UKRAINE: SEPTEMBER 30 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002479

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: SEPTEMBER 30 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS A
CRITICAL TEST FOR DEMOCRACY

Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Ukrainians will go to the polls on September
30 -- for the fifth time in the past three years -- to elect
a new parliament, and attempt to end the political deadlock
that has gripped this country since President Yushchenko's
April 2 decree dissolving the Rada. With the polls showing
PM Yanukovych's Regions party in a dead heat with the
combined "orange forces" of President Yushchenko and former
PM Yuliya Tymoshenko, this election is literally too close to
call. Depending upon the results, we could see a restored
"Orange" coalition government, a broad coalition between
Yanukovych's and Yushchenko's forces, or a Regions decision
to join forces again with the Communists. The open campaign
process and lively political debate in the press show that
the democratic gains of the Orange Revolution are
undiminished. However, with pundits and political forces all
predicting efforts from their opponents sides to falsify the
vote, even a small amount of fraud could make the difference
in this close race. The USG position has been consistent as
we have both publicly and privately called on all political
forces to ensure that this election is free and fair, and
have emphasized that we have no favorites in this race. A
bad election would not only call into question Ukraine's
democratic credentials, it could also cause Europeans to give
up on the country, thwarting Ukraine's European aspirations
and our overall policy goal of a westward-looking Ukraine.
End Summary.


2. (C) Many in the country see this election as the result
of Kyiv-based intrigues -- a political crisis that has little
to do with the rest of the country. Although the west
remains pro-Orange and the east and south firmly in the
Regions' blue camp, voters share a general fatigue with the
constant calls to go back to the polls. Although polls show
18-20% of Ukrainian voters still undecided, few expect voters
to change their political party affiliations and many believe
that undecideds are still deciding whether or not to vote at
all. The parties continue to vie with their own allies for
votes. Political sniping is most pointed in the west between
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko's political forces. In the South
and the East, Regions is fighting for votes with their former
Socialist and Communist allies, partly explaining the recent
Regions campaign strategy to promote a national referendum on
the questions of neutrality (read NATO membership) and an
official status for the Russian language, core issues for
voters there.


3. (C) Regions is again expected to gain a plurality of the
vote, although it is unlikely to manage an outright majority
on its own and may be having trouble getting past its 35%
core voter base. Yuliya Tymoshenko's BYuT is also running a
professional and well-financed campaign, and has enjoyed a
bounce in the polls that show her party running at above 2006
levels at 25% or more of the vote. President Yushchenko's
Our Ukraine-People's Self Defense Bloc has sagged in the
polls over the past few weeks, now hovering around 10% of the
vote. It is likely that the Communists will get past the 3%
threshold requirement into the Rada, with the possiblity of
one additional smaller party slipping over the threshold.
Unlike past elections, Russia, perhaps preoccupied with its
own parliamentary election campaign, has not played an overt
role in this campaign -- a fact many Ukrainians have noticed
and appreciated.


4. (C) There are only a small number of coalition
possibilities in play after the election. The first scenario
is that if the two orange parties combined get a majority,
then it is most likely that they will form an Orange
Government with Yuliya Tymoshenko returning as Prime
Minister. Even in this case, we don't rule out the
possibility that President Yushchenko will again flirt with
the idea of forming a broad coalition with his former rival
Viktor Yanukovych, especially if Regions offers him the
possibility of naming the Prime Minister. However, if the
orange parties do not have the votes, the ball will be in
Regions' court. This would lead to a second alternative of
Regions members convincing Yushchenko to join them in a broad
coalition, as a way to heal the East-West divide in the
country. A third alternative would be for Regions to opt for
a coalition with the Communist Party. Forming a government
with the Communist Party may appeal to some in Regions -- and
some believe to Moscow as well -- but such a coalition would
be difficult for Regions given Communist opposition to free
markets and liberal economic principles. They are also
likely to demand a number of key government posts, including
the Rada Speaker. Such a coalition would be the least
conducive to the pursuit of USG policies regarding Ukraine,
potentially slowing down Ukraine's integration into Europe
and the international economy.

KYIV 00002479 002 OF 002




5. (C) In spite of claims from all sides that these
elections will be marred by fraud by their opponents, the
pre-election campaign period has been remarkably free and
open; candidates have freely toured the country and there has
been a lively debate in the press about everything from
campaign platforms to questions of the appropriate use of
administrative resources and American spin-doctors. Although
politicized, the Central Election Commission is functioning.
While most experts believe that fraud could be a problem,
especially in a close election, none see a return to the
large-scale fraud visible in 2004-5 in the run-up to the
Orange Revolution. Those outside of Kyiv agree that civil
society and the balance between parties around the country
will ensure that no one gets away with stealing the election.
We and the 3500 international observers will look carefully
at potential problems associated with the accuracy of the
voters' lists, the liberal use of the mobile ballot box for
the elderly and infirm, and the striking of the names from
voter lists of those people outside of the country 72 hours
before election day.


6. (C) One troubling development is the appearance of tent
cities in Kyiv and pledges from the leaders of the major
political parties to use "people power" and tent cities to
ensure that the vote is not stolen away in favor of their
opponents. Although they are only lightly staffing these
tent cities now, Regions, BYuT and Our Ukraine-People's
Self-Defense have all said that they will rally their forces
in central Kyiv until the election results are final.
Although the police and military have been extremely correct
in the way that they have handled demonstrators, this large
mass of people in central Kyiv could increase the potential
for violence as the results of this close race are counted
and announced. The Central Election Commission should
announce a preliminary outcome on October 1 and then has 15
days to announce the final results of the election; however,
all of the parties are preparing court challenges that could
end up delaying the release of the final counts as lawyers
cross the country filing suits and counter-suits in
sympathetic courts.


7. (C) Long before the CEC comes up with its final results,
we expect the parties to engage in a dance of coalition
building that could either be completed within weeks or drag
on for months. In the worst case, continued court challenges
and parties refusing to take their seats in Parliament could
lead to confusion and uncertainty, and a continuation of the
political turmoil of the past six months. Whatever the
result, in the back of the minds of the big three, President
Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko,
is the question of the 2009 presidential elections. For
Yushchenko, the September 30 elections and his direct
participation in campaigning for OU-PSD have been a trial run
for 2009. The results have not been encouraging. For
Yanukovych, if his party maintains control of the parliament
this time, he could use the Premiership to make a successful
run for the Presidency that would give Regions full control
of the Government. And for Tymoshenko, a successful
restoration of an orange coalition and her premiership could
mean an agreement to back Yushchenko in the 2009 race;
alternatively, if Regions and OU form a coalition, Tymoshenko
is expected to begin work on her own presidential campaign
immediately.


8. (C) For the USG, our message of preferring certain
policies -- further democratic consolidation, economic reform
and integration into Europe -- but not specific parties or
coalitions, leaves us in a good position to embrace any
government that is formed as a result of democratic forces as
a bilateral partner. In spite of our early "preference" for
an orange coalition after the March 2006 elections,
Ukrainians give us credit for looking forward and working
with the democratically-elected Yanukovych Government this
past year. A strong USG statement on Monday, October 1 that
reflects the OSCE evaluation and fairly apportions credit and
blame for the conduct of this election will be important.
Now we just have to wait for the polls to open.


9. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor