UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE TALKING POINTS DELIVERED:

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001459

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017
TAGS: MARR MCAP PARM OPRC PREL RS AZ US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE TALKING POINTS DELIVERED:
FURTHER QUESTIONS

REF: A. STATE 80555


B. STATE 77010

C. KYIV 779

D. KYIV 615

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) This is a request for guidance. See para 6.


2. (U) Ambassador, accompanied by Army Attache and poloff,
met with Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko June 11 to
deliver the response to Ukrainian missile defense questions
(ref B). We provided written talking points, a Ukrainian
courtesy translation, and the power-point briefing slides.
Hrytsenko thanked Ambassador for the information, and then
clarified that he was seeking not an unattributed non-paper
but a signed, official communication with the U.S. position.
He was specifically seeking a response for three questions to
which Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt. Gen Obering
had provided oral, affirmative answers during his visit to
Kyiv (ref D). In amplifying remarks, Hrytsenko suggested
that U.S. willingness to undertake certain steps could
function as a kind of security and confidence building
measure that he wanted to be able to share (presumably with
the Russians, among others) to allay fears and counter
Russian arguments.


3. (U) Hrytsenko continued that the three questions were:

-- Would the U.S. be willing to share early warning data
regarding missile launches with third countries?

-- Would the U.S. be willing to permit "verification" visits,
to ensure that the Polish and Czech facilities were being
maintained and operated according to U.S. stated intentions?

-- Would the U.S. be willing to allow the stationing of
Ukrainian, Russian, or other third-country experts at the
facilities?

On the last question, Hrytsenko noted the main reason for
wanting Russians (and Ukrainians) on site was to take away
the threat of Russians targeting the facilities.


4. (C) When we tried to explain that more explicit language
regarding U.S. willingness to host visits had been precluded
by Czech and Polish sensitivities, Hrytsenko reacted
skeptically. He argued that he could convince his Polish and
Czech counterparts "in five minutes." The statement was not
about what the U.S. would do, but what the U.S. would be
willing to do, which did not in fact require Polish or Czech
agreement. He dismissed our point that the domestic
political situation in both countries made Czech and Polish
officials reluctant to make such controversial statements.
Domestic opposition in the two countries, Hrytsenko rebutted,
would welcome statements that met Russian concerns halfway.
He opined that the U.S. had not tried very hard to convince
its allies.


5. (C) Ambassador also asked for Hrytsenko's reaction
regarding the Russian proposal to use the Gabala radar in
Azerbaijan (ref A). Ambassador noted the Gabala radar would
likely not substitute for the planned facilities, but might
be employed in addition. Hrytsenko opined that use of the
existing Russian strategic warning systems, including the
radar in Ukraine, would be a good step that demonstrated that
missile defense also protected Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
as well as Western Europe.


6. (U) Request that Department coordinate with MDA either to
issue a letter containing ref B talking points or to
authorize us to transmit the talking points under cover of
our transmittal letter. We further request that Department
provide a letter with responses to Hrytsenko's three
additional questions.


7. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor