Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV2766
2007-11-07 14:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: COALITION POSSIBILITIES - READING THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKV #2766/01 3111459
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071459Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4272
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002766 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: COALITION POSSIBILITIES - READING THE
TEA LEAVES IN KYIV

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: COALITION POSSIBILITIES - READING THE
TEA LEAVES IN KYIV

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: With the opening of the Rada on the horizon
and after five weeks of coalition discussions between
representatives of all of the major parties and President
Yushchenko, we have boiled down the main number of
possibilities for the next government to four -- an orange
coalition led by Yuliya Tymoshenko; a broad coalition between
Party of Regions and Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense
possibly to include the Lytvyn Bloc; a temporary,
technocratic government made up of some combination of
Regions, OU-PSD, Lytvyn's bloc and other individual
lawmakers, with or without a formal coalition agreement; or a
continuation of the Yanukovych Government in an acting
capacity. An outside fifth possibility, floated recently by
Regions with us and possibly with the President, would be an
agreement to suspend the constitution and operate under a
"political agreement" while a new constitution is being
drafted, leaving the Yanukovych Government in place in an
acting capacity, with or without new ministers from
participating factions. Of course, all of these variants
have sub-variants, and some may figure in two-step scenarios
as Plan A and Plan B. For example, many in Kyiv continue to
argue that orange will be given a chance, and when (not if)
Tymoshenko's government fails, either a broad coalition or a
technocratic government will take its place. The Rada is
required to take its seats no later than November 26; once it
is seated, it will have 30 days to establish a coalition (no
later than December 26). So far, all political forces seem
committed to sticking to the timeline.


2. (C) Comment. At this point, we believe that an orange
coalition with a slim majority has a 50% chance of
succeeding, although all options are definitely in play.
Fortunately, the idea of suspending the constitution and
working pursuant to some kind of vague political
understanding appears to be more of a trial balloon rather
than a real plan. If the factions cannot agree on a
coalition, Yanukovych's Acting Government would stay in place
until a new PM is confirmed. Normally, if no coalition

emerges within 30 days of the Rada's opening or no government
is confirmed within 60 days, the President has the right to
dissolve the Rada and call for new elections; however, the
constitution also says that new elections cannot be called
for one year after pre-term polls. With regard to USG
policy, we continue to state that we have no favorite colors
or preferred coalition outcome. Our key USG messages to
Ukrainian political forces should be: do not try to operate
without a constitution in force; elect a Rada leadership and
form committees as soon as possible to begin legislating; and
select and confirm a permanent government as soon as possible
and do not leave an acting unstable and uncertain government
in place. End Summary and Comment.

An Orange Coalition Still in Play
--------------


3. (C) Although the results of the September 30 election made
an orange coalition between Yuliya Tymoshenko's BYuT and
President Yushchenko's OU-PSD possible, thus far this has
remained a theoretical rather than a concrete option. With a
combined 228 seats -- 226 is needed for a majority -- BYuT
and OU-PSD can form a coalition and elect a Tymoshenko-led
government, but they would need practically every member of
each bloc to both be present for the first few sessions of
the new Rada and to vote in favor to do it. Although
Tymoshenko and OU-PSD political leaders Lutsenko and
Kyrylenko have been confident in public about their ability
to deliver the necessary 228 votes, all have told us
privately that they are concerned about getting and holding
on to the votes. The effort to secure and maintain the 228
votes has taken place against the backdrop of continued
public criticism from President Yushchenko and his chief of
staff Viktor Baloha about Tymoshenko's proposed program as
well as press reports regarding individual OU-PSD leaders
refusing to initial the draft coalition agreement or
expressing opposition to Tymoshenko's PM candidacy.


4. (C) Nonetheless, in our view, an orange coalition is
still possible, including approval of a new government led by
Yuliya Tymoshenko, even though the odds of this coming to
pass are probably only 50% at most. Many in OU-PSD who might
oppose Tymoshenko as PM believe that politically they must
support her -- or at least not be seen to oppose her
candidacy -- if they want to maintain voter support and if
they want to avoid making her the shoo-in orange candidate
for the presidency in 2009. There are others who argue that
all of the posturing in the public and the press about
disagreement on policies and positions is simply part of the
negotiating process needed to establish the coalition. And,

KYIV 00002766 002 OF 003


his protests in the press and comments to us about his
dislike of Tymoshenko notwithstanding, if Volodymyr Lytvyn
were to throw his lot in with the orange team, maybe taking
the Speaker slot as part of the deal, the orange coalition
might be more viable for a longer term. Elements in Regions
have noted that they would be happy to sit back and wait for
what they see as the inevitable -- another
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko falling out, a la September 2005, that
would lead to her dismissal or departure, and a resumption of
Tymoshenko's campaign for the presidency.


5. (C) There is another factor supporting the establishment
of orange -- some within OU-PSD, the Presidential
Secretariat, and Regions have argued that an orange coalition

SIPDIS
and a Tymoshenko-led government is a temporary, but necessary
measure before either a broad coalition or a technocratic
government could take office. Formation of an orange
government would deny Tymoshenko the chance to tell voters
that Yushchenko and OU had thwarted her candidacy as PM. It
would also let Yushchenko and OU show its voters that they
had given Tymoshenko a chance and that she had failed.
Finally, an orange coalition, albeit short-lived, would allow
those who prefer a "technocratic variant" to fulfill the
constitutional requirement that a coalition must be formed
when a new Rada is seated, a scenario OU-PSD head Lutsenko
laid out for the Ambassador in October. With regard to
timing, as Lutsenko quipped to the Ambassador, a
Tymoshenko-led government might survive only until the
"drinking season" of the New Year's holidays ended (late
January); others give it six to nine months.

A Broad Coalition - Too Much for Yushchenko?
--------------


6. (C) Assuming that an orange coalition fails, one
alternative is the formation of the long-debated and
oft-discussed "broad coalition" between Regions and OU-PSD,
perhaps including the Lytvyn Bloc. However, this may be too
much for the OU-PSD faithful and a task that Yushchenko may
not be able to accomplish. Yushchenko spent the last six
months accusing Yanukovych and Regions of attempting to
concentrate all political power in their hands. It is hard
to see how he can convince his voters that OU should now form
a coalition with them, at least not before he gives
Tymoshenko a chance to form an orange coalition and govern.
Yanukovych is doing his part to pave the way forward on this
option, making numerous public statements about his close
cooperative relationship with the President. Yanukovych is
also wooing Lytvyn as an insurance policy to increase his
number of votes. One way of making a broad coalition more
palatable for OU voters would be for Regions to agree to a
broad coalition without Yanukovych, leaving OU and Regions
the job of finding a candidate acceptable to both sides --
Presidential chief of staff Baloha and trusted loyalist
former PM Yekhanurov are considered to be leading candidates
for the job.


7. (C) A broad coalition without Yanukovych at the head is
also a challenge for Regions. According to the polls, no
other Regions leader has the same high popularity as the
Prime Minister. Other party leaders are not ready for or
don't want the job -- for example, Raisa Bohatyreva is a
political leader without her own base or financial resources;
Rinat Akhmetov remains a businessman first and a reluctant
politician second; and others just don't have the name
recognition. Deputy Prime Minister Klyuyev somewhat
cryptically told the Ambassador that in the end they would
make a broad coalition work, implying that they would be
willing to jettison Yanukovych if they had to. The party
could keep Yanukovych in the public eye by ensuring that he
ends up with another high-visibility post (such as Speaker),
keeping him on track to land the President's office in 2009,
another key goal for Regions. Or, the decision to agree to
another Prime Minister could signal Regions' decision to back
a different presidential candidate. A decision to enter into
a broad coalition with OU-PSD would also come with political
downsides -- Regions would have to explain the decision to
its electorate, although its base might be more understanding
than OU-PSD's.

No Coalition -- The Technocratic Variant
--------------


8. (C) If Tymoshenko and her OU-PSD allies fail to get the
226 votes needed to either sign a coalition agreement or to
elect a government, or if a Tymoshenko-led government takes
office and then collapses, and if OU-PSD and Regions cannot
reach agreement on a broad coalition, some in OU-PSD,
Regions, the Lytvyn Bloc and even elements of BYuT might
support some kind of a temporary, technocratic government.

KYIV 00002766 003 OF 003


Given the difficulties of putting together a broad coalition
in the current political environment, it is certainly a
serious option backed by some in OU-PSD. In this scenario,
the Rada could function without a formal coalition agreement,
leaving political factions to work together to elect a
Speaker, appoint committee chairs, and start legislating.
However, it is unclear how this might work in practice since
the Rada rules and the Constitution say that a coalition of
parliamentary factions shall be formed in the Rada to include
a majority of MP's. Some have seized upon the Constitution's
use of the word "shall" rather than "must" to argue that a
coalition is not absolutely required, but this strategy would
be open to legal challenges in court. Others have pushed the
argument laid out above that if the orange coalition is
confirmed, and then fails to elect a government, the
requirement for a coalition has been met and there does not
need to be another version approved.


9. (C) Most see a technocratic government formed from
scratch, to include representatives nominated by all of the
factions in the Rada supporting this variant, potentially all
but the Communists. No coalition agreement would be
required, using the "shall" versus "must" argument. Members
of OU-PSD have argued that since, in this scenario, neither
Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych could get enough votes to be PM,
the nomination for PM would fall to OU-PSD. Many see
Yushchenko as then turning to either his ambitious chief of
staff Baloha (rumored by many to be angling already for the
premiership) or previous PM Yekhanurov, who is respected by
many in Regions, to head a new technocratic government. Even
better for Yushchenko, neither is reportedly interested in
making a run at the presidency in 2009.

Or No Coalition -- Yanukovych As Acting
--------------


10. (C) Should Tymoshenko and OU-PSD fail to conclude a
formal coalition agreement or elect a government, another
possibility might be that in the absence of any successful
vote for a government, Yanukovych and his Cabinet would
remain in power in acting status. Presumably the Government
would remain in place until either a constitutional
commission drafted a new constitution or a year has gone by,
allowing Yushchenko to call new Rada elections. In this
scenario, the Rada would elect a Speaker and appoint
committee heads and get on with the business of legislating
-- without a governing coalition agreement. Individual
ministers could be replaced as part of the overall tacit
agreement to leave Yanukovych in place as PM to better
reflect the parties supporting this variant.

Desperate Times ...Suspending the Constitution
-------------- -


11. (C) A number of Regions representatives, including the
Prime Minister, have hinted publicly and privately about
working with the President to find an extra-constitutional
solution to a future deadlock if no grouping of political
forces succeeded in forming a coalition. Specifically, they
have floated the idea of reaching an agreement with the
President to suspend the constitution and govern the country
under some kind of "political understanding" for a year while
a special constitutional commission meets to draft and adopt
a new constitution. Although not directly stated, the
assumption is that Yanukovych would remain as PM during this
period. Thus far, this seems to be nothing more than a trial
balloon. However, should there be a deadlock in the Rada --
either because the parties cannot or do not want to reach
agreement on forming a coalition, then we do not rule out the
possibility that major political leaders may consider this
among their options.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor