Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV467
2007-02-23 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: SCENESETTER FOR OPPOSITION LEADER

Tags:  PGOV PREL UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6406
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0467/01 0541548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231548Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1316
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000467 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC - STERLING, OVP - FISHEL, DEPT - EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SCENESETTER FOR OPPOSITION LEADER
TYMOSHENKO'S FEB 25-MAR 3 VISIT TO U.S.

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000467

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC - STERLING, OVP - FISHEL, DEPT - EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SCENESETTER FOR OPPOSITION LEADER
TYMOSHENKO'S FEB 25-MAR 3 VISIT TO U.S.

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Opposition leader Yuliya Tymoshenko arrives
in the U.S. at a time when the feuding and deal-making
between Ukraine's three major political forces is
hamstringing policy-making and legislating. The struggle
between President Yushchenko and PM Yanukovych for political
dominance and the right to define national security and
foreign policy has continued. After months of quiescence,
Tymoshenko has returned to the ring as an active player,
first making a one-time tactical voting deal with Yanukovych
in January, now trying to forge a more strategic bond with
Yushchenko/Our Ukraine (OU). Tymoshenko's bloc (BYuT) holds
the power to be the spoiler by playing the President and PM
for her tactical advantage. Tymoshenko's end goal remains
early parliamentary elections and a return to power. Amidst
talk of deal-making from all camps, and distrust on all
sides, the political forces are also focused on how the
Constitutional Court will weigh in on a myriad of questions
about how the political system should function. In spite of
the political maneuvering, the primary gains of the Orange
Revolution in societal attitudes, freedom of the press, and
foreign and security policy remain intact.


2. (C) Messages/Themes: --Tymoshenko needs to hear from us
that it is important for Ukraine's future that she act like a
statesman in opposition and support national interests, not
to be seen as only pursuing tactical advantage and a return
to power.

--The Yanukovych team will be the dominant force for at least
the next six months, if not longer, and our goal should be to
encourage good policy choices and constructive cooperation
between key players to move the country forward. She can
play a responsible role promoting good policy choices or she
can pursue tactical political advantage.

--Tymoshenko often voices her support for tougher market
reforms and NATO membership to western audiences, but chooses
more populist themes at home; it will be important to
encourage her to voice the same national interest messages in

Ukraine and back up her words with actions.

--Tymoshenko should use her opposition pulpit to offer
constructive alternatives to current government positions and
to encourage compromise on key issues in order to ensure that
the interests of her voters -- and Ukraine as a whole -- are
advanced. For example, Tymoshenko could be encouraged to be
a more active proponent of energy efficiency and foreign
investment in domestic off-shore exploration to reduce
dependency on Russian gas. End summary and comment.

Viktor and Viktor - how about Yuliya?
--------------


3. (C) The dynamic between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, as the
institutions of the presidency and premiership/cabinet
struggled to define power and influence under the new rules
of post-constitutional reform which came into play in 2006,
was the key political factor in Ukrainian politics from
August 2006 to January 2007, with Yanukovych playing the
consistently winning hand. After appointing Yanukovych PM in
August, Yushchenko essentially ignored Tymoshenko, whose
ratings consistently double his own, and focused nearly all
his attention on reaching a modus vivendi with Yanukovych.
Tymoshenko made him pay in January, when BYuT joined the
coalition in overriding Yushchenko's veto on the new Cabinet
of Ministers law which makes additional inroads on
presidential authorities. While Tymoshenko had tactical
horse-trading reasons for the vote, along with an eye towards
an eventual return as premier, she also clearly intended it
as a wake-up call to Yushchenko, and a reminder that he
depended on her to make the power of his veto, one of his few
tools of influence left, stick.

Getting back into the game, productively or not
-------------- --


4. (C) The CabMin vote handed Yanukovych a crucial victory
and weakened Tymoshenko's claim to be the only political
leader to have stayed true to the spirit of the Maidan,
demonstrating her willingness to deal with Regions on dubious
legislation in her pursuit of tactical advantage. But it
apparently also served as the intended wake-up call to
Yushchenko, as he and OU finally engaged Tymoshenko and BYuT
to work as a joint opposition to the Regions-led coalition.
Tymoshenko's strategy remains focused on creating conditions
in which Yushchenko could dismiss the Rada and call new

KYIV 00000467 002 OF 003


elections, which she feels confident would strengthen her and
return a BYuT-OU alliance to office.


5. (C) Nevertheless, Yushchenko's aversion to confrontation,
her own aggressive street-fighter tactical instincts, and
their mutual distrust and different agendas, are likely to
complicate hopes for effective renewed cooperation.
Moreover, Tymoshenko and OU are still trying to come to terms
with what it means to be a successful and functioning
opposition, especially with no national elections scheduled
for three years. BYuT does enjoy significant representation
at the local and regional government level, both on councils
and as mayors, especially in central and western Ukraine,
which gives her political leverage to push for changes
outside of Kyiv.


6. (C) In Washington, she needs to hear that it is important
for Ukraine's future that she take the high road and act like
a statesman in opposition, support national interests, and
help achieve results beneficial to the country, not only
pursue tactical advantage with an eye solely on returning to
power. It is not clear Tymoshenko fully understands the
constructive role an engaged opposition in a democracy can
play, nor how achieving results even while out of power could
advance her political fortunes. Tymoshenko should use her
popularity and pulpit to offer alternatives to current
government positions and pursue constructive compromise on
key issues to move Ukraine forward.

NATO, MAP, and a possible referendum
--------------


7. (C) One issue which Tymoshenko has studiously avoided
domestically, though not in speeches and op-eds abroad or
private conversations, is Ukraine's national security
interests and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. While Yushchenko/OU
too avoided NATO as an issue in the 2006 election cycle, that
changed after the elections. PM Yanukovych has set the
current government policy as supportive of cooperation with
NATO, but not actively pursuing membership via a Membership
Action Plan (MAP). While Yanukovych acknowledges the need
for a public information campaign on NATO, he/Regions has not
taken an active role. A potential wild card in the medium
future is a signature-based drive to hold a referendum on
NATO and Single Economic Space (Yushchenko has appealed
elements of the outdated 1991 law on refenda to the
Constitutional Court, buying time). Given the current lack
of public support for NATO (roughly 25 percent),such a vote
would fail. Tymoshenko should be encouraged to demonstrate
her statesman-like role by speaking more often to Ukraine's
strategic direction and place in the world, and not only in
economic terms (eventual EU membership, energy independence).

Russia and the Gas Relationship
--------------


8. (C) Relations with Russia, always complex, feature energy
issues as the dominant factor, not to Ukraine's advantage.
The Yanukovych Government managed to conclude a positive
price deal for the 2007 winter season soon after coming to
power ($130/thousand cubic meters of national gas),though at
what cost to other national interests remains unclear.
Russia clearly wants to take control of Ukrainian
infrastructure, and they may have a Trojan Horse ally in Fuel
and Energy Minister Boyko, a founder of the nontransparent
RosUkrEnergo (RUE) middleman mechanism. The GOU has floated
ideas of forming a consortium with Russia to build expanded
gas pipeline capacity to Europe, but has so far stopped short
of allowing Russia any role in owning or managing the
existing Ukrainian gas pipeline network.


9. (C) Befitting her roots in the gas sector, the former "Gas
Princess" Tymoshenko has taken a leading role in Rada
criticism of government deals with Russia, both in 2006 and

2007. At BYuT's initiative, the Rada overwhelmingly approved
a ban February 6 on the sale, transfer, or rental of
Ukraine's energy infrastructure (namely pipelines) to anyone
(but clearly aimed at Russian parties). She often speaks of
bringing greater transparency and openness to the energy
sector but has initiated no action in the Rada in support of
this goal. Tymoshenko could be encouraged to be a more
active proponent of energy efficiency and foreign investment
in domestic off-shore exploration to reduce dependency on
Russian gas.

Pushing on Market Economics, investment climate
-------------- --


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10. (C) Ukraine's economy has performed well since the March
2006 elections, with GDP growth near 7 percent and increased
consumption spurred by rising social pension and wage levels.
As opposition leader, Tymoshenko's comments on the 2007
budget did little to dispel the notion that she is a populist
on economic policy, an image that arose during her stint as
PM, when she raised social spending, advocated price controls
on sugar, meet, and gasoline, and pushed "reprivatizing"
former state enterprises sold at cut-rate prices to
well-connected old-order oligarchs. She winces at the term
"reprivatization" and may better understand its deleterious
impact on the investment climate toward the end of her PM
tenure. Tymoshenko does cast a useful critical voice on
current GOU-proposed policies that may favor oligarchs rather
than promote Ukraine's overall economic health, as well as on
the shadowy nature of current energy supply arrangements.


11. (C) Her Washington meetings give us an opportunity to
push Tymoshenko to play a constructive role to achieve
agreed-on goals of increased economic integration with Europe
and the world, as well as policies that enhance the business
and investment environment for U.S. and Ukrainian businesses
alike. We can also encourage Tymoshenko to build on one of
her real accomplishments as PM in 2005, which was improving
the government's tax and customs policies to eliminate a
significant element of corruption and smuggling, and
simplifying business registration procedures.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor