Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV133
2007-01-19 14:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE

Tags:  PREL PBTS OPDC UNMIK UN YI MD RS UP 
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VZCZCXRO2960
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #0133 0191423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191423Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0962
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000133 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS OPDC UNMIK UN YI MD RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE
DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 5652


B. KYIV 4413

Classified By: Acting DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 000133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS OPDC UNMIK UN YI MD RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KOSOVO STATUS PROCESS TIMELINE: DEMARCHE
DELIVERED

REF: A. STATE 5652


B. KYIV 4413

Classified By: Acting DCM Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary/comment: In view of Ukrainian officials'
previous concerns about the impact of Kosovo independence on
"frozen conflicts" in Moldova and elsewhere, acting DCM drew
on ref A background to brief DFM Veselovsky January 18 on the
Kosovo settlement process. While underscoring that Ukraine's
views did not support the Russian position, Veselovsky urged
the U.S. to move slowly and on the basis of a consensus by
parties concerned on the way forward. Veselovsky's comments
represented an incremental change in the Ukrainian position.
While he obliquely noted the impact that Kosovo settlement
would have on "frozen conflicts" and urged a "go-slow"
approach, Veselovsky did not appear to dispute that Kosovo
would eventually have to become independent. End
summary/comment.


2. (C) Drawing on ref A background, acting DCM and poloff
notetaker met January 18 with Deputy Foreign Minister Andriy
Veselovsky and MFA First Secretary Ihor Kulish to brief them
on U.S. expectations for developments in Kosovo after the
January 21 Serbian parliamentary elections. Noting that EUR
A/S Fried had said as much during the November 16 political
directors meeting in Kyiv (ref B),A/DCM stressed that the
U.S. saw no alternative to independence for Kosovo. UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari was developing a comprehensive
Kosovo settlement package, on which he would consult with
both Belgrade and Pristina. By March, he would present the
package to the UN Security Council, paving the way for a new
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to replace UNSCR 1244.
(On the last point, Veselovsky expressed skepticism that a
new UNSCR would be possible in the face of Russian opposition
to Kosovo independence.) A/DCM emphasized that a united U.S.
and European position was essential to the success of the
timeline.


3. (C) Veselovsky thanked A/DCM and said the information
would be helpful as the Ukrainian government reviewed its
position. He perhaps put more weight on the importance of
the Serbian elections than did the U.S., and would not want
to predetermine actions before the event. He then drew our
attention to a January 16 Moldovan news agency Infotag report
of Romanian President Traian Basescu's visit to Chisinau the
same day. Basescu's comments were important from two
aspects. First, he made a connection between Kosovo and
Transnistria and, second, he said Moldova's territorial
integrity should be preserved, as it should be in Kosovo.
Veselovsky said he understood that other EU countries shared
the Romanian view and that the EU might not be so willing to
proceed according to the timeline that A/DCM had briefed.


4. (U) Note: In the report, Basescu and Moldovan President
Vladimir Voronin agreed that Kosovo settlement would affect,
even if indirectly, prospects for resolving the Transnistrian
conflict. Basescu is also reported as saying Transnistrian
settlement should be based on three requirements: Moldova's
territorial integrity, inviolability of Moldova's borders,
and no granting of collective rights to ethnic minorities.
Basescu felt that ethnic minorities should be granted rights,
but not rights that would lead to the creation of other
states. End note.


5. (C) Veselovsky said he did not want Ukraine to be lumped
with Russia regarding Kosovo. Russia was interested in
preserving its position in the Balkans and undercutting the
European Union and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Ukraine, on
the other hand, wished to support the EU and Moldova. His
remarks were directed toward reaching common goals, but doing
it in way that was better and more certain. Living as he did
in Europe, he understood the sensitive implications of
changing national boundaries and adjusting borders to match
ethnic communities. The principle that changes would be made
only upon the mutual agreement of the parties concerned was
an important one that had to be preserved. He urged the U.S.
to consider some preliminary stage for Kosovo, perhaps some
sort of protectorate under EU auspices, that would allow
Serbia to adjust to its changed relationship to Kosovo. This
approach should be developed as a back-up, in the event that
the situation in the Balkans should turn violent and in case
the UN Security Council needed to review its Kosovo policy.
He conceded that the international community could not go
back, but he cautioned against going forward too quickly.


6. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor