opposition to the ruling
coalition meant the Rada's composition no longer reflected
the political results of the March 2006 elections, which
produced an approximately equal balance between the ruling
coalition and the opposition that resulted from the March
parliamentary election (240-210). Article 83 of the
constitution required the coalition to be made up of
factions, and not individuals. Now that the coalition had
lured over additional deputies, using bribes and blackmail,
it had the real possibility of assembling 300 votes, allowing
it to enact legislation that would be veto-proof.


4. (C) Yanukovych and the Cabinet of Ministers were engaged
in a usurpation of presidential powers that could not be
allowed to continue, Yushchenko argued and later claiming
that all the democratic gains made in the past two years were
at risk. The new Cabinet of Ministers (CabMin) law had been
especially problematic, with several provisions that clearly
violated the constitution, including procedures on naming the
PM, FM, and Defense Minister that encroached on Presidential
prerogatives. Yushchenko had submitted 18 requests to the
Constitutional Court to review these and other provisions.


5. (C) Acknowledging concerns about the precedent of a Rada
dismissal, Yushchenko insisted that new elections would lead
to a national dialogue and that the election results would
bring about a national plan on the way forward that had not
occurred in 2006. Unfortunately, the ruling coalition had
discarded the "Universal" agreement that could have formed
the basis of a unity cabinet. The agreement had enshrined
the importance of judicial reform, incorporated agreements on
language and religion, and established a common approach to
European and Euro-Atlantic integration and a policy on the
Single Economic Space. New elections would be the basis for
a renewed consideration of the Universal agreement and lead

KYIV 00000784 002 OF 003


to healing the divisions between eastern and western Ukraine.


6. (SBU) Yushchenko said he had called in the Ministers of
Interior and Defense earlier in the day to emphasize that no
forces should be moved into the area around Kyiv. (Note:
The Presidential website reported that Yushchenko met with
the heads of all national law enforcement and intelligence
bodies to caution them that the current situation "was a
political conflict to be resolved by political means" and
enjoined them against any use of force.) Yushchenko said
that, later April 3, he would make a public appeal to all
sides at the Maidan, European Square, or other venues for
past rallies to minimize the possibility of violence.


7. (C) Yushchenko said he had discussed his concerns April 2
with Rada Speaker Oleksandr Moroz during mandatory
pre-dismissal consultations. He had asked Moroz to implement
four measures: to stabilize the situation in the Rada,
including through amendments to Rada Rules; to launch his
requested Constitutional Commission that could rebalance the
power relationships in government; to enact the Universal as
a law; and to amend the CabMin law to eliminate its
unconstitutional features. Instead, Moroz had convened a
special session of the Verkhovna Rada late April 2 and
initiated annullment of the December 2004 changes to the
Central Electoral Commission. The step had driven home to
Yushchenko that he could not reach a compromise with Moroz,
closing the possibility of negotiating for several more days.


8. (C) Ambassador asked Yushchenko about the differing
opinions of legal experts on the constitutionality of the
decree and asked if he would be willing to abide by a
Constitutional Court ruling on the decree. Yushchenko ducked
the question, noting that the Constitutional Court had been
silent in its eight months of operation, after being left
inquorate for 18 months by Regions and Socialists' refusal to
seat nominated judges. When the Italian Ambassador pushed
the point, Yushchenko said a political decision needed to be
reached first on his decree, and then the Constitutional
Court could make a ruling. He insisted, however, that
elections must be held. He asked the ambassadors to relay
his arguments to their capitals and said he would soon
telephone their heads of state to enlist G-7 countries'
support. (Note: Yushchenko mentioned he had already spoken
with Russian President Putin April 2 when he had cancelled
his planned April 3 visit to Moscow.)

Walk this back, Mr. President - Yanukovych's position
-------------- --------------


9. (U) The Rada's coalition majority convened at 10:30 a.m.,
with the entire Cabinet, led by PM Yanukovych, present to
debate the decree. Coalition faction leaders, from the Party
of Region (POR),Socialists (SPU),and Communists (CPU) made
statements reiterating coalition positions from the previous
evening (ref B).


10. (U) Yanukovych charged that what he called an "infamous"
decree was aimed at usurpation of power and dissolution of a
legitimate parliament. Describing the decree as an attempt
against the constitutional order, Yanukovych said that it was
designed to create either artificial conditions leading to
incessant elections or a return to the old constitution and
restoration of autocratic presidential rule. Yanukovych
appealed to Yushchenko to avert a disaster by agreeing to
negotiate on an outcome satisfactory to all sides. Saying
"Mr. President, make this step toward Ukraine," Yanukovych
warned Yushchenko that he would ultimately bear the
responsibility for his refusal to engage in constructive
dialogue with a legitimate government.


11. (U) Yanukovych assured the Ukrainian public that neither
the President nor the adventurists who had convinced him to
issue the decree would succeed in disrupting the Cabinet's
work, because the Cabinet of Ministers had a mandate from the
voters and the ruling coalition. Ukraine did not need such
an upheaval that would lead living standards to decline if
not resolved soon, he claimed. The Rada should continue to
work as usual until the Constitutional Court had ruled on the
presidential decree. The Executive Branch of government
would also continue to carry out its duties, despite what he
called the opposition's designs to paralyze executive branch
operations. Irresponsible politicians would not succeed in
plunging Ukraine into crisis and confrontation. Any change
should be implemented in accordance with the constitution.
No one would disrupt reforms aimed at Ukraine's European
integration, and Ukraine would emerge from the current
situation even stronger. Yanukovych called on all Ukrainians
to unite to protect the Constitution, freedom, democracy, and
the rule of law.


KYIV 00000784 003 OF 003



12. (U) Coalition Rada deputies' speeches after Yanukovych
stuck to his general themes. A common charge was that the
opposition had engineered this crisis in an attempt to derail
economic progress achieved under Yanukovych and his cabinet.
Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Nina Karpachova detailed the
reasons that she had concluded the presidential decree was
unconstitutional and appealed for a non-violent resolution to
the crisis. Socialist Party deputy Serhiy Kuzmenko said the
Verkhovna Rada should institute impeachment proceedings
against Yushchenko. Communist Party faction head Petro
Symonenko railed that the opposition had received its orders
from the U.S. to press for Rada dissolution (note: a
reference to opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko's recent
visit to Washington; embarrassed Socialist Chair of the
International Relations Committee Shybko later apologized to
us for Symonenko's outburst) and that Ukrainians should not
be surprised if foreign troops were to land in Ukraine to
finish developments started by the Orange Revolution.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor