Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUWAIT506
2007-04-08 12:35:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

CHARGE DISCUSSES CEIP NEXT STEPS WITH INTERIOR

Tags:  EPET ASEC PTER KCIP KU 
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VZCZCXRO7958
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0506/01 0981235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081235Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8728
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000506 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/ATA, S/CT, NEA/APR, EB/ESC/IEC; DOE FOR
KOLEVAR; NSC FOR JESSEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2017
TAGS: EPET ASEC PTER KCIP KU
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES CEIP NEXT STEPS WITH INTERIOR
MINISTRY, COAST GUARD, AND KUWAIT OIL COMPANY

REF: A. KUWAIT 419

B. KUWAIT 431

C. KUWAIT 448

D. KUWAIT 460

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000506

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR DS/ATA, S/CT, NEA/APR, EB/ESC/IEC; DOE FOR
KOLEVAR; NSC FOR JESSEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2017
TAGS: EPET ASEC PTER KCIP KU
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES CEIP NEXT STEPS WITH INTERIOR
MINISTRY, COAST GUARD, AND KUWAIT OIL COMPANY

REF: A. KUWAIT 419

B. KUWAIT 431

C. KUWAIT 448

D. KUWAIT 460

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d).


1. (U) This cable contains an action request, see paragraph

4.


2. (S/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On April 7 and 8, CDA and
Econoff met separately with Ministry of Interior (MOI) Under
Secretary Nasser Al-Othman, Deputy Director of the Kuwait

SIPDIS
Coast Guard (KCG) Colonel Abdullah Bin-Naji, and Kuwait Oil
Company (KOC) Chairman and Managing Director Farouk Al-Zanki
to discuss next steps for Critical Energy Infrastructure
Protection (CEIP). CDA briefed all interlocutors on the
preliminary findings and recommendations of the Dept-DOE-DHS
team, which conducted a CEIP assessment in Kuwait from 14-21
March. CDA explained that the team's detailed final report
would be made available in about three weeks, but emphasized
that there were several recommendations that could be acted
on immediately. He provided them with a written summary of
short-term and medium-to-long-term recommendations, referred
to significant CEIP efforts being undertaken by other Gulf
oil producers, and emphasized that the USG wanted to ensure
that Kuwait did not become the softest target in the Gulf in
terms of CEIP. Al-Othman of MOI thanked CDA for the
Embassy's support and recommendations but pointed to the
K-companies (Kuwait's various state-owned petroleum
companies) as the source of most of the security gaps. He
promised to organize a "joint staff" to study the final
report and discuss implementation. Bin-Naji of the KCG said
he was eager to work with the K-companies to close security
gaps, and welcomed Kuwait National Petroleum Company's (KNPC)
proposal to establish a service level agreement with the KCG
(Ref. D). He emphasized the importance of having all of the
relevant agencies sitting at the same table to receive and
comment on the final report. Al-Zanki of KOC said that his

company had been working closely with British security
contractor ArmorGroup to install additional surveillance
cameras, enhance perimeter security around tank farms, and
increase the number of patrols around pipelines and gathering
centers. He suggested that the K-companies were resisting a
previously stated objective to consolidate all K-company
security functions within a single subsidiary (Oil Sector
Services Company or OSSCo),as they lacked confidence that
OSSCo would adequately protect their facilities. Al-Zanki
said he and his K-company colleagues were in favor of
retaining ownership and control of security within each of
the individual companies. Within this framework, OSSCo would
retain responsibility for training security personnel and
coordinating security activities among the individual
K-companies.


3. (S/NF) The meetings highlighted the MOI's continued
resistance to taking ownership of its security obligations at
critical facilities, and the K-companies' reticence to
handing over control of their security decisions to another
agency. Post's experience has been that the K-companies,
while far from perfect, are much more forward-leaning than
the MOI when it comes to CEIP. Many of the most significant
vulnerabilities noted during the assessment concerned
security around the perimeter of oil facilities, which falls
under the purview of the MOI, not the K-companies. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


4. (C/NF) ACTION REQUEST: Most of the Ambassador's and
CDA's discussions with Kuwaiti agencies following the CEIP
assessment (reftels) have indicated that Government agencies
and the K-companies will want to discuss the findings and
recommendations of the USG team's final report in fine
detail. Since we expect that the Kuwaitis will seek
clarification and amplification of a number of the
recommendations, as well as advice on implementation, Post
requests that USG CEIP experts be made available to present
the final report to the Kuwaitis and address specific
technical questions that arise.


5. (S/NF) On April 7, CDA and Econoff met with MOI Under
Secretary Nasser Al-Othman to discuss CEIP next steps.

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Al-Othman welcomed the CEIP team's recommendations but
suggested that many of the security gaps identified were the
fault of the K-companies. He said that the problem was with
the "mentality of the leaders of the oil companies," who were

KUWAIT 00000506 002 OF 003


"too relaxed because of the favorable security situation in
Kuwait." Saying "One hand cannot clap alone," Al-Othman
insisted that the Government cannot provide perfect security
without the active collaboration of the K-companies, which he
characterized as unwilling to invest their windfall profits
into security enhancements. Al-Othman pointed to recent
actions that the MOI had taken to improve CEIP including the
construction of a security control center at Shuaiba refinery
and the restructuring of the MOI's Vital Installations Group.
He said that the MOI was conscious of the threat, but
considered this threat to be exclusively external. Al-Othman
strongly supported the USG team's recommendation that each of
the K-companies should appoint an executive-level security
manager with his own budget and staff. He expressed his
desire to continue the MOI's cooperation with the USG on CEIP
and promised to create a "joint staff" to study the USG
team's final report and discuss implementation.


6. (S/NF) Later on April 7, CDA and Econoff met with KCG
Deputy Director Colonel Abdullah Bin-Naji to discuss the
Coast Guard's role in CEIP. Bin-Naji welcomed the team's
recommendations and agreed that early and significant action
was needed to improve the maritime security around Kuwait's
export facilities and refineries. Bin-Naji and Flotilla
Department Director Colonel Saleh Al-Fodari explained that
the KCG currently has one patrol boat and one speed boat
assigned daily to patrol the maritime exclusion zone around
the oil facilities. Both officers acknowledged that the
exclusion zone is currently too large and the KCG too
under-resourced for patrolling and interdiction in this zone
to be effective. Bin-Naji said the KCG would want to study
the final report before making any decisions about redrawing
exclusion areas. Al-Fodari said that, in addition to the
need for better communication and coordination across
agencies, there was a clear need for better intelligence
sharing. Bin-Naji said that the KCG meets weekly with the
K-companies and that both were working together to close gaps
in maritime security. He stressed the importance of having
all of the relevant agencies sitting at the same table to
receive and comment on the final report, and he welcomed
KNPC's suggestion that a service level agreement be
established between KNPC and the KCG to clearly delineate
security requirements (Ref. D).


7. (S/NF) On April 8, CDA and Econoff met with KOC Chairman
and Managing Director Farouk Al-Zanki to brief him on the
initial findings from the assessment and discuss KOC's next
steps. (Note: KOC is the upstream K-company responsible for
drilling and exploration in Kuwait. It owns and operates
wells, gathering centers, crude pipelines, crude tank farms,
and crude export facilities. It does not own or operate the
refineries, which belong to KNPC.) Al-Zanki said he had been
made aware of the CEIP assessment by his security officer,
and he welcomed the preliminary recommendations. Al-Zanki
said KOC was working closely with British security contractor
ArmorGroup to install additional surveillance cameras,
reinforce perimeter security around the North and South tank
farms, and increase the number and frequency of private
security patrols around pipelines and gathering centers.
Al-Zanki identified the mixing manifold, the South tank farm,
and the export terminals as being KOC's most critical points
to protect. Contrary to what Post has been told previously
about security responsibilities within the K-companies,
Al-Zanki said that it was unlikely that the Oil Sector
Services Company (OSSCo) would assume control of all
K-company security functions. Al-Zanki explained that the
individual K-companies were pushing back against this policy
since they found physical security too critical to be
outsourced to another subsidiary. CDA agreed, pointing out
that the USG team recommended that each of the K-companies
establish an executive level security manager with his own
staff and budget. Al-Zanki said OSSCo's role in security
would likely be limited to training K-company security
personnel and coordinating security activities among the
individual K-companies.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s



Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:


KUWAIT 00000506 003 OF 003


http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/

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Tueller