UKRAINE: NATO, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ISSUES ENTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002417

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV NATO PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: NATO, RUSSIAN LANGUAGE ISSUES ENTER
ELECTION FRAY

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., James Pettit for reasons 1.4 (b
,d)


1. (C) Summary. Party of Regions' recent decision to call
for a referendum on neutrality (local shorthand for no NATO
membership),and an official status for the Russian language
resurrects divisive election themes, present in 2004 and
2006, that the major parties had tried to keep quiet so far
in this campaign. Number 4 on the Regions list Inna
Bohoslovska admitted to the Ambassador that this was a
campaign ploy to build support among core supporters, but it
may focus part of the debate on Ukraine's foreign orientation
and Euroatlantic aspirations. Polls show voters focused
primarily on bread-and-butter economic issues, and so far Our
Ukraine-People's Self Defense (OU-PSD) and Bloc Yuliya
Tymoshenko (BYuT) continue to emphasize anti-corruption and
social/economic core messages, avoiding a NATO/Russian
language debate that neither sees as in its interest.
However, Regions campaign manager Borys Kolesnikov told the
Ambassador that while there was a marketing aspect to raising
these issues, giving the Russian language official status was
also a campaign promise that Regions intended to keep.


2. (C) Comment. Just as in 2006, the campaign features a few
smaller parties beating the anti-NATO drum, primarily
Nataliya Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
(PSPU) and the Communists. However, Regions' decision to
raise the issue suggests it may be worried about support
levels in the East, and reflects their sense that this will
be a tight race. Regions leadership continue to cite the
possibility that the loss of two percentage points of support
could have significant impact in seat allocation in the new
Rada. While the near-term impact of the PoR referendum will
be damaging to NATO membership support levels, we anticipate
it will be more limited in scope than the anti-NATO effort
launched by the Ne Tak! bloc prior to the 2006 elections. We
doubt that PoR is fully committed to the referendum issue as
a post-election core goal, and anticipate that the initiative
will be allowed to fade once it has served its purpose of
energizing core voters. However, some members of Regions are
likely to advocate for Russian language being granted
official status, even after the elections. End Summary and
Comment.

NATO/Russian Language Referendum
--------------


3. (C) The Party of Regions (PoR) on September 6 announced
its intention to push for a referendum including questions on
making Russian an official state language and supporting
nonbloc status for Ukraine. Prior to the referendum
announcement, PoR had generally refrained from interjecting
either NATO or Russia/Russian language issues into the
campaign, in sharp contrast with the 2004 and 2006 campaigns.
Inna Bohoslovska, fourth on the PoR list, told the
Ambassador during a September 6 meeting that PoR had to raise
NATO and Russian-language issues, otherwise "we won't win".
Kolesnikov told the Ambassador September 18 that Regions had
polling data that said 66 percent of Ukrainians support
Ukraine's neutrality and 54 percent support official status
for Russian language, with the number jumping to 85 percent
in the East -- so part of the referendum was marketing to
boost support. He cautioned, however, that Russia and
Russian language were part of Ukraine's history and sooner or
later, his party would get two state languages; the preterm
elections had just made it sooner.


4. (SBU) The announcement is aimed at preempting other
parties, primarily the Communists and PSPU, on these issues
and solidifying core support. The signature-gathering
process -- PoR has a nine million signature target, although
only three million are required -- will provide PoR with
another opportunity to raise NATO/Russian-language directly
with voters. This behavior mirrors Regions' 2006 campaign,
where the party's official platform made no mention of NATO
or Russian language, but then they stumped for these issues
as loudly as the leftist parties.


5. (SBU) Our Ukraine has stayed away from these issues
publicly, focusing almost exclusively on its core
anti-corruption message. Following the referendum
announcement FM Yatsenyuk, third on the OU-PSD list,
criticized Regions, stating that "the decision on NATO should
be made by politicians elected by people. Don't attract
attention to things Ukrainians don't need today, solve vital
problems instead." OU-PSD is banking on opinion polls that
show the referendum issues trailing bread-and-butter concerns
among
voters.


6. (SBU) Yuliya Tymoshenko has refrained from publicly

KYIV 00002417 002 OF 002


joining the NATO fray, limiting herself to subtle digs at PM
Yanukovych's ties to Russia. She recently demanded that
Yanukovych confirm or deny reports that his recent vacation
in Altai was paid for by Russian billionaire Vladimir
Yevtushenkov, who BYuT claims is interested in the upcoming
privatization of communications giant Ukrtelecom. Tymoshenko
foreign policy advisor Hryhoriy Nemyria recently told
Ambassador that he viewed the referendum as a sign of
weakness on the part of Regions, signaling a loss of
confidence. He noted that BYuT polling showed NATO and
Russian language issues very low on a list of voter concerns.
Only PSPU leader Nataliya
Vitrenko has maintained a steady drumbeat of anti-NATO
rhetoric throughout the campaign.

A Different Party Landscape
--------------


7. (SBU) The most outspoken proponent in 2006 election of the
pro-Russian and anti-NATO/US views as main campaign message
was the Ne Tak! bloc, which is not on the ballot this time.
Ne Tak! was extremely vocal and well financed -- it launched
an anti-NATO referendum campaign similar to the current PoR
effort that had a sharp negative effect on public support
levels for alliance membership. Although the 2006 referendum
gathered sufficient signatures to be brought before the
electorate, it received a pocket-veto from President
Yushchenko as the Constitution contains no time limit for
Presidential review of a proposed referendum.


8. (SBU) Vitrenko's PSPU received strong financial support in
2006 from Russian businessman Maksim Kurochkin (shot dead in
Kyiv this winter),but has seemed to lack the same deep
pockets in 2007. Current polling has the PSPU well below the
3-percent hurdle (it fell just short in 2006). Similarly, the
Communist Party ran a strongly anti-West/NATO campaign in
2006 and is doing so again in 2007. These parties efforts
have been supported to some degree by second-tier Russian
politicians, such as Aleksandr Dugin, Konstantin Zatulin,
Kirill Frolov, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, making the same
anti-West/NATO statements in Southern Ukraine and Crimea.

Signal to Moscow?
--------------


9. (C) During a September 10 meeting, OU-PSD head Yuriy
Lutsenko told the Ambassador that the referendum was a signal
of increased Yanukovych/Moscow ties, and that Putin wanted
the anti-NATO, pro-Russian language issues raised as a way to
signal Russian voters that things were "going right for them
in Ukraine." Serhiy Taran, a Kyiv political analyst, has
described the current campaign as the first instance since
Ukrainian independence that "Russia has not made a strong
official statement about
Ukrainian politics." Taran believes Russia is unsure of who
could serve as a reliable partner in Ukraine, and that the
upcoming Russian election has focused top-level Russian
politicians on domestic issues.


10. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor