Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KYIV1299
2007-05-25 14:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: MANPADS FOR DESTRUCTION AND

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL PARM NATO PINR US UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKV #1299/01 1451445
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251445Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2471
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0034
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T KYIV 001299 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA, EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PARM NATO PINR US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MANPADS FOR DESTRUCTION AND
COUNTERMEASURES DEVELOPMENT -- FURTHER UPDATES

REF: A. KYIV 1104

B. STATE 65709

C. KYIV 751

D. KYIV 210

E. KYIV 163

F. STATE 5539

Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d)

S E C R E T KYIV 001299

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR PM/WRA, EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PARM NATO PINR US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MANPADS FOR DESTRUCTION AND
COUNTERMEASURES DEVELOPMENT -- FURTHER UPDATES

REF: A. KYIV 1104

B. STATE 65709

C. KYIV 751

D. KYIV 210

E. KYIV 163

F. STATE 5539

Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,c,d)


1. (S) Summary: Deputy Defense Minister Tereshchenko told
visiting PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner May 16 that
the Ukrainian offer to provide 2,101 Man-Portable Air Defense
System (MANPADS) missiles and 582 gripstocks (ref E) for the
NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction project had been made in
error. MoD would only be able to provide 382 Strela missiles
and 197 gripstocks for destruction. Costner said the U.S.
would not be able to contribute an additional $2 million to
the Trust Fund project for the destruction of larger caliber
conventional munitions, since the additional funds had been
in response to agreement on the destruction of the 2,101
missiles and not the significantly lower, new figure.
Tereshchenko also confirmed the information transmitted ref A
that the Ukrainian MoD would be unable to provide Igla or
Igla-1 missiles for any purpose, but suggested unofficially
that 140 such missiles, currently not in operational
condition, might be overhauled sufficiently to meet U.S.
testing purposes. He would discuss the possible transfer of
the missiles with the Defense Minister and hoped to provide a
follow-up in the form of a letter during the week of May 21.
During a May 17 meeting, MFA Arms Control Director Belashov
explained that a new Interdepartmental Commission for
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy had
made the decision on April 12 not to sell or dispose of Igla
and Igla-1 missiles until 2011. End summary.

A High-Level Decision
--------------


2. (U) PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner, DOD official
Jim Lake and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Aircraft

Protection Program Executive Doctor Herman Rediess, during a
May 15-18 visit to Kyiv, met with Deputy Defense Minister
Volodymyr Tereshchenko and separately with MFA Arms Control
Department Director Volodymyr Belashov. Although Belashov's
meeting occurred later, on May 17, his comments put
Tereshchenko's into context and are provided first. MFA Arms
Control Department Third Secretary Konstantin Ivashchenko was
Belashov's notetaker.


3. (S) Belashov indicated that the written response provided
to Embassy May 9 (ref A) of the Ukrainian government refusal
of a U.S. request for a mixture of 500 Igla-1 and 1,000 Igla
MANPADS missiles for countermeasures development (ref D) had
been the result of a high-level interagency meeting held
April 12. (Note: In a March 6 decree, President Yushchenko
reorganized the Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation
and Export Control Policy, of which Belashov had been a
member, into a higher-level Interdepartmental Commission for
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy.
Belashov earlier told us the deputy ministers of the relevant
ministries were members of the commission. The decree
designated National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) First
Deputy Secretary Valeriy Khoroshkovsky as the Commission's
chairman (who has since resigned from his NSDC position) and
subordinated the Commission to the NSDC. A news story noted
the Commission would have particular responsibility to
"handle proposals on maintaining, limiting, terminating, or
restoring military and technical cooperation with other
countries.")


4. (S) Belashov said he had a written statement of the
Commission's decision, which, unfortunately, he was unable to
provide to the visiting delegation. The Commission and the
NSDC had decided not to transfer or dispose of any Igla or
Igla-1 missiles until 2011 and had instructed MFA to so
inform the U.S. He did not know why the limitation only
applied until 2011. MFA helped coordinate on the issues of
cooperation on MANPADS countermeasures development and the
NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction project, but MoD had the lead
on both; he implied that MoD had acted hastily and improperly
in suggesting earlier that Igla and Igla-1 missiles were
available. (Note: Belashov's further comments made clear
that the paper he was drawing from was the same as the one
that Embassy received May 9. He had just returned from the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, JCIC, meeting in
Geneva, and so was unaware that the paper had already been
passed. He reacted with a flash of anger directed at his

subordinate, Oleh Belokolos, when we said we thought we had
received a copy. Belokolos later told us that he had
satisfactorily justified his actions to Belashov.)

Walking Back an MOD Offer
--------------


5. (S) During the May 16 meeting with Tereshchenko, Costner
reviewed MoD's support to the NATO PfP Trust Fund destruction
project and deployed the points in ref B to urge MoD to
respond positively to the U.S. request for MANPADS missiles
for countermeasures development purposes. He stressed that
the U.S. was prepared to consider a deal that included fewer
than the 1,500 missiles requested. Rediess provided a
detailed briefing on DHS efforts to reduce the terrorist
threat of MANPADS to civil aviation.


6. (S) Tereshchenko said he had met May 15 with the military
General Staff to get an update on the status of MoD's
response to the U.S. requests. As a result of this input, he
could clarify that MoD was prepared to provide 382 Strela
missiles and 197 gripstocks for the NATO-PfP destruction
project. When questioned, he said the Strela missiles were
all that were available for destruction. Costner recalled
that Tereshchenko had earlier offered to provide 2,101
missiles and 582 gripstocks for the destruction project, in
return for which the U.S. had agreed to provide $2 million to
the project specifically to address Ukraine's priority for
destruction of large-caliber munitions. Costner had been
consulting extensively with the NATO Maintenance and Supply
Agency to amend the original destruction project plans on the
basis of this agreement. The reduced number of missiles for
destruction could not justify the additional U.S.
contribution, which would also not be pro-rated for the
smaller figure.


7. (S) Tereshchenko weakly explained that the 2,101 missiles
had been the number available for destruction and for
commercial sale together, and that poor staff work had
resulted in the misunderstanding that all the missiles could
be provided for the destruction project. If the U.S. was
interested in acquiring Strela MANPADS missiles (i.e., SA-7s
and SA-14s) on a commercial basis, MoD could provide the
offer to the Cabinet of Ministers for its consideration. For
now, however, no Igla-1 or Igla missiles (i.e., SA-16s or
SA-18s) were available either for sale or destruction. He
had met with the Defense Minister May 15 and would meet him
again to report on the outcome of his meeting with Costner
and his colleagues. Tereshchenko would urge the Defense
Minister to reconsider the Ukrainian position on Igla and
Igla-1 missiles.


8. (S) Stressing that he was speaking off-the-record and
personally, Tereshchenko said MoD had 140 "Igla" (during the
discussion, Tereshchenko seemed to be using Igla to refer to
both Igla or Igla-1 missiles) that were in "category three"
condition, or not operational. The missiles could be
overhauled and put into operational condition. Tereshchenko
asked for a written U.S. request for MANPADS missiles to be
used as a basis for considering the option of providing the
category three Iglas to the U.S. When Costner said such a
written request had been provided by Ambassador Taylor to
Defense Minister Hrytsenko shortly after Costner's last visit
in January (ref D),Tereshchenko said he would have his staff
locate the letter. He would meet with Hrytsenko and the
Chief of the General Staff and hoped to provide a written
response on the possible transfer of the 140 Igla missiles
during the week of May 21. (Note: According to Belashov,
final approval for such a transfer would not be up to
Hrytsenko and/or the C
hief of the General Staff alone, but would have to be
approved by the Interdepartmental Commission for
Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control Policy,
given the Commission's April 12 decision. End note.)


9. (S) Costner stated that he realized these were not easy
decisions for the GOU, but stressed that the USG had
intentionally made proposals that would be mutually
beneficial: Regarding destruction, in return for the
missiles the GOU would receive much needed funds to address
its top priority for destruction - larger caliber munitions.
Regarding acquisition, the USG offered detailed briefings on
our MANPADS countermeasures testing program, an invitation
for Ukrainian representatives to attend live-fire tests at
White Sands New Mexico in the fall, an exchange of
exploitation data resulting from those tests, and an offer of
a U.S. assessment of the vulnerability of aircraft departing

and leaving Boryspil airport to MANPADS attacks. Costner
urged Tereshchenko and his colleagues to once more review the
two proposals as joint cooperative efforts to address
mutually beneficial goals.

Ukrainian Countermeasures Presentation
--------------


10. (C) Consistent with the offer made in late March (ref C),
on May 17, the ADRON Research and Development Company, Ltd.
hosted the U.S. delegation to provide a briefing on its
"Adros" infrared countermeasures system for combating MANPADS
launches. After the briefing and a detailed question and
answer session, Costner made clear that U.S. experts would
study the information, but that he could make no assurances
regarding future consultations or potential purchases.
(Note: The subsequent preliminary assessment by Dr. Rediess
of DHS was that the Ukrainian system did not meet the more
stringent requirements set forth for U.S. countermeasures
systems. This position has not yet been provided to ADRON or
GOU representatives, but likely will be communicated in the
course of future MANPADS consultations. End note.)


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor