U.S.-GOK DISCUSS SECURITY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000455

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA/ARP, S/WCI, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PHUM KU TERRORISM
SUBJECT: U.S.-GOK DISCUSS SECURITY MEASURES NECESSARY FOR
GUANTANAMO DETAINEE TRANSFER

REF: A. KUWAIT 319

B. 06 KUWAIT 4582

C. 06 KUWAIT 4429

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
).


1. (S) Summary. A visiting USG interagency delegation
discussed concerns about possible transfer of the four
remaining Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo with GOK officials
on March 24. USG delegation told the GOK officials that the
remaining detainees were significantly more dangerous than
those previously released to Kuwait. The delegation stressed
that the need for heightened post-trial GOK measures aimed at
mitigating the likelihood that the detainees would "return to
the fight" was the key USG concern rather than heightened
focus on successful GOK prosecutions. GOK officials detailed
the monitoring and mitigation actions taken against the
previously released detainees as some options for dealing
with additional transferees. The GOK stressed the importance
of family interaction in rehabilitating detainees already
transferred, claiming that none had engaged in extremist
activities since their return to Kuwait. GOK officials
described assistance it provided to former detainees and also
GOK disincentives aimed at the detainees and their families
for detainees' failure to meet expected standards of
behavior. The USG delegation stressed the importance of
heightened and robust measures above what was already in
place against detainees already transferred to Kuwait. The
USG delegation invited the GOK to send a delegation to
Guantanamo to assess how best to structure the heightened
mitigation measures necessary. The meeting concluded with
the expectation that the GOK would attempt to formulate the
heightened measures it would take toward the remaining four
detainees and communicate the measures to the USG. End
summary.


2. (S) On March 24, U.S. delegation members Christopher
Camponovo (NSC),Alan Liotta (DoD),Andrew Morrison (DoS),
and Marisa Porges (DoD) met with GOK's Khaled Al-Maqamis,
Director of Coordination and Follow-up, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; Sultan Abu Jarwa Assistant Undersecretary, Ministry
of Justice;, and three Kuwait State Security officials:
Abdullah Al-Kandari, Counterterrorism Department Director;
Abdullah Al-Rashid, Counterterrorism Department Deputy
Director; and Hamdi Al-Abdullah Counterterrorism Department
Deputy Director, and discussed measures needed to allow the
possible future transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti
nationals detained at Guantanamo Naval Base.


3. (S) Camponovo said at the outset of the meeting that the
remaining four Kuwaiti detainees at Guantanamo were
substantially more dangerous than previously released Kuwaiti
detainees and had not yet been approved for transfer.
Camponovo said that the U.S. was concerned given that all
previous detainees had been released following acquittals by
Kuwaiti courts on terrorism charges. (Note: All eight
detainees returned to Kuwait thus far have been prosecuted
and found not guilty. The GOK is currently appealing to
Kuwait's highest court the not guilty verdicts of five of the
detainees. The GOK officials also reported that one of the
previously transferred detainees, Nasser Al-Mutairi, had
recently died. End note.)

Prosecution Option
--------------


4. (S) Camponovo said that prosecutions were only part of the
equation, noting that in other countries only a few detainees
transferred to their home countries had been successfully
prosecuted. For this reason, the U.S. is particularly
interested in what measures, beyond prosecution, the GOK
could take to mitigate the threat that these detainees would
"return to the fight." Liotta concurred with this, noting
that in many countries counter-terrorism laws had not proved
effective in obtaining convictions against known terrorists.


5. (S) The MOJ's Jarwa said that GOK actions must adhere to
Kuwaiti law. He said that 95% of the evidence used in the
prosecutions of detainees already tried by the GOK had been
statements provided by the USG from questioning at
Guantanamo. He said the defendants refused to admit the
truth of the USG-supplied statements in the Kuwait trials.
He said that the defense attorneys cited reports of detainee
abuse at Guantanamo and that this seriously undermined the
credibility of the statements. Jarwa underscored this point
by stating that the evidence supplied to the GOK to date

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lacked credibility.


6. (S) Morrison asked if the courts had considered sending
officials to Guantanamo to take depositions from potential
witnesses. Jarwa was not sure if this would be possible
under Kuwaiti law or logistically practical. Liotta asked if
there were ways to maximize the pre-trial and trial periods
by bringing multiple charges against each defendant. Abu
Jarwa replied that multiple charges would be combined into a
single case if they were considered related. If considered
unrelated they might be tried in separate trials.


7. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK had a program aimed at
all prisoners in which imams "well-schooled in the Quran"
sought to spread the understanding that Islam does not
support extremism. He also described the GOK's broader
efforts to educate religious leaders and the general public
on principles of moderation. He said there was no program
specifically directed at Guantanamo returnees.

Post-trial Options
--------------


8. (S) KSS Director Al-Kandari said that post-trial release
mitigation efforts on detainees/returnees already released
consisted of:

- Monitoring their travel abroad through arrangements with
their counterparts in neighboring countries. (He said that
thus far none of the eight detainees already returned had
traveled outside Kuwait.)
- Daily monitoring of their activities in Kuwait including
who they met, where they went;
- All information collected was entered into a database;
- Families sign oaths that they will monitor the actions of
the returnee;
- Returnees also sign oaths that they will abide by the laws
of Kuwait;


9. (S) MFA Al-Maqamis stressed that the key to
mitigation/rehabilitation was the families of the returnees.
He said previously the families were unaware of the
returnees' extremist activities but that now they were very
aware and concerned particularly about avoiding further
punishment for their family members. He said that family
interaction played a key role in rehabilitating these
individuals noting that none of the former Guantanamo
detainees had engaged in any extremist activities since
returning to Kuwait. He claimed that they were "changed
persons" who were now "rational and calm." Morrison asked
how the KSS would characterize the families of the remaining
four detainees at Guantanamo: i.e. whether they would be
likely to support rehabilitation efforts. Al-Maqamis said
the four families had grown close over the years but did not
provide any details on their possible willingness to help
wean the returnees from the extremist Islamist cause.


10. (S) Al-Maqamis said that the GOK provided assistance to
the returnees to help the reintegration process including
finding jobs. Al-Maqamis said the level of compliance by the
returnee and the families determined the level of support
provided by the GOK and that inadequate compliance resulted
in less assistance. In more serious instances, the GOK would
make it difficult for the returnee and his family to find
jobs, obtain necessary official documents, including
passports, and to receive other forms of government services.
But he did not provide examples of cases where this had been
effective in the past. In response to Camponovo,s
questions, the KSS officials noted that they were limited in
the sort of monitoring they could carry out; for example, a
court order is required to search bank records. Porges asked
how restrictive the GOK could be in denying passports. He
replied that the Ministry could defer issuance for up to five
years in cases of lost passports. However, individuals could
challenge delays in passport issuance; this has not yet
become an issue, as none of the returnees have applied for
passports.


11. (S) In response to a question from Maqamis, Liotta said
that the assurances given by the GOK in the agreement to
transfer previous detainees would not change. He stressed
that the implementation measures in support of those
assurances would need to be substantially more robust to
permit the transfer of the remaining four Kuwaiti detainees.
He said that the USG would provide further information to the
GOK on the remaining detainees but reiterated that
prosecution was only part of what should be a comprehensive

KUWAIT 00000455 003 OF 003


approach to preventing the detainees from returning to
terrorism.


12. (S) In response to Camponovo's inquiry, the GOK officials
said that it might be possible to craft an agreement between
the detainees and the GOK that conditioned their return on
acceptance of heightened requirements for the detainees after
their return to Kuwait such as regular meetings with GOK
security officials, restrictions on movements/activities,
regular meetings with "moderation counselors." Camponovo
said that a similar agreement had been reached between the
United Kingdom and one of its nationals detained at
Guantanamo. The GOK requested a copy of that agreement.


13. (S) Liotta invited the GOK to send a team of GOK
officials to Guantanamo to visit the detainees for the
purpose of evaluating how the GOK mitigation plan might be
strengthened. The team could include officials from the
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Religious Affairs and
others. He noted that this visit was not a precondition to
transfer of the detainees but that it would give the GOK an
opportunity to evaluate the detainees individually and
determine an appropriate response in each case.


14. (S) At the conclusion of the meeting, the US delegation
agreed to provide additional releasable information on the
detainees. The GOK will then provide a response to the
invitation to visit Guantanamo and a comprehensive proposal
of measures they would plan to take with regard to the
remaining detainees.


15. (S/NF) DELEGATION COMMENTS: While the meetings increased
GOK,s awareness of the importance of post-transfer security
efforts, it was clear that the GOK has limited, if any,
capability to effectively implement additional security
measures. Prosecution is not a viable option, so ultimately
any assurances will rest on the credibility of the
organization offering them. For example, the KSS was quite
straightforward in their limited ability to monitor and keep
track of returned detainees once released from GOK control,
despite a willingness to do so based on the threat the
detainee presents. The delegation was convinced that
although the MOJ, MOI, and KSS officials understood the basis
for our heightened security requirements, follow-up will
likely be required at more senior levels to ensure
Minister-level support for these efforts.


16. This cable was cleared by the interagency delegation.

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Tueller