Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUWAIT419
2007-03-24 13:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT,

Tags:  ASEC BEXP ECON ENRG EPET KCIP KU PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKU #0419/01 0831336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241336Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8574
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 1652
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2343
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000419 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, DS/ATA, S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC; LONDON FOR TSOU
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR IE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2015
TAGS: ASEC BEXP ECON ENRG EPET KCIP KU PTER
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT,
MARCH 13-22

REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 4581

B. KUWAIT 177

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L KUWAIT 000419

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, DS/ATA, S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC; LONDON FOR TSOU
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FOR IE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2015
TAGS: ASEC BEXP ECON ENRG EPET KCIP KU PTER
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ENERGY ASSESSMENT TEAM VISITS KUWAIT,
MARCH 13-22

REF: A. 06 KUWAIT 4581

B. KUWAIT 177

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) Summary: A multi-agency USG Critical Energy
Infrastructure Protection (CEIP) team visited Kuwait March
13-22 to assess security vulnerabilities in Kuwait's energy
infrastructure and make recommendations on improvements (see
para 8 for a complete list of the U.S. delegation). The team
found significant security vulnerabilities from both land and
sea approaches to the refineries. Essential controls at a
number of critical points in and around the three refinery
complexes were lacking, rendering key installations open to
terrorist attack. Throughout four days of meetings and site
visits, the team found the security orientation at the
refineries to be limited to safety concerns such as fire and
industrial accidents -- which have occurred in recent years
-- but with inadequate focus on threats from terrorists.
Kuwait's refineries and associated electrical power lines
need immediate and basic security upgrades. Over the
long-term, the GOK needs to create a mechanism -- the team
recommended a joint operations center staffed by
representatives of relevant security agencies at the national
and refinery level -- to ensure better coordination and
communication between security agencies. The Kuwaitis, who
were engaged and cooperative throughout the visit (the U.S.
delegation was able to see anything it requested and to
photograph extensively within the facilities),were sobered
by the recommendations and appeared eager (at the technical
level) to make both short and long-term enhancements to their
energy infrastructure, but orientating the Kuwaitis toward a
greater focus on terrorism and reduced stove-piping is a very

long-term project that will require commitment from the
highest levels of the GOK. We will follow up (before
receiving the delegation's final report in approximately one
month) with senior petroleum and security officials to make
sure that the delegation's call for immediate improvements is
heard beyond the working level and that the Kuwaitis are
clear about the delegation's recommendation to make security
changes now. The mid-April visit to Kuwait of U.S. Deputy
Energy Secretary Sell should also provide momentum. End
Summary.

Program
--------------


2. (C/NF) From March 13-22, an eleven-member team
representing four USG agencies -- State, Energy, Homeland
Security, and the Coast Guard -- conducted the most thorough
assessment to date by the USG of Kuwait's critical energy
infrastructure. The assessment built upon previous visits to
Kuwait by APHSCT Townsend in November (Ref A) and by CENTCOM
in January (Ref B).


3. (C/NF) The delegation undertook the following activities
during the visit:

-- Day 1: GOK energy sector officials briefed the CEIP team
on the structure of Kuwait's vital installations protection
scheme, including the responsibilities of various
organizations and ministries. Muhammad Al-Faresi, Advisor to
the Security Decision and Follow Up Committee (SDFC),which
reports directly to the Council of Ministers, led the
briefing. Also participating were Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation (KPC) Manager for Safety and Health Fadhel Al-Ali
and Oil Sector Services Company (OSSCO) Security Manager
Abdullah Al-Ajmi. (Note: KPC is the parent company of all
Kuwaiti oil sector companies, collectively known as the "K
Companies.") Al-Faresi's presentation highlighted
communication and mandate gaps between the various KPC
subsidiaries and the Ministry of Interior, which holds
responsibility for perimeter security at all oil
installations, and the fragmented nature of responsibility
for security in general. Al-Faresi discussed several
initiatives that the SDFC is pursuing, including a joint
operations center to bring together the KPC subsidiaries,
MOI, and the Kuwait Coast Guard. He stated that Kuwait's
facilities are most vulnerable from the seaside, and that the
most fundamental problem is an unclear chain of command, with
"too many bosses."

-- Day 2: The CEIP team delivered a series of presentations
covering basic security threats and how to prepare for them,
as well as a video presentation on physical security barriers

and blast mitigation techniques. The presentations were
attended by representatives from KPC, the Kuwait National
Petroleum Company (KNPC),Kuwait Oil Company (KOC),OSSCO,
the MOI, National Security Bureau (NSB),and the Coast Guard.
In the evening, SDFC officials gave the U.S. delegation an
unscheduled presentation highlighting the need for Kuwait to
make energy infrastructure protection a national priority.
The officials indicated that the highly compartmentalized
nature of the Kuwaiti government and poor communication both
between and within ministries made it essentially impossible
to implement a broad interagency approach to improving
critical infrastructure protection in Kuwait. In order to
overcome these obstacles, the officials proposed the
establishment of a Kuwait Homeland Security Institute that
would combine local private sector support and USG expertise
in homeland security to advise GOK decision makers, educate
Kuwaiti policy makers, and prepare the Kuwaiti civil
community to address homeland security issues in an informed
manner.

-- Day 3: The CEIP delegation, which split into land and sea
teams, toured energy infrastructure sites controlled by KNPC,
which runs Kuwait's three refineries and export terminals.
The land team toured the large Al-Ahmadi refinery, focusing
on perimeter barriers and entry controls at the gate and met
with fire and emergency personnel to review their ability to
respond to a terrorist incident. The maritime team toured
seaside installations such as the sea island loading
facility, the maritime perimeter of the secure area, and oil
piers and met with the harbormaster to discuss his equipment
and security procedures.

-- Day 4: The CEIP land team toured the Shuaiba and Abdallah
refineries. As at Al-Ahmadi, the focus was mainly on entry
gate and perimeter security, although the team did tour the
fire station and refinery health clinic. The sea team met
with Coast Guard officials toured the control center and
facilities at the Coast Guard headquarters.

-- Day 5: In a briefing attended by representatives from the
various K companies, MOI, NSB, and two consulting companies
hired by KOC and KNPC (The Armor Group and Global Villages,
respectively),the CEIP team delivered a recap of the visit
and provided a series of recommendations covering Kuwait's
immediate physical security needs and its long-term
structural needs in decision-making and chain of command.
The team provided discs to several of the agencies present
with specifications and diagrams on security upgrades they
could consider.

-- Day 6: The CEIP team de-briefed its findings to the DCM
and representatives from Econ, Pol, RSO, FCS, and NCIS at the
U.S. Embassy.

Findings and Recommendations
--------------


4. (C/NF) The team expects to finalize its report within a
month and send a set of detailed recommendations to the GOK.
Foremost among them will be recommendations to immediately
install fortified concrete vehicle barriers along the
exterior fence-line, anti-ram barriers at all access gates
and emergency perimeter gates, and provide hardened control
booths for MOI personnel. MOI personnel who inspect vehicles
entering the facilities need training in basic bomb
detection. On the maritime side, recommendations include
prioritizing which facilities are the most critical to oil
export and implementing enforceable security zones around
them, establishing a joint operations center with Port
Control and the Coast Guard with clear procedures for
reporting and responding to threats, and conducting pilot
boat authentication during outbound liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) transits.

Reaction from the Kuwaitis
--------------


5. (C/NF) The Kuwaitis assembled for the almost three-hour
de-brief and question and answer session on March 20 appeared
to find the presentation sobering. Graphic images of flimsy
gates protected only with padlocks separating refinery
installations from a major expressway -- from which a truck
or even a passenger vehicle could gather speed and plow
through the fence and enjoy unimpeded access into the
interior of the refinery -- were powerful. Photographs of

vehicle exit routes protected only by tire spikes were
similarly unnerving to the audience. The Kuwaitis absorbed
the recommendations in a non-defensive manner and asked
numerous questions about specifications of recommended
improvements that demonstrated a level of concern and
indicated that the urgency of the message penetrated. Some
attendees expressed concern about the costs of installing
more physical barriers around facility perimeters.


6. (C/NF) Of equal concern to the Kuwaitis was how to
overcome the lack of inter-agency cooperation and
coordination, particularly with the MOI and Coast Guard. As
one Kuwaiti participant put it, the fragmented nature of the
GOK's security apparatus, with responsibility divided among
numerous organizations, is "the biggest challenge Kuwait
faces." The CEIP team concurred, and suggested the
establishment of a joint committee composed of
representatives from all GOK and K company elements involved
in securing critical facilities. This committee would
clearly define each organization's roles and
responsibilities, and would establish basic security
standards to be employed across all critical facilities. In
addition, the CEIP team suggested the creation of a joint
operations center staffed by representatives of these same
agencies, which would be a central control center in the
event of an emergency or terrorist attack. Lastly, the team
suggested that all the K companies create dedicated security
offices supervised by a Deputy Managing Director-level
security officers, each with its own dedicated staff, budget,
and authority to make security-related decisions.

Next Steps
--------------


7. (C/NF) We believe it is essential for the GOK to act
immediately on the basic perimeter upgrades on both the land
and sea sides, which can be done relatively easily and
inexpensively. The delegation's full report, which we
anticipate receiving in approximately one month, should help
guide the GOK's planning. In the meantime, we will follow up
directly with senior petroleum officials, Ministry of Energy
and security agency officials to further debrief the visit
and to ensure that the most important recommendations reach
beyond the technical level. The delegation mentioned to the
Kuwaitis additional training in conducting assessments --
that would train the Kuwaitis to conduct their own
assessments -- available through Sandia Laboratories, which
the Kuwaitis expressed interest in. While there are
immediate steps that can be taken, the longer-term and
ultimately more challenging goal of creating an integrated,
multi-agency security apparatus that encompasses critical
energy sites will require considerable political commitment
from the highest levels of the GOK.

Participants from the U.S. Delegation
--------------


8. (SBU) The U.S. delegation included the following
individuals:


1. Richard P. Soler, DS/T/ATA - Team Leader

2. Bruce A Averill, CEIP Policy Coordinator, S/CT

3. Donald C. Grant, Captain, US Coast Guard, Chief, Port
Security Evaluation

4. Randy Rhodes, Port Security Specialist, US Coast Guard

5. Walter Lewis Edwards, Operations and Training

6. Kevin Maloy, DS/T/ATA

7. Patrick Willging, Office of Energy Delivery and
Reliability, DOE

8. Donald L. Moffett, DS/PSD/PSD - Anti-Ram/Blast Mitigation
Specialist

9. Gary Risden, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist

10. Patrick Whelan, DS/PSD/PCB - Physical Security Specialist

11. William Spencer, DHS


9. (U) This cable was cleared by CEIP Team Leader Rich Soler.

********************************************* *

For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/

********************************************* *
LeBaron