UKRAINE: PRESIDENT PUSHES FOR QUICK COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 002546

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PRESIDENT PUSHES FOR QUICK COALITION
NEGOTIATIONS

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Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary. President Yushchenko has tried to jump start
negotiations on forming a new governing coalition by calling
all five political forces represented in the new Rada to a
meeting October 8 and instructing them to submit proposals on
the prime minister and coalition within five days. He has
also suggested that before any candidate is confirmed, the
Rada pass a number of pieces of legislation designed to show
good will and to straighten out the power sharing between
bodies of government, including eliminating immunity for
parliamentary deputies, abolishing the controversial law on
the Cabinet of Ministers, and giving the President more
control over the power ministers. Yushchenko's proposals
have met with mixed results. Bloc leader Tymoshenko
immediately announced that she was willing to offer the
opposition key positions, including a deputy prime minister
slot, while Prime Minister Yanukovych underscored that
Regions will not be in a coalition that does not have a
Regions PM and that a new Rada could only amend the CabMin
law rather than abolish it. Defense Minister Hrytsenko told
the Ambassador that some in Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense
now wanted to avoid a vote on Tymoshenko as PM entirely if
the orange forces did not have the votes, because the
rejection of her nomination would empower Regions in further
coalition talks.


2. (C) Comment. Yushchenko may still be hoping to find a
compromise that gets both Regions and BYuT buy-in by
demonstrating that he is willing to work with all sides.
Moreover, his push to have initial talks over by the end of
the week is a promising step towards a faster coalition
process than 2006's four-month debacle. However, with
Yanukovych and Tymoshenko both still pushing their positions,
and Yushchenko adding in his own demands for legislation and
then departing the country for the week (on a trip to
Lithuania and Slovakia),the negotiations promise to be
difficult. Our position -- we do not take sides in these
negotiations and will work with any government that emerges
from the recent election -- is well understood by all three
major parties and Lytvyn. End summary and comment.

Election Count is In
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3. (SBU) With no surprises in the results, the Central
Election Commission (CEC) announced on October 9 that it had
100-percent preliminary results in and had received all
official protocols, which they were still reviewing. Deputy
CEC head Andriy Mahera told the press, however, that due to
ongoing court disputes, the CEC would be unlikely to announce
the results sooner than October 14. (Note. The results must
be announced by October 15, according to the election law,
and promulgated no later than October 20. Once the final
results are promulgated, by law, the Rada must be seated
within 30 days. End note.)

Yushchenko Lays out his Demands
--------------


4. (SBU) President Yushchenko October 8 held a meeting with
representatives of the five parties/blocs that made it into
the new Rada. According to the press, in attendance were
Presidential Chief of Staff Baloha, NSDC Secretary Plyushch,
PM Yanukovych and Raisa Bohatyreva from Regions, Tymoshenko
and Oleksandr Turchynov from BYuT, Yuriy Lutsenko and
Vyacheslav Kyrylenko from OU-PSD, Oleh Zarubinskiy and Ihor
Sharov from the Lytvyn Bloc, and Petro Symonenko and Valentyn
Matveyev from the Communists. Yushchenko also held a private
meeting with Symonenko a half hour before the general
meeting. The President asked all parties to finish coalition
negotiations within five days and submit to him suggestions
for prime minister and coalition composition. (Note.
Interestingly, Yushchenko has announced plans to be in
Vilnius and then Slovakia, taking him out of the country for
most of the week and removing him from the negotiation
process. End note.) Yushchenko also suggested abolishing the
Cabinet of Ministers law, which was passed when the Rada
including BYuT voted to override Yushchenko's veto in
January, and which contains some seemingly unconstitutional
provisions, and putting the power ministers directly under
control of the President.


5. (SBU) The following day, First Deputy Head of the
Presidential Secretariat Oleksandr Shlapak said in an
interview that the President intends to insist that any vote
on a prime minister be preceded by votes on six key bills.
The first two would be a first vote on amending the
constitution to eliminate parliamentary immunity and the
second would be a law to remove other benefits for MPs.

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(Note. MPs currently get apartments in Kyiv and large
allowances for things like "health" rests at Crimean resorts.
End note.) Shlapak said the other four pieces of
legislation, all of which touch on the powers of government
organs, would be laid out in a formal presentation next week.
Initial comments from BYuT and Regions leaders showed
opposition to supporting bills they had no role in creating
or discussing.

Other Camps Weigh In
--------------


6. (C) Tymoshenko announced that if an orange government was
formed, they were ready to give the opposition one deputy
prime minister position, head of the Rada's audit chamber
(like our GAO),and a number of Rada committee chairmanships.
She added that they would consider also giving the
opposition some deputy minister and deputy governor
positions. Tymoshenko also said that the proposal for
forming an orange coalition had been sent to Lytvyn. In an
October 5 conversation, former BYuT deputy Yevzhen Kornychuk
told us that the BYuT rank and file was increasingly worried
that President Yushchenko would not live up to his commitment
to support an orange coalition, noting that BYuT was ready to
go into the opposition if need be. He said that Yushchenko
had been surprised by BYuT's strong showing and was still
trying to figure out what to do and how to block Tymoshenko
from becoming Prime Minister.


7. (SBU) After the group meeting with Yushchenko, Yanukovych
told the press that Regions would only be in a coalition if
they got the premiership. Otherwise, they would go into
opposition. This was, however, the first time he indicated
that Regions will take its seats in the Rada if they are in
the opposition. Yanukovych and Tymoshenko also met
separately on October 8, but no details have been made
public.


8. (SBU) Strangely, in an apparent effort to remain in the
coalition game, Communist leader Symonenko also announced
that the Communists would consider endorsing Tymoshenko as
PM, if the CPU were given positions in the Interior Ministry,
Prosecutor General's Office, Audit Chamber, and National Bank.

Defense Minister Hrytsenko Gives his Perspective
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9. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko, number 4 on the OU-PSD
list, told the Ambassador October 8 that in spite of the
existence of a theoretical majority vote for the orange
parties, he did not believe that Tymoshenko would be able to
convince all 228 BYuT and OU-PSD Rada members to vote for her
to become Prime Minister. Hrytsenko suggested that if orange
did not have the necessary votes in hand, it would be far
better not to let an actual vote take place. If there was a
vote on Tymoshenko as PM, and it failed, then Hrytsenko
believed that it would allow Regions to emerge as the main
player in negotiations. Hrytsenko argued this was something
OU should avoid; it was better to know up front whether or
not orange could win. Right now, according to Hrytsenko,
Regions was offering everything and anything to everyone to
form a coalition. If a vote on orange was called and then
lost, then Regions would stop bargaining. In Hrytsenko's
view, if an orange coalition could not succeed, then OU-PSD
should work with Regions to form a broad coalition. However,
as far as Hrytsenko is concerned, in such a coalition,
Yanukovych would not be acceptable as PM.


10. (C) In fact, Yanukovych would not be acceptable as PM for
either OU or BYuT in any scenario, according to Hrytsenko.
He thought that Yushchenko would be willing to accept
Yanukovych as Speaker, but Tymoshenko would not. In general,
Hrytsenko argued, both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych needed to
understand that losing and ending up in opposition was not
the end of the political world, and in fact, could be better
for their presidential ambitions. Hrytsenko thought that
this was a useful message for the international community to
convey to both. In response to the Ambassador's question,
Hrytsenko said that he did not believe that Yanukovych's
threat that Regions would not take their seats in the Rada
was serious.


11. (C) With regard to the effort to form an orange
coalition, Hrytsenko confirmed that discussions were ongoing.
Tymoshenko, Turchynov, and former Socialist Vinskiy were
representing BYuT; Tarasyuk, Vasynyuk, Hrytsenko, and
Lutsenko were representing OU-PSD. (Note. This may not be a
complete list; for example, we understand that OU faction
head Kyrylenko has been involved in most negotiations. End
note.) Discussions were difficult, but there was hope that

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compromise would be found. The conversations about positions
in the government were hard, but the biggest issue was a lack
of trust. According to Hrytsenko, Tymoshenko even thought
that she might get the support of 40 Regions deputies and the
20 deputies belonging to the Lytvyn bloc if there was a vote
on orange. (Note. This seems unlikely to us. End note.)
For himself, Hrytsenko said that after the new government was
formed he wanted either to remain as Defense Minister or
become a deputy prime minister in charge of security affairs,
as Sergiy Ivanov did in Russia.


12. (C) Hrytsenko raised the idea of a compromise
"technocratic PM," an idea that had floated around during the
final two weeks of the campaign. The main problem was that
neither Tymoshenko nor Yanukovych would agree to this if
their party formed the coalition and the successful formation
of such a technocratic government would require their buy-in.
Hrytsenko noted that Yushchenko wanted to find his "own
Zubkov" - a reference to the newly-appointed Russian PM - but
understood that Tymoshenko and OU leaders Lutsenko and
Kyrylenko opposed this. Hrytsenko told the Ambassador that
he was not for now interested in the job; at this stage, it
was "not an option" since he would not be able to affect
either people or policies. However, Tymoshenko had attacked
him during the campaign because she saw him as an alternative
PM.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor