UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH DECRIES OPPOSITION'S

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH DECRIES OPPOSITION'S
INFLUENCE ON YUSHCHENKO, BUT IS STILL READY TO COOPERATE

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Although disappointed by President
Yushchenko's continued rebuffs to his invitations to work
together, PM Yanukovych told visiting EUR DAS David Kramer,
NSC Director Adam Sterling and the Ambassador that he
remained open to a broad coalition in parliament and
cooperation. Yanukovych expressed concern about what he saw
as negative influence on Yushchenko from opposition leader
Yuliya Tymoshenko and the presidential administration that
made cooperation difficult. Yanukovych said that Tymoshenko
was focused on becoming president in 2009 -- and he would
have no choice but to accept his party's inevitable call to
oppose her and ensure that she was defeated. Even better
would be adoption of the Party of Regions initiative to have
the President elected from within the Rada, obviating the
need for presidential elections in 2009. This might be the
only way Viktor Yushchenko would be reelected, according to
Yanukovych. Regarding the conflict over the foreign
minister, Yanukovych said that the candidate was not the
problem -- the coalition would support any qualified
individual -- but that the process was key. If the President
refused to consult with the PM and the Rada leadership before
he nominated a candidate, then he could not expect Government
or coalition support. DAS Kramer urged Yanukovych to stick
with cooperation and stressed the importance of reaching
agreement on an FM ASAP. End summary.


2. (C) Comment. This March 19 meeting took place just
after an inconclusive roundtable called by the President to
discuss the "crisis" in parliament with the PM, Rada Speaker
and faction heads, and several days prior to the successful
Rada approval of Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the President's nominee
to be Foreign Minister. At that moment, Yanukovych appeared
to be pessimistic about chances for cooperation, even as his
counterparts were undoubtedly engaged with the President's
team on finding a way out of the foreign minister impasse.
In the meeting, Yanukovych was frank and minced no words in
his blistering attack on Yuliya Tymoshenko and the
presidential administration. And Yanukovych was clear in his
commitment to be a candidate in the 2009 presidential
election, unless his party succeeded in amending the
constitution to have the president elected by the Rada. End
comment.

Yushchenko Needs to Get on Board
--------------

3. (C) PM Yanukovych spent 45 minutes at the top of the
meeting outlining the economic successes of his government
before noting that he needed to turn to the "other side of
the coin." According to Yanukovych, the Government, the
Cabinet of Ministers and the Rada were all operating well,
professionally promoting the development of the country and
doing their jobs. He claimed that outside of Kyiv, nearly 80
percent of local officials were non-political actors who
simply wanted stability and development. Unfortunately, the
opposition in the center was out of touch and was advocating
non-peaceful solutions to the ongoing conflict within the
Government - pushing for new elections, holding rallies and
planning a march on Kyiv (references to Tymoshenko and
Lutsenko). Yanukovych argued that these solutions were not
supported by the people and that Yushchenko was making a
mistake by cooperating with the opposition, whose political
views were increasingly isolated from "real life".


4. (C) Yanukovych noted that he had urged Yushchenko to
participate in the Regions-led "process of developing the
country," but the problem with Yushchenko was that he was
tied up in talk of power and authority. According to
Yanukovych, "people do not understand what he means. It
would have been better to join with us; better for him and
better for the country." Yanukovych said that it was hard to
understand the President; "when we talk he seems to agree
with me, but then he talks to his team and entourage and this
changes." In Yanukovych's view, Yushchenko was "past his low
point" and now had the chance to make qualitative changes in
his approach. However, Yanukovych was uncertain that
Yushchenko would make the right choice: "I asked the
President to take the lead; the least he can do now is not
stand in the way." He went on to note that "if Yushchenko
opposes us economically, it will hurt him politically. He
will lose standing in society. We miss his participation.
If he led the process, we'd have 100 percent participation in
the process."


5. (C) Continuing his theme of the importance of
cooperation, Yanukovych said that it was "not becoming for a
president to always look like an offended person." In short,
Yanukovych claimed that he always offers cooperation with
Yushchenko, but to no avail and this was hurting Yushchenko's

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popularity: "the longer it takes for us to find
understanding, the harder it will be for him to keep his
place. One day he will find himself on the sidelines of the
political processes in the country."

The Foreign Minister Mess
--------------

6. (C) Yushchenko's unwillingness to cooperate had been
demonstrated in the problems regarding the nominations of
candidates to be the Foreign Minister and head of the SBU,
according to Yanukovych. Yushchenko had chosen to send the
names by "slow mail." There had been no phone calls, no
discussions about the nominations. Yanukovych said that this
was not how it should be done; it would be better to bring
together the President, PM and Speaker, and then to discuss
and decide. The PM suggested that some observers of the
process believed that the President had never been serious
about these nominations: "if he had really wanted them to be
appointed, then he would have taken practical steps to do
just that." Per the constitution, the Rada was not obligated
to approve the nominations, and in Yanukovych's opinion, the
process had been unsuccessful from the start.


7. (C) Yanukovych suggested that the opposition had
contributed to spoiling the situation as well. Only last
week, acording to Yanukovych, the President had appealed to
the PM and Speaker to save Ohryzko's nomination as FM. While
lobbying Rada members to support the nomination, Yanukovych
had been stunned to see the head of the presidential
administration (Viktor Baloha) appearing on television with
the leader of the opposition to state that the Rada would
have to approve the nomination "because the opposition
demanded it." Once that happened, the nomination was doomed.
In Yanukovych's mind, from that moment on it was impossible
for the coalition to support Ohryzkho's candidacy.


8. (C) According to the PM, it was important to stop seeing
every situation as a win-lose event: "if we fail to reach
compromise, then we all lose." The only way out of the
current FM impasse was for Orhyzhko to step down and for the
President to discuss possible candidates with the PM and the
Speaker. Yanukovych said that he could support any of the
candidates that had been discussed in the press, or any
former deputy foreign ministers who had the requisite
experience. When DAS Kramer asked whether the PM would
support the nomination of his own foreign policy advisor
Konstantin Gryshchenko as a candidate, Yanukovych laughed,
noting that he wouldn't stand in his way, but that he liked
having him on his team. The PM reiterated that what was
important was prior discussion and agreement on a candidate.
(Embassy Note: Something that apparently took place with the
snap announcement and successful confirmation of Arseniy
Yatsenyuk as Foreign Minister on March 21. End Note.)

Tymoshenko the Terminator
--------------

9. (C) Yanukovych said that he was pessimistic about
cooperation with Yushchenko after the conclusion of the March
20 roundtable called by the President with the parliamentary
faction heads. In his view, at the meeting, it looked like
Yushchenko was the spokesman and Tymoshenko was calling the
shots. Yanukovych was vicious in his characterization of the
former PM, noting that their interests clashed at every
level. He said that she was dedicated to "destabilization,
destruction and disruption" and that people did not support
her approach. Yanukovych argued that people were "tired of
her; she offered nothing constructive and she was
unpredictable -- a real threat to Yushchenko. It was
inconceivable to Yanukovych that Yushchenko did not
understand that any increase in her support would have to
come from Yushchenko's supporters.


10. (C) Turning to the presidential elections scheduled for
2009, Yanukovych said that "she is focused on being the next
president, but she will never win." The PM quipped: "In that
case, I will have to take part - my party will demand it.
Referring to a Party of Regions initiative to change the
constitution so that the next president would be elected from
within the Rada (instead of direct elections),Yanukovych
said that unless the constitution is amended, Yushchenko
won't be elected a second time. If the opposition's goal is
a new early election, they will also be disappointed.

One Way Out - A Broad Coalition
--------------

11. (C) Summing up, Yanukovych said that the only way out
of the current impasse for the President was to form a broad
coalition with the PM's coalition in the Rada. Yushchenko's
current strategy of cooperating with the opposition was weak
and not sustainable; he needs to make a decision soon and the

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PM was confident that he would make the right choice.
Yanukovych suggested to DAS Kramer that "what he (Yushchenko)
says is not what he believes. It appears to us that he is
merely the spokesman and Tymoshenko is making the decisions.
If he remains silent, it is the same thing as saying that he
agrees."


12. (C) Yanukovych argued that Yushchenko could not afford
not to take a position. In the PM's opinion, Yushchenko had
enjoyed two years of nearly unlimited power and had done
nothing with it. The President needed to lead and that it
was ridiculous for the president to be part of the
opposition; by definition he was part of the authority.
Tymoshenko was not the right ally, according to Yanukovych,
and he did not understand why she continued to have so much
influence.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor