Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV2833
2007-11-16 14:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: ODDS MOUNTING AGAINST A TYMOSHENKO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8594
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2833/01 3201459
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161459Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4338
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KYIV 002833 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ODDS MOUNTING AGAINST A TYMOSHENKO
PREMIERSHIP

REF: A. KYIV 2766


B. KYIV 2813

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 KYIV 002833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ODDS MOUNTING AGAINST A TYMOSHENKO
PREMIERSHIP

REF: A. KYIV 2766


B. KYIV 2813

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: After visiting EUR DAS Kramer's series of
meetings with top Ukrainian political figures, it is clear
that the path to the premiership for Yuliya Tymoshenko will
be difficult and is still far from certain. Presidential
Administration head Baloha said that he was "101%" certain
that an orange coalition and Tymoshenko premiership was
assured by November 30, but only if she met all the
pre-conditions laid out by the President, now to include
explicit statements in the coalition agreement backing NSDC
Secretary Plyushch as Speaker and the President's nominee (to

SIPDIS
be named) as Kyiv Mayor. Otherwise it would be impossible.
OU Defense Minister Hrytsenko noted additional presidential
preconditions -- including canceling "objectionable
provisions" in the coalition agreement and signing a letter
on applying for a NATO Membership Action plan (also mentioned
by Baloha),and an assumption that Plyushch would be Speaker.
Plyushch told DAS Kramer that he "would do whatever the
President asked" although his goal in the process has been to
find a formula leading to a coalition of more than 300 that
could change the constitution and return stability to the
political process. OU-PSD head Lutsenko worried that a
presidential decision to put Plyushch forward as Speaker
could irretrievably damage the orange coalition and spike
Tymoshenko's chances to head the government. Tymoshenko
Advisor Nemiryia said that he was 70% confident that
Tymoshenko would succeed in forming a coalition, but if not,
she was prepared for opposition. PM Yanukovych was confident
that he would remain in office as PM, and in several
conversations, assuming that Tymoshenko failed, Yanukovych
was mentioned as a likely "acting PM" for the next months or
years. He also was ready to go into opposition. Potential
spoiler Lytvyn argued that his bloc would not "join" any
existing bloc, but he did not rule out helping to create a
bloc if approached.


2. (C) Comment. Although Baloha oozed confidence that he

(and the President) were in control of the situation, many in
Kyiv still see the situation as in flux, with some going so
far as to suggest that Yushchenko has not yet made up his
mind about which way to go. With the Rada now scheduled to
open on November 23, the parties are entering the political
end game and although Baloha suggested that the Presidential
Administration was orchestrating everything, it seems clear
that there are many unknowns about what will actually happen
over the next few weeks (as Baloha suggested) or the next
month (the Rada has 30 days after opening to form a coalition
and a government). Although we laid out numerous scenarios
in ref B, it looks like there are two main choices:
Tymoshenko will succeed in getting her orange coalition and
the premiership; or if she fails, Yushchenko will attempt to
prompt a coalition-less Rada to begin its work and leave
Yanukovych and his Cabinet in acting status, remaining in
office as long as they cooperate with the President. During
his meetings, DAS Kramer stressed the USG policy that we have
no favorites among the potential coalitions, but urged the
political parties to reach agreement on a government as soon
as possible so that we could get down to business in managing
the important issues in the bilateral relationship. End
Comment.

Baloha - In Control of the Situation
--------------


3. (C) Leading off with the statement that "Plyushch will
be the Speaker, unless the President changes his mind,"
Presidential Administration head Baloha laid out what he
termed "the one option regarding the future prime minister."
He said that on November 23 after the Rada opened, OU faction
head Kyrylenko and BYuT leader Tymoshenko would sign a
coalition agreement -- one that "we, without a doubt, will
support." However, whether Tymoshenko becomes PM would
depend on whether she agreed to several conditions,
specifically and explicitly included in the coalition
agreement. First, the name of the future Speaker, Plyushch,
would be included. And second, the name of the next mayor of
Kyiv (to be proposed by the President and supported by
Tymoshenko) would also be noted. Later Baloha said that the
name of the next mayor would come from a list of 5-7 nominees
proposed by Yushchenko; Tymoshenko could choose from these
names. If this was agreed, Baloha said that Tymoshenko would
be approved as Prime Minister by "the end of the month.
There are no other conditions, everything else was taken care
of (including legislation prepared under his leadership),--
only these two points remained." Interestingly, Baloha
thought that Tymoshenko would be able to accept the idea of

KYIV 00002833 002 OF 007


Plyushch as Speaker much more easily than surrendering her
right to influence the nomination of the orange candidate to
be the next Mayor of Kyiv. He also noted that Yushchenko had
supported OU-PSD head Lutsenko as the mayoral candidate, a
position Lutsenko had long-talked about, but that Tymoshenko
had rejected the idea. (Note. Per ref b, many here see this
position as the fourth-most powerful post in the country,
after President, PM and Speaker, and an excellent place from
which to launch a presidential bid, even though the position
is not currently empty and could only be opened up through
complicated recall legislation through the Rada. End note.)


4. (C) Baloha acknowledged that it would be problematic for
Tymoshenko to get the votes for PM -- 100% of coalition
members must vote and if some of the coalition members do not
vote for Plyushch as Speaker, then the same number would not
vote Tymoshenko as PM. When DAS Kramer asked how the
coalition would know who voted (since the vote for Speaker is
a secret ballot; the PM vote an open ballot),Baloha said
only that he would know, but the bottom line was that if
Plyushch did not win the vote for Speaker, there would be no
vote for Tymoshenko as PM. Regarding the ability of OU-PSD
and BYuT deputies to follow party discipline and vote as
instructed, Baloha said that OU-PSD was in good shape. Prior
to these elections, the OU list had been cleaned up and he
was confident about the support of these deputies. However,
Tymoshenko had not done the same with her list and he had
doubts about the loyalty of all of her deputies. For example
in the spring, prior to the dissolution of the Rada, a group
of 40 BYuT deputies were widely-known to be about to jump to
the Government. Suprisingly, in the run-up to the pre-term
elections, Tymoshenko had not dropped these people, many of
whom had money, from her list and therefore, he was not sure
that these people would support her.


5. (C) Denying that Yanukovych had any chance to be
selected as PM, Baloha said that Yushchenko was committed to
laying the foundation for a stable government that could stay
in power for a full five-year term. If Tymoshenko could meet
all of the President's pre-conditions, then she could count
on being in power for a long time. She had already agreed to
give up her presidential aspirations and support Yushchenko
for re-election in the coalition agreement. However, Baloha
cautioned, written agreements and promises would not be
enough to guarantee Tymoshenko the post. In Baloha's view,
Yanukovych had signed all of the required papers to become
Prime Minister and "look what happened. We're not that
stupid to do it again with Tymoshenko." Baloha thought that
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko needed to look into each other's
eyes and reach agreement; he was still waiting for this to
happen. Although denying that it was a precondition, Baloha
mentioned that Tymoshenko also needed to sign the proposed
letter regarding Ukraine's request for a MAP from NATO. In
his words, "this is a game that will have to end; she will
need to sign that letter."


6. (C) Wrapping up, Baloha said that three months ago,
Yushchenko said that he supported the formation of an orange
coalition -- and he said it again today. He noted that there
have been small misunderstandings between members of the
orange team, but that these misunderstandings stemmed from
uncoordinated actions. Baloha said that he had been open and
honest in laying out the way ahead and that he stuck by his
101% chance that there would be an orange government and a
Tymoshenko premiership as long as she met all of the
conditions. However, if not, then he would have to "take
back all of my words. Everybody gets what they deserve."

Hrytsenko - More Work Ahead for Tymoshenko
--------------


7. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko asserted that there was a
"90%" likelihood that NSDC Secretary Plyushch would be Rada
speaker. In order for Tymoshenko to become Prime Minister,
however, she had to demonstrate that she could exercise the
appropriate leadership, fashion an effective coalition, and
form a Cabinet of Ministers that would work well with the
Rada. She had not demonstrated this capability when she was
unable to overcome the impasse that delayed the functioning
of the Rada Working Group. Tymoshenko would blame the Party
of Regions, but Yushchenko would ask whether she had
attempted to meet with Yanukovych to persuade Regions to take
its seats on the Working Group. Tymoshenko could argue that
she could not meet with Yanukovych and that he would
manipulate such a meeting for his benefit, but Hrytsenko
faulted her for not being willing to make the effort.
Hrytsenko noted strong leadership would be necessary since,
after the vote for the Prime Minister and Speaker, the Rada
would immediately take up the Ukrainian budget.


KYIV 00002833 003 OF 007



8. (C) Hrytsenko noted that Yushchenko had told him
November 10 that he was concerned about the Working Group,s
failure to meet; this was a factor in his evaluation of
Tymoshenko,s prospects to become prime minister, but she
would also have to meet other conditions. Hrytsenko wryly
noted that the conversation had been carried in the press.
(Note: Kommersant Ukrayina, in its November 12 edition,
reported that microphones had not been turned off during
Yushchenko,s participation at a swearing-in ceremony for new
soldiers. The paper noted that Yushchenko had met with
Tymoshenko and OU-PSD political council chairman Vyacheslav
Kyrylenko November 9 to urge both political factions to enter
into negotiations with Party of Regions regarding a broad
coalition. During the overheard conversation, Yushchenko
disparaged Kyrylenko, implying that he did not want Kyrylenko
to become Rada speaker and bemoaned BYuT and OU-PSD,s
unwillingness to negotiate with Regions.)


9. (C) Hrytsenko continued that Tymoshenko would need to
agree cancel objectionable provisions of the coalition
agreement -- the early abolishment of the military draft,
refunds of savings in three years, and the moratorium on land
sales. In addition, Tymoshenko would need to agree to sign a
draft letter to the NATO Secretary General formally
requesting a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine.
Hrytsenko said he had signed the letter of support for the
coalition without reservations because the letter did not
itself incorporate the coalition agreement, and its
objectionable provisions, but simply said the signatories
would approve the coalition agreement once it was introduced
into the Rada. Later in the conversation, Hrytsenko said the
draft letter was ready and had room for two signatures -- the
President,s and the Prime Minister,s. Although Yushchenko
could change his mind, Hrytsenko opined that the signature on
the letter would be a prerequisite for Yushchenko,s backing
of a prime ministerial candidate. Hrytsenko noted that the
coalition agreement set MAP not as a rhetorical goal but
specifying the legislation to be amended and that all other
necessary steps would be taken to fulfill MAP. Tymoshenko
had signed the coalition agreement.


10. (C) If these conditions were met, Hrytsenko said,
Yushchenko would back Tymoshenko as Prime Minister and
Plyushch as Rada speaker. OU-PSD would put forward serious
candidates for its Cabinet allocations, which Tymoshenko
would not oppose since OU-PSD had its agreed quota. OU-PSD
would also support Plyushch if Yushchenko asked. In response
to Kramer,s question regarding who was really in control,
Hrytsenko pointed to the selection of Plyushch as evidence
that, while Baloha might be an influence, Yushchenko
ultimately made his own decisions. When Kramer sought
confirmation that Plyushch and Baloha do not get along,
Hrytsenko quipped, "They get, but not really 'along.'"


11. (C) Hrytsenko laid out the possibility of a caretaker
government, with the Rada speaker elected but not the Prime
Minister. While Yanukovych had zero chance of being selected
as the next prime minister, he could continue on as an acting
prime minister of this caretaker government, which could
remain in place as long as a year. Yanukovych, unlike a
month ago, was ready to stay on in this role. When Kramer
mentioned that Yanukovych, in Kramer,s meeting, had appeared
confident that he could become prime minister, Hrytsenko
again quipped that Yanukovych was like the cuckolded husband
who was the last to know that his wife was cheating.
Hrytsenko said he would remain as Defense Minister if asked,
giving up his Rada seat when the Cabinet was formed. He
opined that Yatsenyuk might prefer the position of National
Bank governor or to return to working in a government
economic or financial position, but he did not definitely
know. If Yatsenyuk were to leave, then presumably
Presidential Adviser Oleksandr Chaliy might be a leading
candidate for foreign minister.

Plyushch - Looking for a 300 plus Majority
--------------


12. (C) Noting that those who thought that the pre-term
elections would change nothing were wrong, NSDC Secretary
Plyushch said that the main goal right now was not to form a
coalition, but instead was restore stability to political
life. The constitutional amendments agreed in 2004 were
clumsy and had upset the system of checks and balances. In
Plyushch's view, what was needed now was a 300-vote coalition
in order to change the constitution. He acknowledged that
the constitution could also be changed via referendum, but
that a referendum was an instrument that needed to be used
carefully -- in March 1991, 70% of Ukrainians wanted to stay
in the USSR; in December the same year, 90% had supported
independence. According to Plyushch, the President is the

KYIV 00002833 004 OF 007


sole legitimate entity in the country and bears the
responsibility for creating the conditions of political
stability and prosperity. He argued that it was impossible
to support a decision endorsed by only one part of the
population; that force alone could not implement the needed
political reforms to secure the balance of power. He noted
that 228 votes for a coalition was not enough to bring
stability. No matter how much Yushchenko might like the 228
votes, he could not forget that he represented all political
forces and all Ukrainians.


13. (C) When DAS Kramer asked specifically how it would be
possible to get the support of 300 deputies in the Rada,
Plyushch said that this would only come about as a result of
a political understanding between OU-PSD, Regions and BYuT.
Once this general understanding was reached, Lytvyn's bloc
would join in as well. Arguing that BYuT had more members
than just Tymoshenko, who would definitely oppose this larger
grouping, Plyushch said that some in OU-PSD would also oppose
it, at a minimum the 13 OU-PSD field commanders who performed
well only during revolutions. Yushchenko was not afraid of
Tymoshenko or the 2010 elections. In the next two years he
was committed to fulfilling his original campaign goals --
Ten Steps Toward the People -- but to do this he needed 300
votes. It was critical for Yanukovych and Tymoshenko to
subordinate their efforts to form a coalition to the greater
good of achieving political stability. Plyushch acknowledged
that getting 300 votes was the goal, but if he failed, there
would be no regrets for trying. In Plyushch's view,
accepting a 228-vote coalition would be admitting that 300
was unattainable and then trying to choose the best of all
the bad options.


14. (C) In Plyushch's mind, the ideal set-up would be for
Yanukovych to be Speaker and Tymoshenko to be PM, but as of
today, they could never negotiate a deal. Yanukovych is now
willing, but Tymoshenko refuses. He said that he did not
oppose Kyrylenko as Speaker -- "being young is not a
drawback," however, as Speaker, Kyrylenko would not be a
political participant, but a "non-factional deputy"
responsible for the functioning of the Rada. When asked
whether he would be Speaker, Plyushch said that no one had
offered him the job and that he would prefer to stay at NSDC.
However, he had come to NSDC because Yushchenko had asked
him; if Yushchenko asked him to go to the Rada, he would
fulfill his request. Plyushch was scathing in his criticism
of Tymoshenko's campaign promises that were included in the
draft coalition agreement, especially regarding the costs of
abolishing military conscription and repaying the lost
savings of Ukrainian depositors after the break-up of the
USSR, noting that she did not yet have 228 votes for the
orange coalition quipping "I won't give my vote easily."

Lutsenko - Against Plyushch As Speaker
--------------


15. (C) OU-PSD head Lutsenko said that Baloha and his group
have not learned any lessons from the past and think they
have much more bargaining power than they really do. He laid
out several variants: Kyrylenko as speaker with Tymoshenko as
PM; Plyushch as Speaker with a 90% chance that Yanukovych
remains as acting PM and 10% that a coalition is formed to
back Tymoshenko; Yanukovych as Speaker with Baloha as PM
(Lutsenko believes this scenario is only possible in
Baloha,s mind, but at a later meeting Regions Deputy
Bohoslovska laid it out for the Ambassador as a serious
option, with Baloha, Yatsenyuk or Lytvyn as PM); and Lytvyn
as Speaker with Tymoshenko as PM. Lutsenko said he would
support any basic orange democratic coalition. Any other
result would mean that he would go into the opposition with
Tymoshenko. He does not hold her in high regard, referring
to her several times as "neo-communist" (Bohoslovska's term
was "neo-Bolshevik"),yet her policy goals of European
integration, WTO, and steps to create an independent Ukraine
track with his political vision. Lutsenko indicated that
Baloha initially supported the first variant of Kyrylenko as
Speaker and Tymoshenko as PM, but was convinced by Regions
financier Rinat Ahkmetov politically and personally (Lutsenko
said Baloha has hundreds of thousands of dollars as a gift
from Ahkmetov in his safe) to support the variant of Plyushch
as Speaker and Yanukovych as Acting PM.


16. (C) In Lutsenko's view, Yushchenko,s political future
is virtually dead regardless of what comes out of the
negotiations. The only thing Yushchenko can do that isn't
political suicide is go with the first variant of Kyrylenko
as Speaker and Tymoshenko as PM. Even then, Lutsenko could
not see how Yushchenko could win a second term without a
radical change in the election law. He said that his
electorate would not forgive him for betraying the Orange and

KYIV 00002833 005 OF 007


that Ukraine would turn into a two party system which
Lutsenko thinks would be a tragic result for Ukraine. He
says he joined OU because of his fear of a two party system
and that as a practical matter, he needed OU,s support on
election committees. (Embassy Note: As a
recently-established political organization, People's Self
Defense did not have standing under the election law to
participate as an independent party. End note.) Lutsenko
did not regret the decision and would make the same one in
hindsight in spite of OU,s poor electoral showing and OU,s
electoral mismanagement. However, if push came to shove,
Lutsenko would go with BYuT into opposition and break away
from OU. Lutsenko noted that Yushchenko is particularly
frustrated with Baloha because once again, Yushchenko is
faced with no good alternatives and needs to get his hands
dirty in the negotiation process. Lutsenko noted one aspect
of the close Yushchenko/Baloha relationship is a genuine
friendship; another is that Baloha has been very active in
pushing the President,s agenda by any means necessary.
Lutsenko wryly noted a number of times this has allowed
Yushchenko to distance himself from the day to day political
fighting and focus on less urgent issues such as the
Holodomor commemoration.


17. (C) Lutsenko did not believe that any coalition would
be achieved before late December which means Yanukovych will
remain as Acting PM and be able to use his position to
bludgeon the Orange side on a daily basis. Lutsenko thought
that a broad coalition between OU/Regions can't happen
because at least half of OU (including his group) would not
agree to a broad coalition and go into the opposition. Any
broad coalition between OU/Regions would almost assuredly
need the support of the Communists, a scenario that is
unpalatable to both OU and Regions. He said that
negotiations are even more complicated because Regions
(encouraged by Baloha) are acting as if they won the
election. According to Lutsenko, Lytvyn is a wildcard.
Lutsenko claimed that Lytvyn was happy with the chaos because
he is positioning himself to be the "man on the white horse"
who could save Ukraine from its bickering politicians.
Another reason Lytvyn was trying to stay above the fray was
that he only represented himself and a few others in his
bloc; he could not be certain that the other members of his
bloc would support any deal that he made.

18, (C) Lutsenko lamented the politics of personalities
among the "three dinosaurs". He noted his desire to become
mayor of Kyiv, something that none of the three dinosaurs
want, and described the overall political situation as
dysfunctional, lacking any strategic vision or thinking.
However, the Big Three are very careful not to allow up and
coming politicians a platform to provide a better alternative
and vision. Lutsenko does not personally care for Lytvyn but
noted he at least can speak and think strategically. He says
Lytvyn has little popular support (funding from Firtash among
others) and it is unclear what if any agenda Lytvyn has to
offer. However, if Lytvyn enters the fray on one side or the
other, a coalition could form that would provide stability
and could help make politics "normal" for a year to a year a
half until the Presidential elections.

BYuT - Orange Still Possible
--------------


19. (C) Tymoshenko Foreign Policy Advisor Nemiryia told DAS
Kramer that Tymoshenko was out of the country relaxing --
that's how confident she was in the outcome of the Rada
coalition negotiations. He explained that Tymoshenko would
only consider two outcomes: either the premiership, which he
put at about 70 percent, or opposition. Surprisingly, he
mentioned that if Tymoshenko were to become prime minister,
she was considering Beijing as her first official visit. He
expressed regret that current NSDC Chairman Plyushch had a
very good chance of becoming the Rada speaker, but seemed
resigned to this outcome. Nemiryia said that that Krylenko
from Our Ukraine, who had been considered a potential
candidate for the Rada Speaker, had been undermined by
Presidential Administration head Baloha. He opined that
Lutsenko would make a good chairman of the NSDC, which he
thought was poorly run by Plyushch. Nemiryia confirmed that
Tymoshenko has not changed her position on refusing to sign
the letter with Yushchenko on asking NATO for a MAP and that
she would not sign unless it was modified. In her view,
concern about Ukrainian energy security and ongoing gas
negotiations with Russia further complicated the matter.


Yanukovych: Broad Coalition by mid-December
--------------


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20. (C) A relaxed and confident PM Yanukovych told DAS
Kramer that he expected a broad coalition of Party of
Regions, OU-PSD and the Lytvyn Bloc to be formed no later
than mid-December, with 268 MPs and agreement that Yanukovych
would remain PM. Otherwise, he said, Regions was ready to go
into opposition, which would "not be a tragedy". He said
that a three vote majority "orange coalition" could not
function and cited his previous experience in 2004 when he
needed a majority of 243 votes to run the Government
effectively. Once the broad coalition was in place, he
would be able to promote stability and undertake
constitutional reform. When pressed on whether an orange
coalition would even go up for a vote, he said if he were a
betting man, the odds were 100 to 1 against it.


21. (C) DAS Kramer praised Yanukovych and other Ukrainian
leaders for resolving their differences peacefully through
elections and encouraged Yanukovych to continue to make
Ukraine a good example of a functioning democracy for the
region. However the USG hoped to see a government formed as
soon as possible and that we would continue to have good
cooperation with whatever coalition is formed. He warned
that Western leaders could lose interest and ignore Ukraine
if it did not put an end to the endless political wrangling.



22. (C) Yanukovych criticized Yuliya Tymoshenko for
resorting to "populist" rhetoric during the final weeks of
the election campaign and believed that her promises were
unrealistic and meant to deceive voters. He said that
Tymoshenko's campaign promises to professionalize the
military by 2008 and return lost savings from Soviet-era
banks created a rift in the BYuT/OU-PSD pre-election
agreement forcing OU-PSD into an awkward position. He added
that Tymoshenko's hopes for the presidency in 2009 would be
shattered if she publicly went back on her campaign promises
and hinted that some in BYuT may not support the coalition
out of "principle". When asked by DAS Kramer about efforts
to pressure BYuT and OU-PSD MPs to vote against the
coalition, Yanukovych in a veiled reply said that Regions had
not made any efforts to pressure MPs, but some individual MPs
might have done so because they saw no other option.


Lytvyn: Waiting in the Wings
--------------


23. (C) Lytvyn told DAS Kramer that his position on
coalitions remained the same -- he was ready to participate
in the formation of a coalition, but he would not join a
coalition that had already been formed. He said that he
wanted to support President Yushchenko, who had taken a
consistent democratic position since 2004, but that he would
not serve the interests of "those who speak on his behalf."
According to Lytvyn, in the Rada, his bloc would support
legislation proposed by Yushchenko, but that he could not
join the orange coalition on the terms that they have
proposed -- he did not want to "be a Moroz." He suggested
that Yushchenko had not yet made a decision regarding the
shape of the future coalition. If Tymoshenko was not
successful, Lytvyn did not have another candidate in mind -
his bloc would abstain. In Lytvyn's view, the best coalition
would be a grand coalition of Regions, BYuT and OU-PSD;
second choice would be orange; and third would be Regions,
part of OU-PSD and the Communists. He thought that if
Yushchenko allowed Tymoshenko to become PM, then he would be
giving her his blessing as the next President. According to
Lytvyn, if Yushchenko proposes Tymoshenko as PM, he would not
support her candidacy or her campaign promises. Lytvyn said
that he would consider supporting her nomination as PM if she
had a real plan for achieving her promises, but that she had
no plan. All in all, he predicted that it would take at
least a month for the political game to play out, although it
would move faster if orange succeeded in getting 228 votes
for a coalition and a prime minister.


24. (C) In Lytvyn's view, his bloc will be a
politically-neutral, friendly force that will support any
proposals and legislative work that won't cause problems
within the faction. A budget was a critical first step. He
said that if Tymoshenko wanted to work hard and avoid her
leftist leanings, then she would be successful. However, if
she saw the premiership as a first step toward the
presidency, then she would fail. Lytvyn urged that the Rada
convene and be allowed to begin work and follow the
procedures. However, he was concerned that some in Regions
would not accept the idea of being in the opposition; it was
critical that the President and a future PM ensure that
Regions' deputies were turned into friends not foes. Lytvyn
said that Yushchenko could not choose Kyrylenko to be

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Speaker; he would become Tymoshenko's deputy in the Rada. He
thought it was likely that Yushchenko would support Plyushch
for the job and that Tymoshenko would also support it. In
his scenario, some in OU-PSD would not support Plyushch, but
others in Regions would. At that point, it would be clear
that Tymoshenko could not be elected as PM or form a
government and Yanukovych would remain in place as Acting PM.
After a year, if the government did well, Yushchenko could
take the credit. If not, he could disband it. The future
would be determined by Yushchenko in concert with Plyushch
and Yanukovych. The only remaining issue would be what to do
with Tymoshenko.


25. (U) DAS Kramer did not have an opportunity to clear this
cable prior to departing from Kyiv.


26. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor